World Liberal Order Dead

After nearly a thousand years of running, French philosopher and writer Volter (Voltaire) commented, the fallen Holy Roman Empire was no longer Roman or Emperor. Today, about two and a half centuries later, the problem, to define Volterin, is that the liberal world order in Zvenje is no longer liberal, no world, no order.

The United States, working closely with the United Kingdom and others, established liberal world order at the end of World War II. The objective was to ensure that the conditions brought about by two world wars in 30 years would never rise again.

To that end, democratic countries decided to establish an international system that was liberal in the sense that it should be based on rule of law and on respecting the sovereignty of countries and their territorial integrity. Human rights had to be protected. All of this had to be implemented throughout the planet; at the same time, attendance was open to all and voluntary. Institutions were built to promote peace (United Nations), economic development (World Bank) and trade and investments (the International Monetary Fund, and what later became the World Trade Organization).

All of this was supported more by the economic and military power of the United States, a network of alliances across Europe and Asia, and nuclear weapons, which helped prevent aggression. The liberal world order was thus supported not only by ideals embraced by democracies but also by strong power. None of this was overlooked in the Soviet Union, which was unbliable and had a completely different concept of what constitutes order in Europe and the world.

The world's liberal order resulted in healthier than ever at the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. But today, a quarter of a century later, the future is in doubt. In fact, all three components -- liberalisation, universality and law enforcement -- have been challenged as never before in the history of the last 70 years.

Liberalism is in retreat. Democracys are feeling the consequences of increasing populism. Political extreme parties have gained ground in Europe. Votes in the United Kingdom in support of EU departure noted the decline in elite influence. Even the US is experiencing unprecedented attacks by the country's own president on media, courts and law enforcement institutions.

The authoritarian systems, including China, Russia and Turkey, have become heavier. Countries such as Hungary and Poland seem indifferent to the fate of their youth democracies.

It is increasingly difficult to talk about the world as a whole. We're looking at the rise of regional lines either, the most obvious in the Middle East, of regional chaos, each with its own characteristics. Attempts to build world buildings are failing. Protenctionism is on the rise; the latest round of world trade talks never yielded results. And there are few rules governing cyberspace.

At the same time, the rivalry among the great powers is returning. Russia violated basic international relations rates when using the armed forces to change borders in Europe, and violated US sovereignty through efforts to influence the 2016 elections. North Korea has rejected a strong international consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons. The world has stood apart from humanitarian horrors in Syria and Yemen, doing very little in the WTO or elsewhere in response to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government.

Venezuela is a failed state. One out of every hundred people in the world today is either refugees or displaced inside their own country.

There are many reasons why this is all happening and why now. The increase in populism is partly in response to income in stagnation and job loss, mostly due to new technologies, but has been widely attributed to imports and migrants. Nationalism is an increasingly used tool by leaders to empower their authority, especially amid difficult economic and political conditions. And world institutions have failed to adapt to new balances of power and technology.

But the weakening of the liberal world order is caused, more than anything else, by the change of U.S. behavior. Vice President Donald Trump, the US, has decided not to join the Trans-Peacekeeping Partnership and withdraw from the Paris climate agreement. It has unilaterally placed tariffs on steel and aluminum, relying on an excuse (national security) that others can use in a process that can put the world at risk of commercial wars. It has raised questions about the country's commitment to NATO and other alliances. And she rarely talks about democracy or human rights. The slogan “America of pre” and the world liberal order seem incompatible.

My argument is that the U.S. should not simply be set aside for criticism. Even today's other powers, including the EU, Russia, China, India and Japan, may be criticized for what they are doing, or are not doing, or both. But the U.S. is not just like any other country. The US was the leading architect of the liberal world order and the main supporter of this order. The U.S. was also the main beneficiary.

America's decision to abandon the role it has played for more than seven decades is a turning point. The world's liberal order cannot survive on its own because others have neither the interest nor the means to maintain it. The result will be a less free, poorer and less peaceful world for both Americans and others.

Taken from Project Syndicate