Direct Effects of Demarket Vote

Not a single more important matter is that mistakes related to demarcation, whether they are procedural and methodological or substatic, material: when the plow first goes wrong, it can hardly return to the starting line without leaving at least a third of the field without plowing. This arrogance created on such a vital issue for a people, of course there is an explanation. It was found, that explanation cannot be easy, because such an abstract dimension, such as state territory and the border line, through rope measurements without a point of reference, turned into a very vivid and politically pragmatic concept, concrete to banality, giving it a dimension that objectively does not have. They found the angle, measured it all over Kosovo, yesterday and today, ironed out Kosovo's land and found the amount of surfaces, but not with the aim of determining Kosovo's borders, but to show that the titles they had taken in violation for the rest of their lives were true and that the taxes they had taken on Kosovars for their large salaries were able and deserved. The debate deteriorated, not by the defiling of the ignorance by them, which Edward Said calls “technical technique”, but by the international political environment in the Balkans and around the Balkans and Russia's role in the middle. In fact, this international environment explains much about the nature of organised crime in Kosovo and the rule of law.

If the volume of territory and the population is taken into account, then it is evident that Kosovo represents the country with the greatest impact on the Balkan political configuration and beyond. In fact, in European security architecture, Kosovo participates with a serious percentage, far greater than it can be thought of. This situation arises not as a result of the human activity of its residents or leadership, but as a consequence of Serbia's country and position in Europe -- following Montenegro's membership in NATO and following the elimination of the Albanian “foe, Nikola Gruevski, Serbia remains the only country where Russians can seriously anchor themselves serving as a safe door to Russian interests in the annual Euro-Atlantic security zone. While the Baltic and transkaucasian countries make up a certain area where Russians have a legitimacy declared since the early 1990s as the “the interest of nearby neighbourhood”, Russian penetration in the Balkans represents a serious sign of rivalry towards the West and its vital interests. This situation has defined and defined the nature of the state of Kosovo, at the same time that it determines our relations with Serbia and with local Serbs: Westerners in Kosovo, since NATO's entry here, have created the governing standard under which people with a serious criminal past should be tolerated in public life as long as they can serve in the cause of stability at any cost of Kosovo, because any instability potentially opens up space for Russian penetration in the country. This also means using these Kosovo stability guardians to carry out the dirty “ “, as is the establishment of the Special Court, where Kosovo's “stabilizers themselves are supposed to end, as is the appointment of Kosovo's borders with neighbours, such as the founding of the Serbian Association, this structure in Serbian territorial autonomy in Kosovo, and so on. To accomplish all these jobs, these stabilizers have had their hands free from Kosovo's international friends to build their Mafia networks within the state, in all its ports, as well as the media empires to convey their vision, which is summed up in three-four sentences of their limited mental operations: Kosovo's <x8th).

This toleration of “stabilizers” was allowed until the moment they confronted each other in terms of the vital interests of Kosovo's international friends, such as the case with demarcation, a point beyond which Kosovo's friends could not pass: organised crime and corruption did not constitute a serious security problem. This confrontation was diced because it affected the security interests of neighbouring countries across Montenegro and Kosovo, because it left the doors open for the Russians to destabilise other Balkan countries. This conspiracy created around the demarcation led to the preliminary governance being viewed as an atavism, moderate, and so forth: the essence was, and that's true, that past governance and all those not built by Kosovo's friends as its <x2-stabilizer” should be eliminated from the scene of the subsancial decision making about Kosovo and Kosovo until these “stabilizer<5> perform the dirty tasks associated with the cantonisation of Kosovo and the Special Court. These tasks, in the end, have been and are the main parameters explaining the formation of the current ruling coalition: Turtles All The Way Down says Storm Simpson in his country song. The launch of the Special Court and the years of delays in its functioning must be seen by this prism. Its final outcome may also be conditional on the same factors. Let's see.

Spain and Russia, two friends in fogtime

The proclamation of Catalonia's independence in Kosovo, by the naive, was met with enthusiasm and writing that drew parallels to Kosovo, as did Russia and its propaganda in the Balkans through Serbia's mouth. It takes little thought to understand that this Kosovo enthusiasm is wrong, as has been the adoption and support of Palestine and its pro-seal vote at international forums by the Rama Government, by the government of this late “Albanian”. While in the case of Palestine there may also be an explanation related to Israel's non-recognition of Kosovo, when the Catalonian issue is carried out, things stand terribly different. After all, with the passage of Israel's capital in Jerusalem, their argument that Kosovo's recognition would create a precedent for Palestine, no longer drink water, and no survey. Catalonia, yes, this Catalonia of the Red Revolution, now the driving force of Spain's economy and intellectual spirit, remains without parallel to Kosovo. This is witnessed by two factors.

