Philosopher Putin, what are his main ideas for making Russia world superpower?

The first promise. From his view of its history and civilization, Russia is destined to be a major world power and, as a result, there is no choice: if Russia wants to continue to exist as a nation, as a country and state, it cannot do otherwise than advance an independent foreign policy, even though this policy does not satisfy other actors in the world scan.

The second promise. Russia does not aspire to control half, one third, one quarter or so of what other world portage, one way or another independent de iure, but subject to other secular protagonists (great powers). The experience of the Soviet Union, which has abused forces and tools often at the expense of its population to support worldwide «friend regimes, from a strategic point of view, has led Putin to a single conclusion: managing highly extended areas of influence and a very large number of people to expect immigration, from a strategic point of view, is more of a mess than an advantage.

The third promise. West cannot be trusted. Whatever the reasons, whether justified or not in Moscow's view, the West will always look to Russia in the best case a contestant and to the worst (and much more often), a rival or an enemy.

Fourth Promise. The entire record or experience a period of global and regional transformations, the final conditions of which are not very clear. The transformation process will continue minimally for the next 2 ʹ 3 decades (but perhaps even more). However, it is clear that the result of these transformations will not be the birth of a «brotherhood of all the peoples of the world» (what is the utopia) or of a hierarchy of semi-democratic states («totalitarian democracy» that Washington would like) run by a single centre (in fact from a single country), but only of a new combination of great power (more independent) and simply small and small (less) countries.

Consequently, Putin's strategic goals as president of Russia in the next six years will be the following:

1) To preserve and strengthen Russia as one of the major world powers (not at the level of the Soviet Union, since its system was inflated and irrational).

2) Maintain and strengthen Russia as a particular country and civilization and as strong as possible in today's world, independent as possible so that no one dares to touch its sovereign interests.

3) Maintain global peace and, if possible, peace in regions adjacent to Russian borders. To ensure the first one, Russia must maintain a strategic military balance with the United States; while to ensure the second must intervene, sometimes even with the use of weapons, in regional conflicts in its strategic interest territories, but never to start those conflicts.

4) To preserve and protect Russian civilisation (included in the political and ethnic sense), even in countries where, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, considerable numbers have been found (such as in Estonia and in some young independent states of Central Asia) or very large (as in Ukraine) residents of Russian ethnicity or civilisation (such as in daily, Russian - speaking terms).

5) It should be underlined that this last point, for a set of objective circumstances of subjectives, has enjoyed less attention over the past few years, including the first years of the Putin presidency. However, Russia's annexation of the Crime from Russia, which has so much frightened and shaken the West and that despite all objective promises, it has occurred precisely that at the top of the Kremlin was Vladimir Putin and not any other president, it shows that it has ended the bad tradition, which descended from Gorbaciov and Jelcin, of ignoring the vital interests of Russians against their will to live beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.

I will now describe, as I understand and see, the entire spectrum of components of the Russian global strategy under the direction of Vladimir Putin during his new presidential mandate. Sometimes I will also mention on this list the methods Putin will carry out this strategy.

Putin's Global Strategy General Tents

In general, here are Russia's strategic lines according to its president:

1) To maintain non-conflict reports of how possible, with the leading protagonists of the world's scan (great global and regional powers), provided the side and against it does not provoke conflict.

2) Maintain the current system (based on the agreements of Yalta and Potsdam) of international institutions with the United Nations at the top and the international law system, although many things in this system do not satisfy Russia on its own (for example, the predomination of American representatives and Western states under their control at the top and within the devices of these institutions).

3) To implement an alternative strategy and policy towards the American and Western global scientific strategy and the policy of «protecting democracy and human rights». It's a strategy and a policy of «non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states» and «protection for each member of the international right community to be organised politically and socially according to the traditions and norms of the country's civilisation».

4) Pushing to abandon bloc mentality and a follow-up approach, the practical outcome of which has been Washington's regular creation on the part of «coalizations» for «curbing or punishing» a specific location.

5) To promote and try to implement the principle of the necessary <x0) collective security», that is, of a system in which the security of a group of countries will not be realised at the expense of losing the security of another group of countries (are an example of the many proposals Moscow has made to the United States and their European vasals to give up the position of American defence systems close to Russian borders, and as an alternative, to create a common European military defence system).

6) Pass without trauma from a uniform world in which the United States is the hegemone power in a multipolar world.

7) Fighting together, of course, against common and global threats, such as international terrorism.

8) Finally, what Putin leads will be the idea that in the current international reports (as has always happened before, the interests and opinions of the one who is strong are of weight throughout world history. Even based solely on the example of Gorbachev and Jelcin, Putin is fully aware of the fact that the more you let the West go, the more he will claim new concessions.

For this reason strengthening as much of the Russian power and its international influence as possible will remain one of the priorities of the Kremlin's global strategy.

United States

The report with the United States applies to the following 3 rules:

1) Emancipation gradually and, if possible, nonconflict by American economic and particularly financial predomination.

