Brian Reca's Three Intellectual Errors

Writes: Brian Latifi

I read a comment by Blerim Reka on yesterday's Constitutional Court ruling. In just a few paragraphs containing his text, the deceptary law doctor makes three essential intellectual errors.
First error: The constitution is not a novel, Reka says. His thesis, clearly, has irreversive correspondence for literature. Demek, according to his logic, literary interpretation is a non-serious issue, while the interpretation of the constitution is precise science. This dietary thought says nothing about literature, but it says a lot about its author. An intellectual who speaks in such a way of literature only tells us that he has serious defects in his cultural makeup.

Second error: The constitutional court does not interpret what the author of the constitution has meant, but only what the text says in the constitution's letter, Reka says. As lawyer Reka would have known that since Monteskje and the Founding Fathers of the U.S. Constitution, the difference is made between the letter of law and the spirit of law. The Literal interpretation of the constitution text is not the whole interpretation of it. It becomes complete when it becomes the interpretation of the constitution's spirit, with which the term needs to be understood the purposes and political values for which the constitution is written. So, interpreting the constitution never creates a technical cigar. The Constitutional Court's decision to suspend the president's decree is clear to respect these two dimensions of constitutional interpretation. The Constitutional Court Law, at Article 27, says that this court imposes temporary suspension measures “on an issue that is the subject of procedure, whether these measures are necessary to avoid irreparable risks or damage, or whether taking these temporary measures is in public interest”. The danger of public interest cannot be determined solely with the constitution's letter. Her soul is also needed. The security of the people is the highest law of the state and the interpretation of the constitution obeys that principle.

The third error: Reka invites us to understand his argument, we need to read Hans Kelsen, whom Reka calls “the father of constitutionalism”. If a law student of the first year made that mistake, it would somehow reason, but when you make a doctor of jurisdiction, we really should feel sorry for him. Kelsen is a late lawyer, and anyone who has read any serious text in the field of law philosophy finds out that constitutionalism in Western judicial opinion begins with Plato and Aristotle. Plato in his “work Laws” wrote that the prosperity of human society can be experienced only then the laws are above all. He defined the constitutional order as a order in which the law is the master of power and power of his servant. After Plato, Aristotle, in the book “Politics”, decidently says that rule of law is more desirable than individual rule. In what Aristotle calls “political rights”, he considers “Politin” or constitutional order, as the most advanced form of these regimes. In modern times, there is John Locke, English philosopher, the one who laid the foundation of liberal constitutionalism, in his work “The second tectate on the civil government”, more than two centuries before Kelsen. Kelseni himself became a lawyer through political philosophy, whose fundamental problem, from Plato to John Rawls, is the problem of justice. Kelsen's dissertation work was a study of the political philosophy of Dante Aligier, the great poet of the Middle Ages, who theories on the secular state divided by religion. Kelsen's “The supreme law, Kanti says, is a universal norm, in the sense that it is decided by the reason not influenced by different interests. Carl Schmitt, Kelsen's theoretical rival, says somewhere that “when lawyers start thinking, they become philosophers”. Brian Reka should start thinking.