Kosovo and Albania, Serbia in the middle

1.

The recent division of Kosovo got the sense of the political situation, as a model solution to a frozen conflict, but with a secret potential to intimidate Kosovars and return to them the idea of losing without an alternative. Separation was also promoted as an idea, as well as a secret, of the people's subjection to the political gods, who, having been endowed with the power of separation - and also of decay - turns out to have the great potential of destruction. The people must remain bowed down. These ideas in politics are used to rule, not use to solve any problems.

The idea of partitioning Kosovo is a Serbian idea, not Albanian or international. It emerged in the 1880th century in Serbia, as the post-memormanment” idea, to find alternatives to the practical application of the Serbian Academy's anti-Albanian manifesto. The opinion was first made public by Vasa Cubriloviqi, who, after being decorated by Sinan Hasani, chairman of Yugoslavia's leadership, in an interview in the media came up with the idea of partitioning Kosovo between Serbia and Albania as the only solution to the Serbian and Albanian problem in the Balkans. But why did Serbia need the partition of Kosovo? Because, after the 1981 demonstrations, Serbian demographers of the Cvirici school did an estimate: with Kosovo within Serbia, as the world was propaganda, in the second half of the 20th century Serbia would have over 50% of the Albanian-born population. That was Serbia's grim prospect. So Chubrilovqi, through the division of Kosovo, asked for a clear split “ “with Albanians.

Later, during the 1990s, the idea of partitioning Kosovo represented and developed Dobrica Qosiqi. In Serbian opinion this idea was also promoted as a pragmatic solution to Kosovo's problem and Albanian-Serbian relations. All relevant politicians of Serbia at the end of the 20th and early 20th century, be they left or right, be they radical or moderate, from Milosevic and Stambolic, including Kostunica, Djindjic Square, to Dachiqi, Nikoliqi and Vuciqi, in the work of Serbia's national policies, the Kosovo issue and Albanian-Serbian relations are poor students of Cubliqi and Qosqi.

On the other hand, no matter how it sounds like speculation, the way ethnic cleansing was implemented in Kosovo, how destructions and property injuries were made, how it was decided and how French KFOR troops were brought to the Mitrovica area, including the behaviour of the KLA and the Albanian political factor in the months and early post-war years, it seems that the idea of partitioning Kosovo from an option of Serbia had also gone to international and political minds.

It is now known that the Serbian idea of partitioning Kosovo, according to the Qosik model, in Albanian opinion promoted Rexhep Qosja. He clearly coined this idea, with a “background of territories”, transforming it into a political agenda even the frightening ghost of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century: the so-called <x2). Although Qosja did not speak of Kosovo's simple division, but in exchange for territories, it was the worst service an intellectual and writer could make politics. Its name may also include the implications of Albania on this issue, because, being close to the left and serving as the undeclared Socialist adviser, the idea of the exhumation “captured in the air” and turned into the political agenda of Edi Rama. It is no secret that Rama, on stage and in the background, is helping Vuciqi promote in international circles the idea of partitioning Kosovo. I take it realistically, Edi Rama has no open account with Kosovo, nor can I use it for electoral effect, only that, by continuing a tradition of subdiversive engagement of a part of Albania's political factor at the expense of Kosovo, he makes such adobesities to be factored through the Chancellors of European states, while his country is torn apart by smuggling of drugs, crime and corruption. Meanwhile, Hashim Thaci, ex-center and plebè in politics, has no clear idea, but, shaken by reputation falling in and out of the country, appears ready to cause shocks of enormous size, with the goal of returning and recovering on the political scene. Both of them, such as Edi Rama as Hashim Thaci, at national work and the Kosovo issue, continue to be poor students of Rexhep Qruja.

Meanwhile, the idea of partitioning Kosovo, chewing and reprinted, confirmed and denied, put on the opinion in the most greedy way, is quite possible that on the real policy plain, the association of Serbian municipalities with executive competencies and related to territorial boundaries. Because Rama, Thaci and Vuciq are typical politicians “postmodernists”, small dictators of Erdogan's type, who have a common political creed: unprecedented manipulation of opinion.

It's paradoxical, ugly, inflammatory and politically destructive that, while Great Britain wraps up the discussion about Kosovo at the UN Security Council, considering its citizenship as a completed issue, in the Albanian world we have presidents and prime ministers, and another far-reaching chorus, which, through diplomatic Chancellors, reopen the Kosovo issue in the most unacceptable way. It is no longer the problem of what goals these Albanian policy exhibits have, but it simply needs to be asked what crazy countries these are, with parliaments, governments and academys (!) that mandate such people to talk about major issues in such an irresponsible way.

2.

But why is Albania involved in this political development, which exclusively should meet only Kosovo? And why, exactly in this situation, do voices appear in Albania that want to be held by Serbia, at least by letting them know for the same time both Serbs and Albanians (both Kosovars, of course) that Albania is the relevant factor that determines Albanian-Serb relations and that Kosovo is only a dark and insignificant episode of these relationships...?

Albania's politicians and analysts know tou've made numerous remarks to Edi Rama in the affairs of the state and other political affairs, but I haven't read anywhere to anyone told them not to fuck up the affairs of Kosovo, as has Albania's. On the other hand, no case can be found, that one from Kosovo has publicly said a single word about seawork, that is, the division of territorial waters between Albania and Greece. Why, Kosovars have not yet grown up for such subtle political jobs, or do they not have enough sensitivity to say their word on any important issue of Albania? They have sensitivity, however, even to Albania's surprise, they may even have knowledge, but with Kosovars it has been impressed that Albania does its own jobs. If Albania has decided to go to Greece and Mero Base, let's not mention the genocide and Greek massacres in the villages of Tepelena, what do I have to do with Athens and tell Greeks that we Kosovars have forgiven them or pardoned them for the bad deeds you did? Meanwhile, analysts from Tirana (some of them clear-minded, while other ones that Albania perceives as far as Kamuz and no palmways around), now that Serbia is in trouble with Kosovo because of integrations and because of bad relations with most neighbours, driven to Belgrade and, after throwing into political and <x0gent”, happy that they have managed to provoke Kosovo's opinion, return to Tirana as triumph of a wretched cause.