2) Maintaining a strategic military balance with the United States.

3) Washington's opposition where Russia's interests or its constructive relations with other states are effectively affected.

At the same time, it reenters Putin's strategy to reject any other form of anti-American activity. Putin has no intention of deliberately undermining the positions of the United States in the current world. It is limited by waiting for these positions to be weakened accordingly (the following development of other force centres) and because of external policy errors committed by Washington. In this regard, this is the preferred method by Putin to fight against Western hegemony in general and American in particular. Putin stays on hold, since he knows and understands that sooner or later the West will make another mistake. And at this point it's only left to decide, because it has assessed the pros and the counters, whether to exploit this mistake or not. This is what happened to the Crimea, which is the most obvious example. In addition, Putin knows that in any economic, political or military union, initially compact or late, contrasts arise between both its individual members and its leader (in fact, master) and other members. And if this union is directed against Russia's interests, it's only enough to be expected to weaken or self-destruct.

Europe (European Union)

No doubt Putin has already renounced the faithful (if he ever had) in a utopia like «the common European Home» and therefore does not issue on promises and in futile projects related to the creation of a mutual European « <x3m>. Putin has never, not even before, tried to cross the European Union or NATO and certainly won't do it now. For example, because you see with his eyes how much unity exists and its appearance, also manifested in some common action ʹ specifically in the policy of sanctions against Russia ʹ is guaranteed only by Washington's military and economic control over the European « » and ) the increasingly clear thing from the compromising material assembled ad hoc. However, Putin will attempt to exploit any rift inside this «unity». There will always be no success, since Washington is too attentive to act in such a way that it is against the Russian front in the European Union and NATO that there are no differences of opinion and especially the action. But this system is already providing regular signals of malfunction, not only because both the European Union and NATO have long existed and have grown old and have become outdated, but although they have expanded greatly, going beyond their real borders.

I can't tell you that Putin thinks like I've been saying for no less than 15 years that the European Union will collapse and the same reasons for which the Soviet Union collapsed (I think that the date of this final collapse is not beyond 2025). But it seems obvious to me that Putin does not believe that the European Union and NATO will manage to reconcile their ranks. It is also clear that Putin will skillfully use this confusion and this shift for Russia's interests. In addition, Putin cannot help but see that a civilization crisis of the classic «» is increasingly manifest. And it will be based on the fact that sooner or later the less dependent European countries of the United States and/or smarter will be obliged to address Russia as the true guarantee of protection of European civilisation. Putin will attempt all his forces, despite opposition from the United States and some European Union countries more oriented in the Russian-based sense and, at the same time, Germanophobic, to maintain and improve reports with Germany. Clearly, he will not do it with Great Britain, which for almost five centuries has fought against Russia's influence in Europe. It will not do with France, which with the last presidents has lost all face in foreign policy. Only Germany, although in fact a country occupied by the United States, has remained the only major power beyond Russia's borders on the European continent.

China

In the optical transformation of China into the second world superpower (at least on an economic level), Putin's global strategy to this country will have the objective of giving up Beijing's push towards a conflict with the United States, not to deepen the already existing contrasts between an increasingly weak America and a growing China yesterday, making the greatest advantage of good reports with Beijing, to expect to see the outcome of competition between the two, at the moment only economic and financial.

Countries and Other Regions

How Putin will operate in a similar context has already demonstrated by forming an ad hoc coalition between Russia, Turkey and Iran in relation to the Syrian issue. What's in the eye? Before all, everything that on the basis of a regional-interest compliance has joined three very different countries among them that the West has thought well to hostilely. Involved é and is the most surprising fact a reliable NATO member as it has been for many decades, Turkey!

And it can be assured that in any other regional conflict, provoked by Americans or in which Washington wants to enter with the rampant selfishness and its unforgivable hypocrisy, it will always be possible to find 2- 3 or 4 large border nations whose national interests are actually damaged by the plans and actions of the United States and their vasal allies. It will be reached at such a point that will appear on its own and inevitably motives that will push to create similar ad hoc coalitions in anti-Western function. It would suffice to find someone firm and strong enough to establish an alliance of that kind.

Putin will not establish similar coalitions outside the perimeter of regions directly with Russia, such as in Central America, South America or South Africa. And the reason is that Putin doesn't intend to deliberately and study the positions of the United States in the rest of the world, nor much less hinder Washington's policy wherever there are countries or people dissatisfied or damaged by American politics. The extremely rationality and trust only in what can be provided are Putin's foreign policy initiatives. Moreover, such a position is criticized by some of its inner opponents, taught by Soviet greatness. Repeat: Putin notes that the world is tired of American hegemony and that, in one way or another, it will be free of how much. And neither Russia nor the Kremlin nor Putin personally are obliged to do the work for the whole world.

Passsoviet Space

Regarding Putin's political line in the post-Soviet space that is part of his global strategy, I would have much to write about and understand why: Russia's national interests are here. In this article, I will be restricted to identify the main points.