The first factor concerns the cultural structure and political philosophy of the Catalonians before and after declaring independence: the whole world has seen in the leadership of that people a bright and responsible political mind, which does not take euphoric but generally co-ordinated steps with the continent where they live. This behavior is dedicated to the whole Catalonian culture and the country's rich intellectual tradition. In addition, in the Constitution of Spain, the country is called a nation and something that is essentially not of secular Spanish traditions but of surrounding countries. Above all, Catalan cultural tradition, far more than Spanish, resembles European values and principles.

The second factor that does not allow any parallels to be established with Kosovo concerns the European response to Catalonia's independence -- at each stage in this issue, Europe remained neutral, with open animations from Spain. Viewing it as a European issue, Europeans gave clear evidence to Spain that even the solution to this problem should be done by methods and European roads, not those roads and early mid - 20th and pre - 20th - century methods, but by means of hard work and sacrifice in Europe, as a result of integration processes on the continent.

As such, Spain and Russia remained silent, as friends that linked only one thing: the naiveness of Spanish politics, which, with emphasis, approached the Catalan issue, viewed it as a reference point for Spanish politics towards Kosovo. If Europe were both euphorics, the situation would have badly cleared. In Madrid, as in Pristina, it is thought white and black: Catalonia's partition speeds up Kosovo's recognition from Spain and vice versa. It's not like that. What carries much weight and has conveyed a clear message not only to Spain but also to Russian calculations has to do with the European response to the Catalonian issue: this response has given the Russians a clear message that Catalon is not a crime, as is not just Kosovo, respectively, that the problem of Catalonian self-rule, rated with the Constitution of Spain, was not born from the depression and with brutal military intervention from the metropolis, but was born as a normal flow of socio-political development and socio-economicism of the peninsula taken as a whole. This situation makes it very different, completely different, Kosovo's case with Catalonia and Russian policies of creating quotas, ethnically clearing their territories of unwanted peoples for Russians.

Europe does not allow the effect of long-term stability on the continent

Following that, the European answer has permanently shut Madrid down as far as Kosovo is concerned, because it has shown that Russian policies towards Kosovo and Catalonia have to do with Russian foreign policy interests, consisting of paralyzing and obstructing any process of Euro-Atlantic influence in areas they target, from Syria to the west of China, and beyond the east of Vladivostok.

Kosovo and Kosovars should be clear and exploiting this climate and this European response to Spain: it is most likely that getting rid of the demarcation agenda will open fast ways to start the process of recognising Kosovo from countries they have not yet recognised, where Spain is key to the keys. In their behavior towards Spain, Europeans and Americans have a strong attack on Madrid. Showing Madrid that Kosovo has other problems and that Kosovo's self-determination has been a civilisation project of the Old Continent precisely to prevent the Russian logic of resolving political problems exclusively with violence, Europe broke the nose of Putin's Russia: it took out every argument that draws parallel between barbarity and civilization: the first consistently applied to territories and peoples under Russian immigration influence, whereas the second, witnessed in practice with Catalan. While visa liberalisation and recognition from Spain can be of media effect in the event of removing demarcation from the agenda, the issue of Kosovo's full integration into Europe represents another story: that process requires decontamination of the state system and of parallel segments of Kosovo civil society that supports the provisional structures in state power, something that cannot be done with those who are part of the problem with the “the Kosovo re-stabilizer”. This makes clear to every angle that integration into Europe, in the first place in the Council of Europe that has sponsored the establishment of the Special Court, cannot happen to those who are potentially wanted by this court today. Those wanted today by this court, at the same time, pose the serious obstacle to creating alternative political space: the lack of political space in Kosovo is not the cause of impasse, but the consequence of the failure of those with the monopoly of Kosovo “stabilizer” to create a political space. This will be so until Kosovo is seen as a matter of strong security. And Kosovo will be seen as such an issue until the special court proves that this is not so, so to start its work and open the door to Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic integration. After all, not only political space, which is not being created as a consequence of this logic of seeing Kosovo as a matter of heavy security, but also demarcation itself has been created and is the result of this logic of security. We hope it will be removed from the agenda. If that happens, Europeans and Americans will have a lot of leverage on Spain to promote the dance of Kosovo's recognition, precisely to prove that Kosovo and Catalonia are two different things. Europe and Spain know that Kosovo's vision from this prism can change and radicalise political processes that do not go in harmony with either Spain or Europe's interests as a whole. It does not allow Europe and its effects from the Middle East to affect the long-term stability of the continent. European movements for the speed of Balkan integration should be seen in this. Otherwise, Russia will open new fronts on the Old Continent.