In fact, the same thing, in front of Albanians from Albania to Belgrade, has been slaughtered and continues to run away from Kosovars themselves -- everyone for nostalgic, everyone for being loyal to Serbia -- somebody else to verify the displaced patriotism of anyone to take advantage of European foundations, but everyone with clear political agenda: to help Serbia more than themselves. Opinion in Kosovo does not care why some Kosovo “bastard” drove from hour to hour in Belgrade, sometimes legally, while feeling very hurt, when the Albanians of Albania do the same. It seems that Kosovars do not give up on the old folly, that Kosovo's <x2-calamas” do not pay attention, while working with Albania is different. Although disappointments have been ongoing, often tragic, and with remote consequences, Kosovo does not give up this ugly inferiority and this historic vindication. It is a strange paradox that Kosovars have ever asked Albania to do for Kosovo what they themselves have not done for themselves. Meanwhile, Albanians of Albania, some of them, have consistently taken care of making hurtful statements for Kosovars, thus offset the lack of real potential for neither better nor worse for Kosovo.

3.

Parathesis: There is already a negative experience and historical memory among Kosovars, that in their relations with Albania often entered Serbia, and that, in such cases, it has always been won. Here are a series of events, still standing at <x0mbred” in Kosovo's reports with Albania: In 1921, an extremely conservative discussion on Kosovo takes place in the first Albanian parliament, but a year later Albania and Yugoslavia recognise each other. In 1923, the Albanian army enters the Yunik Neutral Zone and makes it peaceful, giving irreparable blow to the Kacak movement in Kosovo. In 1924 Noli also comes to power assisted by Hodge Kadria's Progressive Party, but after three days he orders the dissolution of the “Kosovo National Defense Committee”. With the help of Kosovar Chiefs Ahmet Zogu connects with Prusci and returns to power in December 1924, but then kills one after one of Kosovo's two biggest leaders, Bajram Currin and Hasan Pristina. Kosovar Communists, from Ali Kelmendi to the last, helped Albania's communists make the party and establish ties with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Commission, but as a ransom they received the Bujan Resolution, in which the guarantee of Kosovo joining Albania was Albania's Nationalist Army. Only this army fired no bullets to fulfill this guarantee. After World War II, Yugoslavia destroyed Kosovo's nationalist and anti-communist groups with the help of Albania, among other things, by receiving information through Greek spies, with whom Koci Xoxe was linked. Later, during the communist rule, some of the illegal groups in Kosovo were disconfirmed by Albanian officials and later sentenced to many years in prison, while after 1990 the Kosovars were used in an effort to defend hopeless communism, to take power by the Socialists in 1997, or to restore Berisha to power in 1998 and so on.

Right in this period, during the years of '%90s, the ugliest episode will constitute Albania's indecent and hurtful institutional and non-institute behaviour in behalf of Serbia and at the expense of Kosovo. When wars broke out in Croatia and Bosnia, hundreds of Kosovo Albanians and Macedonia are found in the port of Durres, along the streets of Tirana and other cities of Albania, without shelter and no care. Later, when Croatian offensive against rebel Krajina erupted and the turbulent Serb departure from that space occurred, some prominent names of Tirana's public life offered their homes to Serb refugees, although they knew very well that these same refugees were already used by the state of Serbia to recolon Kosovo. In this same period, when Serb violence in Kosovo had taken on the extent of genocide and had begun Serbia's international isolation -- almost the whole leadership of the Democratic Alliance, comprised of prominent intellectuals -- roamed Belgrade allegedly for Kurdish visits, as they met secretly with Milosevqi. In 1995-96, when pyramid schemes threatened with major overthrows, former President Berisha urged Demac against Rugova and had to use the Kosovo issue to save its power. And, perhaps, the most disappointing point of these reports was not Nano's face-to-face meeting with Miloschevich in Crete in 1997, on war alert in Kosovo, but the declaration of Albania's prime minister at a major international forum in Lisbon in 1998, that “Kosovo should have for the capital Belgrade”, at the time the true war had already begun in Kosovo. Parathesis closing.

4.

As usual, I want to make a cultural conclusion: In Albania, many authors have been published over the past 20 years from the literature of southern Slavs, from Serbian, Montenegrin, Bosnian and other literature. Some of these publications are in my library, which mostly mymes have forgiven publishers, such as Andric, Pavicin, Tomashevich, Selimovici, Nikolaydis, Hodzic, etc. Most mistranslating, even with the wrong titles, in some cases serving with Kosovo translations. No one reads these books in Albania because their translation and language is a horror (respect for any exception). Yes, why doesn't anyone in Albania say that these books are published for the effect of reading, not for literary or cultural effect, but for political effects? And why has it become so loud for Kosovo's literature, for its language, and its publication in Albania is considered nearly “the impossible display”? So how come these Serbian, Montenegrin, Montenegrin authors, etc. find it numerous in Tirana's libraries and fairs, while no Albanian publisher can find Azem Shkrelin, Anton Pask, Esad Meculin? It's not about literary values, neither about readers' demands, but it's just about rejecting Kosovo with its entire cultural state.

Why, then, all of this, exactly why?