How did Saddam Hussein predict America's failure in Iraq?

Early in 1917, during World War I, British General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude led an army of 60 thousand British and Indian soldiers from Basra to the Tigris and Euphrates River to Baghdad. His enemy was the Turkish army, about twenty-five thousand strong, protecting a province that [...]
Early in 1917, during World War I, British General Sir Frederick Stanley Maude led an army of 60 thousand British and Indian soldiers from Basra to the Tigris and Euphrates River to Baghdad.
His enemy was the Turkish army, about twenty-five thousand strong, protecting a province that was then part of the Ottoman Empire.
The Turkish “Army that had been ahead of us” said he had his superiors,” has ceased to exist as a fighting force because of its victims, prisoners, demoralisation and the loss of much of its” artillery.
Maude led his army to Baghdad on a spring ride on March 11th, issued a statement saying: “We come as rescuers, not invaders”. But the Iraqis thought otherwise.
In 1917 the Iraqi tribes began a rebellion that lasted until October 1920. The British responded with an increase of troops, then put the war on the hands of its air force, where it also sparked debate on whether toxic gas should be used in Iraqi villages.
Winston Churchill, who was then a colonial secretary, said: “so powerfully, I am in favour of using gas against uncivilized tribes. ”
The war failed (without the help of poisonous gas), but the British had learned lessons, turning the country's administration into the hands of Faisal I bin Hussein.
Faisal was followed by a host of relatives, but the country's true power was Nuri al-Said, a sophisticated killer. In 1958 a group of officers killed Faisala in the palace courtyard in Baghdad and then pursued Nuri (who would escape the capital by hiding in disguise) and then executed.
That was Iraq.
At the end of the summer of 2002, US General Tommy Franks was in the middle of drafting Iraq's firing plan, where Major General Raad al-Hamdani was invited by Saddam Hussein.
Hamdani, an Iraqi urban Sunni, was the commander of one of the divisions of the Republican elite of Saddam and among several military officers in whom the dictatorship trusted.
Hamdan had gained that trust, serving for more than twenty years in the Iraqi Army, fighting in six wars and becoming one of the regime's most loyal soldiers. He was a high strategist and intellectual of the Iraqi army. So Saddam enjoyed talking to him. Hadman was a student of military history and often told the dictator what he read.
In the summer of 2002, Hamdan focused on the World War II war on Ludendorf Bridge, which extended to the Rhine River in the city of Remagen. In March 1945, the bridge was the last remaining structure in Rhein, and the Allies intended to conquer it intact. If the Germans destroyed the bridge, the allies knew it could take weeks to breach Germany's borders. The Germans knew that, so they maintained access to the bridge, struggling hard to deny the positions of American troop units on the opposite side.
As the Americans approached the bridge, they had a taste of German artillery, lying in their positions that filled the western bank of Rin. In the worst case, Germans had calculated, that they would destroy the bridge at the last minute. The Americans would then be caught on the other side of the coast.
Hadman was telling this story to Saddam. And so, he said, the Americans came, and the Germans “started” hitting you with explosives. But it didn't, because they couldn't shoot Americans while they attacked the bridge. At that moment, Hamdan ended, Germany was sentenced. Saddam heard this story, then released his breath. So Hamdan explained what he meant.
Americans are coming to highways from the border of Kuwait to Nasiriyah, he said, and they will target bridges over the Euphrates River. Or come from the southwest. When they come”, he said,” we'll blow up bridges”.
Saddam was amazed. Americans won't make it, he said. Saddam was certain of this victory. “Don't worry”, he said,” will not have war”. “was wrong”.
Operation “Iraqi Freedom” began on March 19th 2003, with a bombing campaign aimed at Iraq's political leadership. The bombing that began at dawn was followed by an earthly invasion.
On the right, the Marine Exhibition Force aimed at the southern oil fields, with Armed British Division 1 securing the Faa Peninsula in the southeast part of Iraq in the back of the IMF.
The main purpose of the Americans was bridges over the Euphrates River, as Hamdan had predicted.
On April 2nd, Hamdan admitted that Saddam wanted to see him in Baghdad. Hamdan was upset, his men were fighting and needed him. But he was a good and loyal officer, and Saddam was his chief commander. On seeing him, Hamdan noticed that Saddam had changed a little in the past summer. But now he had his son, Qusay, who was head of the army and chief of Hamdan.
Saddam asked him to report, so Hamad gave him a summary of the fighting. Then he crossed into his battle plans. America's “are coming quickly from south”, he said, “with large units to the west. Hard fighters” His defensive decision was the al-Qaeda bridge over the Euphrates River.
“We must blow up that” bridge, he said.
Saddam listened, shook his head, and turned his head from his son to the army chief. The American “will make their major blow from Jordan and from Turkey's north”, Saddam said. “So they will plan to accommodate Baghdad”.
Hamdan looked at the army chief, but he made no sound. The American “is beside me”, Hamdani said, “we are fighting with them”.
Saddam shook his head. Don't shoot those bridges, Saddam said. We'll need those “bridges, he added. Then Saddam's son, Qsay, spoke also. “We have plans for Americans”, he said.
Three hours later, Hamdan returned to oversee his command, stretching from Nasiriyah 130 miles [130 km] south.
Later, during his first years in exile in Amman, Jordan, Hamdani would remember this conversation. He had never liked Queen, because he was thirsty for blood, just like his father.
<x0) But over the years, and as Hamdani thought about it, reflections would be recorded in history. He thought a lot about war. “There has been a good reason why Queen (God bless his soul, added Hamdan), stood in the face of defeat, and Saddam still seemed safe”.
“Now I think Saddam would certainly understand that Americans would have their own victory”, he said, speaking Arabic. He wasn't stupid. And as he predicted we would win and he was convinced that his men would make it. Americans would enter Baghdad and celebrate their victory. But was there a success? They would never make it. Eventually, they would do what others did, win, and fail”.
“And he was right”, Hamdani said. The American “won, but then failed”.