None of the post-Soviet space sites (former Allied republics that were part of the Soviet Union) has yet to make its final geopolitical choice. The motives are clear: most of these countries must set their foreign policy by almost zero. Nearly all (with the exception of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) continue to be tempted and act discreetly between Russia, the United States and China (the last especially important in Central Asian countries) and among these geopolitical giants of Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Putin is well aware of all of this, but maintaining maximum correctness toward the regimes established in these countries, the brand essentially authoritarian, prefers to wait more patiently to understand how things will work that, among other things, move in the same way as the stable balance of global forces. Putin has realized that sooner or later each of these countries will be called to make a choice and the lack of special pressure on Moscow's part in the face of some tactical losses that will one day yield its own fruits and will be more productive than constant pressure from the United States and other antirus-function actors interested in dividing Soviet heritage.

For me it is clear as the sunlight that such a strategic line of Putin to these countries will continue.

The Baltic States (Letonia, Estonia, Lithuania), as I have written, are an entirely different issue. They repeatedly intervene as voluptists aware that they do everything to exacerbate reports between Russia and the Bahsked States, Russia and the European Union, already deeply compromised. I consider it possible, if not necessary, that Moscow's policy on these countries now infected by the racism virus (to Russians living in their territories) and the neonazism (the fact that the democratic European Union continues more stubborn). But I think Putin doesn't want to postpone the next six years towards a solidification of positions, but that considers bringing these countries a fruit stemming from general reports between the United States and the European Union on the one hand and Russia on the other.

Finally, the issue of Russians located outside the borders of the Russian Federation, an issue related to the situation in Latvia and Estonia, except Moldova, but especially Ukraine. Putin's internal and foreign policy opponents are especially critical of the fact that he is showing great patience to the perpetrators in many post-Soviet areas, the systematic destruction of Russian culture, Russian language education, and Russian language itself. I also think Russia should act very firmly, diplomaticly, politically and economically.

At this moment the problem is imposed by greater force in Ukraine. So it is precisely here that greater changes in Putin's stance about the Russian «issue will have to be expected outside Russia's borders. It cannot go unnoticed that since reports between Russia and Ukraine have deteriorated in its public interventions, Putin has increasingly ascertained what prior to the coup in Ukraine (Jevromajdan, to say Alauropicce) he preferred not to remember, namely that the Russian people are actually Europe's largest divided nation. And that is exactly so, since no less than half the Ukrainian population is Russian. It's about 20 million people. The percentage rises up to 75%. 80% if we consider people who speak Russian as the first language. Like many Russians, not burdened by government positions, I have always said that if the German people had the opportunity (not without Russia's help) to be reunited in a single state, there is no less right among the Russian people. And sooner or later it will happen. I am sure that Vladimir Putin, with the quality of Russia's president, will not publicly present the issue either in similar clarity, nor will even less consider a geopolitical objective of the new presidential mandate. But to me it is clear that he perceives more and more the pressure of such a matter. For its part, this will somehow transform its policy towards Ukraine in the event that the current political regime will remain -- of importance to what leaders at the helm.

Better than Crime can't be done. But he'll meet up to do it.

It is not my intention to judge that within which the subject is viewed as a Ukrainian problem in Rome, Berlin, Brussels or Washington, but for Russia, it is definitely a strategic issue. Russia's investigation of crime is the result of Putin's foreign and domestic policy that can only be valued by Russians, and which is hard to find similar in Russian history. That's why I say, "It's better than the Crime." I mean, it's not hard to imagine what a president of Russia or Putin himself would have done better than this incredible victory, no matter how dangerous. I believe Putin will have to go further and decide in the first six months of the presidency the Novorossija problem (to put it simply), the current Russian and Russian-speaking Ukraine, of which Donbass is only a small part). It does not matter how many in Kiev Ukrainian nationalists or their NATO and European Union patrons reiterate that «there is no Novorossija»: there can be no exchange for wish for reality. It's been four years in a row that Putin, at the cost of damaging his reputation within Russia, does his best to keep Ukraine at the borders of 1991 (without self-declared crime, of course). Joint efforts by the nationalist Kiev regime, led by Porosenko, Turcinov and Avakov, and backed by the West, continue without stopping the way for Ukraine's eventual collapse.

In addition, the open antirus forces of the West are clearly aimed at an attempt by Kiev's armed pressure on the Donjeck and Luhansk republics or at triggering another scenario where Russia will be forced into a direct conflict on Ukrainian soil. These forces, slowly but without stopping, are reaching any results. In view of this unconventional tendency, excluding the Kremlin's political self - control, they are forced to consider that a civil war throughout the area and the eventual collapse of Ukraine (in which, if not enough, are included even some European Union countries bordering Ukraine) appear inevitable. In this case, beyond personal goals, Putin will be forced to take appropriate measures. There will be no other choice.

(Vitaliaj Tretzakov is journalist and president of the High School for Television at Moscow State University “Mikhail Lomonosov”)

Prepare: ARMIN TIRANA / World.al