Balkan Paralysis

The collapse of Yugoslavia 25 years ago, later made synonymous with “-Balkanisation” and nationalist conflicts, is a source of inspiration for the Catalan Indians. In the Balkans, however, the Catalan crisis sparks controversial interpretations and re-enhancing the appetites of disgruntled nationalists with post-Yugoslav territorial regulation. Since 1991, Jordi Pujol, president of the Catalan government from 1980 to 2003, had seen the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union begin a new era of nations. If Croatia, with its 4 and a half million inhabitants, and Estonia with 1 million and a half inhabitants could become independent, then why couldn't Catalonia, which had 7 million inhabitants? Pujol, who talked about “deployment” and not Catalonia secession, has had to abandon the political scene for fiscal invasion. But his thesis has been borrowed by current President Carles Puigdemont.

In the summer of 1991, Puigdemont went to Slovenia to attend the events: developments in the December 1990 referendum and the declaration of independence in June 1991, the Yugoslav Army's response, and finally, at the beginning of July, European mediation, which envisioned a three-month rhetoric on Slovenia and Croatia's independence. On October 8th, Slovenia reaffirmed and implemented its independence. Here's what's been the pattern of Catalan Indians. It could be added that the wealthy northern republics were increasingly hesitant and contributed to Yugoslavia's balance, robbed by President Slobodan Milosevic.

As in Catalonia, a fiscal revolt can take up indigenous tones. As in Catalonia, the new elites wanted to accompany binomial sovereignty an identity of radical relocation of political and economic power. The reference Slovenia allows for the underlying differences between today's Spain and then Yugoslavia to be highlighted. Slovenia is far from Belgrade, and there was no Serb minority. In contrast, the case of Croatia and Bosnia, or even Kosovo, was followed by a break in Serb communities and a decade of wars.

There is a money on which it would be useful to focus: in 1989 the removal of Kosovo's autonomy and the establishment of direct control on the part of Belgrade convinced Slovenian and Croatian leaders that the moment had come to leave Yugoslavia. At the Rambouillet Conference in 1999, Serbs rejected the proposal of a “racial economy” of Kosovo inside Serbia. It was the presumption of violence and the radicalisation of Kosovo's breakaway effects, which then led directly to independence. The Yugoslav case in masoning that the removal of autonomy implies that you do a great favour to the Indian cause.

Then what are the differences between today's Spain and yesterday's Yugoslavia? In the transition towards democracy of a multiethnic state it is essential for the first elections to be held throughout the country: hence, re-founded democracy can legitimise the territorial framework in which it is located. Consequently, after the fall of the Francoist dictatorship, it was necessary for the first elections to be held under the Spanish state, which in a second stage, with the 1978 constitution and subsequent amendments, has guaranteed considerable autonomy to regions such as Catalonia and Basque countries. In Yugoslavia, Milosevic, the last leader of the Serbian Communist Party, opposed the principle here. The first free elections were held at the level of individual republics.

Another fundamental difference is that power has been given to regions in Spain, while Yugoslavia was a federation of republics equipped with it “self-rule, including that of secession”. After 1989 this federalism was considered an inheritance of Communism and was renegotiated. A compromise solution could have been the transformation of the communist federation into a democratic confederation, but the rejection of Milosevic's Serbia favoured indifference in Slovenia and Croatia. Nothing similar exists in Spain's democratic asset, which may find a solution to the Catalan demand for sovereignty by negotiating an evolution towards some form of federalism. But in Catalan, as in the Balkans, more complex historical heritage is instrumentalized. Milosevic stressed that he was fighting against Ustashe fascists in Croatia, a country in which his president was a former Tito Army general. Today's Catalan nationalist right wants to be caught in the wake of left antifracism, for which “Homage Catalonia” George Orwell's left the reference text. Despite the efforts of Catalan hopefuls to link their cause with Catalonia's in 1937, over the past 40 years the region has ruled in the interior of a democratic and decentralised Spain. Rajoy is neither Franco nor Milosevic.

The Spanish crisis has had recessions in the Balkans. During this game of mirrors Slovenia and Croatia, two countries that are part of the European Union and have signed appeals for dialogue in Brussels, hesitate between sympathy and caution, taking positions in a sense contrary to their own stories. As Slovenian philosopher Slavoj dealt with, old-left “, which was in fact hesitant in the face of Slovenia's independence, signs petitions for Catalonia, while the nationalist right, which has been fighting for independence, today is in favour of unity”.

The announcement of Catalonia's independence has triggered conflicting reactions to various fragments of the post-Yugoslav mosaic. Serbia is involved in many fronts. The autonomous region of Vojvodina has seen Catalan flags and scriptures “Vojvodina = Catalonia”. Milorad Dodik, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, has claimed the moment has come to talk about a peaceful “division of Bosnia”. He too wants a referendum to serve as a pre-couple for an annexation of the Serb side from Serbia, but that the Belgrade government does nothing to encourage. Supporters of anemics from Croatia's Mostar region in Bosnia have marched with the short-lived Bosnian Croat reblica (1991 com 1994) beside those of Catalonia, calling the next “we will be in!”. But especially Belgrade has re-established the Kosovo issue.

Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic does not rule out the idea of a secession of northern Kosovo, where a large part of the Serb minority lives, while President Aleksandar Vucic condemns the hypocrisy of the European Union, which has recognised Kosovo but protects Spain's integrity. Paraleli is not very based: Kosovo's recognition came after a decade apartheid and a total re-definition of Yugoslavia. But the Catalan crisis will certainly not persuade hostile countries towards recognising Kosovo (among which Spain) change ideas.

Today's democratic Spain is not Yugoslavia, but it must be found that the rise of nationalism and secessionary wills strengthen each other and are a trans-European phenomenon. Václav Havel, president of the Czech Republic from 1993 to 2003, spoke of <x0 communicative>” and thought European integration would be the cure for it. On the contrary, Catalonia, Flandra, and Scotland demonstrate that in the midst of democratic and rich Europe today flourishes a native and linguistic nationalism defined by Europeist. The European Union is not only a solution but also part of the problem.

Beyond the analogy with the Balkans, there is one thing that anyone who has closely observed Yugoslavia's outbreak has learned and on which they would do well to reflect the Catalan crisis protagonists: at the moment of the independence referendum, no one thought that a war would break out a little later and that the euphoria of a newly introduced nation in history would be transformed into a descent into hell. The world.