Inflation 2.0 or the Kurtian theory of electoral tip

However, it must be acknowledged that Kurt has an almost brutal sincerity to do things openly without scurvy or tact. Because this package is not just an economic measure but an ideological auto-densonation. It is a moment when politics removes the mask and publicly admits that you don't even believe in our own developmental narrativa. If after seven years of power rhetoric, “transformation”, economic patriotism, sovereignty, social revolution and all epic rhetoric for the right “ ”, the final solution for inflation remains 100 euros per person, then the problem is not only economic. The problem is philosophical.

Because a serious Western government, when faced with economic crisis, talks about productivity, investment, business climate, competition, structural reforms, fiscal relief, growth of domestic production, exports, energy, technology, industry and administrative modernisation. And here we have something much more primitive, “na cash dry, and the brain didn't dock”. In a way, this is the cleanest and direct form of electoral bribery mentality. Except instead of the secret envelope, we already have patriotic bank transfers.

This reminded me of an international presentation of his professorial tones from the philosophy that his government was inspired by Kant's norms and justice, by the Utilitarism (which he even slandered and attributed to Mill, although the real founder is Jeremy Bentham), and by the Aristotle's ethics of virtue. But it is understandable that philosophy is mentioned only as an intellectual decoration abroad to disguise a completely banal policy when governing Kosovo. You're talking about Kant, Mill and Aristotle, while in practice the only philosophy that seems to apply is: “how much does it cost?

After all the academic jargon and the names of philosophers are concealed the same eastern transaction shit. Thus, not Canaanite morality, but Kurtian pragmatism in the form of shopping mentality; not aristotelian virtue, but eastern provincial clientilism; not Utilism for most, but electoral calculations for themselves and the personal court of political courses.

The irony gets even bigger when you think this package is being introduced as policy “against inflation”. If inflation were some mythology that feared 100 euros. If prices on the market, energy bills, rents, oil or basic products suddenly say: “Excuse us very much, the government distributed a package, there's nothing we can do about it. We're pulling our tails off the saddle. ”

In fact, the very need for this package is evidence that inflation has not been resolved. On the contrary. It is an indirect recognition that citizens cannot afford normal life. So the government is acknowledging that purchasing power has been so hit, that it needs an emergency injection of cash to avoid social revolt and produce some emotional oxygen before the elections. But the biggest problem is not even 100 euros; because the end this ruling party has already mismanaged billions of euros without leaving any sign of the quality of public services and without building any infrastructure, cultural or sports works.

The problem is how the Chief Power sees the citizen. In normal democratic philosophy, the citizen is viewed as an individual with dignity, rights, and long - term aspirations. The state exists to create conditions for it to build its life with work, merit and perspective. In Balkan customer philosophy, the citizen is seen as short-term political consumer. A being that can be temporarily relaxed with subsidies, favors and symbolic payments. So it's not viewed as a citizen but it's reduced to clients; it's not offering development, it's simply “that we're” and it's not targeting functional economies but just emotional management of poverty.

In this sense, “Inflation 2.0” is almost political manifesto. A government that, instead of long-term reforms, chooses to distribute before the elections, is actually saying something very clear: “We haven't built mechanisms that create sustainable prosperity, so we're buying some public money. ”

And here comes the great cynicism of Balkan history. Because the money that is distributed is not private money for Kurt philosopher's attempted attempt. It's the citizens' money. So first the state takes from the economy through taxes, VAT, excises, customs (which have been added automatically from the increase of ccmations) from an unproductive economy dependent on remittances, and then returns to citizens a small part like “aided” and expects public thanks in the voting box on June 7th. . It's almost like a thief stealing your wallet and then, in front of the cameras, turning 20 euros from yours, saying: “Don't say I didn't help you. ”

Also important to analyze is the timeline; this measure does not come as an instant response to the crisis, nor as part of a structured reform within a multi-year economic strategy designed to increase aggregate demand, stimulate consumption, and stimulate economic growth. But just in the pre-election atmosphere. Of course. Because in the Balkans subsidies are accidentally raised before the elections, tenders are accidentally added before the elections, patriotism accidentally flares up before elections, and the citizen's care by chance wakes up weeks before the vote.

In a normal European state, the citizen asks: “What economy are you building?” In the primitive part of the Balkans the question is reduced to: “How much are you giving?”. And this is the greatest cultural tragedy of all this model, because it's not just financial corruption, it's moral and psychological corruption. It's the gradual education of society that politics does not exist to build institutions, but to distribute favors and tips. It does not exist to create opportunities, but to give charity periodically selectively in exchange for the vote. As a result, the citizen no longer acts as an accounting citizen but as a customer waiting for a turn for a payment.

That is why countries like Kosovo and Albania are stuck for decades in permanent transition. Because politics is not measured by industrial highways, serious universities, technological exports or administration reforms, but by seasonal survival packages.

Meanwhile, young people leave, and this is the most painful and cynical part of the whole scheme. As the state distributes 100 euros to produce several days of media enthusiasm, thousands of young people continue to think about how to leave the country. Because they understand on their backs that a serious economy is not measured by how much money the government distributes, but with how many possibilities for prosperity it creates without having to connect with the government. In normal countries, human ambition is not to need the state, while in the Balkans, politics makes sure that citizens cannot live without the state. That's because the ethnicity addiction produces control and naturally control produces power. Because the economically independent citizen is dangerous to populism. It is not easily purchased, easily feared, and not deceived by seasonal subsidies.

So pre-election social packages are so important to the autism system. They are not only economic issues or transactions but also a power ritual. It's the way policy recalls the hierarchical report: “You have it when we give you”. And here lies the final paradox. A party that came to power by promising national dignity, sovereignty and political emancipation is ending up using the most banal instrument of old Balkan culture; the distribution of the cass before the elections.

In the end, after all of Kant, Millie/ Bentham, Aristotle, economic patriotism and revolutionary rhetoric remains only the old Balkan philosophy and electronic tip. There's a power that doesn't know how to build well, that's why it's trying to buy patience; a state that doesn't produce perspective, that's why it distributes charity; and a prime minister speaking as German philosophers at international conferences, but rules as a provincial businessman in Europe's latest Oriental trade.