Jerusalem, Trump logic, and the Consequences

Fifty years have passed since the Six Days ' War, the June 1967 conflict, which, more than any other event, follows to define the unfinished road between Israel and Palestine. After the fighting ceased, Israel searched the West Coast, Gaza and Jerusalem, except for the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights.

After that time, the world saw this military outcome as temporary. Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council, the foundation of what became a diplomatic solution to the problem of Palestinians without citizenship, was adopted five months after the war ended. But as is often the case, what began as temporary was long followed.
This is the context in which President Donald Trump recently declared that the United States recognises Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Trump declared that the US was not taking a position on the final status of Jerusalem, including the <x0 specific borders of Israel's sovereignty”. He made it clear that the US would support a two-state solution if it agrees with both sides. And he chose not to start the US embassy immediately from Tel Aviv, even though he could have renamed simply what is today the US consulate in Jerusalem.

Attempt to change US policy while arguing few things have changed didn't convince many people.. Most Israelis enjoyed the new US stance, and many in the Arab and wider world were angry.

The reason Trump chose this moment to take this action is a conjucture issue. The president suggested he was simply recognizing reality and that his predecessors' political failures to do so have failed to bring about some kind of political benefit. That is true, although the reason diplomacy has failed over decades has nothing to do with US policy towards Jerusalem and has much to do with the divisions between Israelis and Palestinians and the distance between positions.

Others have attributed the statement to US domestic politics, a conclusion supported by the unilateral statement in the US statement to ask for anything from Israel in return (for example, restricting residence construction) or offering anything for Palestinians (the word comes, support of their claims on Jerusalem). Although the decision caused some violence, this is more like a lost possibility than a created crisis.
What made this declaration not only controversial but potentially counterproductive is that the Trump administration has spent a large part of its first year in drafting a plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This statement could weaken the very limited prospect of this plan.

What the Trump administration has in mind to give others and Saudi Arabia in particular, is a central role in peacekeeping. The basis for this perspective is that Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments are more concerned about Iran's perceived threat than anything related to Israel. As a result, they are supposed to be willing to put aside their old animosity toward Israel, a country that generally has a common opinion with them on Iran.
Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian issue can create a political context in the Arab world that can allow them to do exactly that. Hope in the Trump administration is that Saudis can use their financial resources to force Palestinians to agree to achieve peace with Israel on conditions Israel is willing to accept.

The problem is that the only plan the Israeli government will likely accept the Palestinians' bid contains much less than the Palestinians have historically sought. If so, Palestinian leaders can decide for themselves that it is better to say no than to sign a plan that will surely disappoint many of their people and leave them weak in front of Hamas and other radical groups.

Saudis themselves may hesitate to come up with a plan that many will consider to be a sale. The main priority of the new Saudi leadership under the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is to consolidate power, which the prince is doing so by linking himself to an attempt to fight corruption in the kingdom and by pursuing nationalist and anti-Iranian foreign policies.

But none of these tactics are going entirely according to plan. Anticorruption effort, though popular so far, risks being tarnished by selective persecution of violators (which suggests it is related more to power than to reform) and by Reports in the life - style of the crown prince himself. And anti-Iranian efforts are becoming inseparable with what is becoming an unpopular struggle in Yemen and diplomatic humiliation in Lebanon and Qatar. Meanwhile, ambitious plans for reforming the country are resulting in easier to conceive than to implement and will surely create dissatisfaction among conservative elements.

The problem for Trump and Jared Kouchner, his son-in-law who leads US politics in this area, is that Saudis will likely result much less diplomatic partners than the White House has hoped. If the new crown prince is concerned about the internal political position, he will hesitate to stand side by side with a president of America who is seen so close to Israel that he is not willing to meet even the Palestinians' minimum demands for state.

All this brings us back to Jerusalem. Trump has argued that recognising the city as the capital of Israel is an excessively delayed “step to advance the peace process and work towards the final agreement.” More and more, the Trump movement will have the exact opposite effect.

/Project Syndicate