Kosovo alert: Turkey ignores Albanians, respect Serbia

This article was published on January 31, 2008, and Periscope was translated on the occasion of John Bolton's dismissal. His authors are Lawrence Eagleburger, Peter W. Rodman and John Bolton himself. The Bush administration has indicated it is ready to recognise the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Albanians in [...]
The Bush administration has indicated it is ready to recognise the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Albanians in Kosovo, which is Serbia's province, which from 1999 onward was under UN administration and NATO military control.
Such a declaration [of independence] may occur as early as February. US recognition would be done with Serbia's opposition, without a negotiated solution between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians, and without modification from UN Security Council Resolution 1244, reaffirming Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo by guaranteeing the province “substatic autonomy.” American recognition could follow that of several other European Union members, who have been under great diplomatic pressure from Washington, though some EU states and countries outside Europe have said they would not support such a move.
Attempting to impose an agreement on Serbia would pose a direct challenge to the Russian Federation, which opposes any agreement on Kosovo that would not be accepted by Belgrade.
We believe that an agreement imposed on the Kosovo issue and the offensive to dividing Serbia's sovereign territory without its reconciliation is not in the interests of the United States. The assumption of American politics that only the quiet time of nine years in Kosovo would suffice to slumber Serbia and Russia and cause them to abandon their positions in a century-old conflict has proved to be extremely naive.
We believe that American politics for Kosovo should be reexaminationd immediately, and we ask the Bush administration to make it clear that it will not recognise Kosovo's independence, which would discourage Kosovo Albanians from taking this step.
The current American policy stands in the unconvincing belief that Kosovo is “unic” and that it would not set precedents for other countries stemming from the conflicts. Of course, each conflict has its own unique characteristics. However, ethnic and religious minorities in other countries are already showing signs that they will follow Kosovo's example. This includes Albanian communities in neighbouring southern Serbia, Montenegro and especially Macedonia, as well as the Serb part in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Recognition of Kosovo's independence without Serbia's approval would set a huge precedent and with unpredictable consequences for many other regions of the world. The Kosovo model has already been cited by supporters of the separatist Basque movement and by Turks in Northern Cyprus. Neither does the Security Council, as no other international body has the power or authority to impose changes to the borders of any state.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of such a policy is the indifferent attitude manifested against Russia's objections. Whatever disagreement the US may have with Moscow on other issues, it has so much, however, it should not trigger an unnecessary crisis in US-Russia relations. There are urgent issues America must work on with Russia, including Iran's nuclear goals and North Korea nuclear capacities. This co-operation would be interrupted by the American move to neutralise Moscow's legitimate concerns regarding Kosovo.
If the US recognises Kosovo, Moscow's inactivity cannot be taken as guaranteed. In 1999 Russia was weak, and so did its objections.
Today, it would be unwise to ignore Russia's willingness and ability to help Serbia. In a matter of so little importance to the United States, is this a useful waste of significant political capital with Russia?
Our policy for Kosovo is no longer problematic even for our friends and allies in Europe. While some European countries, particularly members of the EU, may feel obliged to join in recognising Kosovo's independence, a number of these states would do that indiscriminately, only because of Washington's inflexibility and perseverance. Like the U.S., Europe would not benefit anything from the avoided confrontation with Russia.
Even if Kosovo declared itself an independent state, it would remain a dysfunctional state and an isolated area of the international community for an indefinite future. Corruption and organised crime are rampant. The economy, if we ignore international aid and criminal activities, is unstable. The rule of law, the integrity of courts, the protection of persons and assets, and other honours of citizenship are virtually incompatible. While these failures are often billed to Kosovo's undefinated status, the unilateral declaration of independence recognised by some states and denied by many others would hardly change that fact.
The result would be a newly frozen “conflict”, with the status of unresolved Kosovo. The risk of renewed violence would impede Kosovo's development. Furthermore, increased tensions require increased American presence in Kosovo, which we cannot afford because of other commitments.
Serbia has made major steps in democratic development and economic revitability since the collapse of Slobodan Milosevic's regime. Current policy in terms of Kosovo risks a widespread return of these giant steps. Forced to choose between international partnership with the West and protection of territorial sovereignty and the constitution, there is no question what Serbia will choose.
The current positive trend can be overcome by political radicalism and internal destabilisation. Serbia's reports with countries recognising Kosovo could be derailed. Serbia will inevitably draw closer to Russia as its sole protector.
We do not underestimate the difficulty and complexity of the Kosovo issue, nor do we suggest that the status quo last indefinitely. As with other sensitive issues, stable agreements must result from negotiations and compromise. Such a result has been undermined by the US promise to Kosovo Albanians that their demands will be realised if they remain steadfast, even though no agreement was reached with Belgrade. Such a promise cannot be justified by the goal, often heard by independence proponents, that the “patience” is ending, and that independence should be declared immediately. This is nothing more than calming down a threat to violence.
The re-evaluation of American politics for Kosovo is too late. We hope that the dangerous policy that can set dangerous international precedents can be avoided if that re-evaluation starts immediately. In the meantime, it is imperative that no hasty action be taken and that will turn this small problem into a major problem. /Periscope











