Berisha's attempt to conceal the conflict with Rugova. How Demech and students in Pristina used against him

Sali Berisha was moving more and more away from US politics daily. The victory of even local elections on October 20th 1996 had completed its full power and at the same time its drama. He added political enemies to Albania and lost the most important ally in the world, the US.

The pressure to close the pyramid companies had begun. Government relations with the IMF had deteriorated. His Minister of Finance, Ridvan Bode and Bank Governor Christaq Lunik, made statements proving they were not as playful with Sali Berisha's determination not to touch pyramid firms.

In this tense situation, the first pyramid schemes were being broken. Entrusted that the only way to bring the US back to its side was Kosovo, Sali Berisha was invested in that battle.

Sali Berisha uses Ademi Demacin vs Rugova

Sali Berisha looked to Adem Demac, a leader who had ignored him until then. Demac, who had made gestures of involvement in politics by joining the Kosovo Parliamentary Party, was invited to Tirana at the end of November.

The press's attention to this situation was extreme. As a journalist of “The Voice of America”, I tried to interview Adem Demachin. The problem was that he couldn't find his place. Kosovo's representation in Tirana had no information. He only knew he was invited by Sali Berisha.

Berisha wanted assurances on the topic of talking to Demac. There was particular curiosity about whether the idea of the interview was mine or the editorial. Then he offered me a guard of his, to hook me up with Demach's guards. Finally, I was told to go to the former hotel “ (Miniri), a small hotel in the corner of “Skender Behave” That's where they told me someone would give me a phone to connect to Demach.

I stayed half an hour, but nobody was coming. I asked the receptionist if he had any messages for me. After asking about the name, he told me “po”. After a while, a tall guy from Mr. Demach's security came into the lobby and said he'd give me a phone, where I could call Mr. Demachy in half an hour.

It was an hour I was going to meet someone who was hiding in the middle of Tirana. The phone he gave me was a fixed number, not a mobile. He seemed familiar because he had some same numbers. As soon as the boy left, I rang and saw the reception girl pick up the phone.

Got it. Ademi Demach was at the hotel. The <x0);ilegal vice” had not yet managed. We started the interview in the hotel hall “Vyosa”.

During the two - thing interview, it was clear. The first to support the protests in Serbia and the second that the government in Tirana had made no mistake in supporting them and criticising Pristina for passiveity.

The interview was what Sali Berisha wanted. It required assembly of parliament in Kosovo, dynamising institutional resistance, supporting protests in Serbia. Diametrically opposed to Rugova's stances.

Two questions of his answers explained everything.

Recently, Tirana's official press, but official politics is also calling on Kosovo Albanians to support Serb opposition demonstrations. Do you join in?

Demach: I, as you know, have also sent a message in support of these demonstrations. The message has met in support and has made a big echo, both among the demonstrations and among the Serbian intelligence. I think these demonstrations should be supported, because Serbia's democratisation is a condition that would make Kosovo free at a smaller price and at a higher rate.

Are there any changes in Tirana's official policy to today's Kosovo policy record?

Demach: Tirana's policy has been consistently in favour of the Kosovo movement, in support of Kosovo independence, and this policy has had very small hallucinations. But, recently, Albanian politics -- namely, the Albanian state -- has crystallized completely. Mr. Tritan Shehu's recent statements and recent statements by President Berisha are very favourable and are just as it needs the support of the Albanian movement. ”

With Sali Berisha, she met on November 24th at noon. Berisha praised the fact that Demac had remained “sybol to our national resistance” -- an assessment that exceeded Ibrahim Rugova's weight in the history of peaceful resistance.

Berisha's official announcement says: “He confirmed his opinion on the education agreement to President Berisha that the school problem could be solved by Albanian students themselves”, which meant protest movements by students and students in Pristina if the agreement was not implemented. This was the motive for your protests in Pristina on October 1997. Berisha also underlined his support for the education agreement, “as proof of President Milošev's will to respect what has signed”.

Berisha, meanwhile, called for Kosovo to gather its Parliament, to function normally “Parliament and other institutions, which not only would not complicate, but instead would contribute to the stability and peaceful resolution of the Kosovo issue -- issues that constitute the most intermediate factor of the Balkan crisis”.

Support for the Serb opposition, the effort to establish Kosovo's still unconventional parliament and the formation of legal institutions in Kosovo, were also the thesees that sparked his silent battle with Rugova. It was actually all utopia. Ibrahim Rugova had failed to protect his deputies from being arrested without constitutionalising, let alone gathering them. Berisha knew that very well. He was simply telling Rugova, “do this or leave because others do it”.

The irony was that Rugova would come to Tirana the day after Demac. He was going after Albania to Norway, to continue in the US at a meeting with Warren Cristopher, then in return to France he would get a medal from the Sorbonne University in Paris. After a month, it would return to Tirana and then to Pristina.

Sali Berisha's drama was huge. Ibrahim Rugova, who had considered one arm of his until then, was now facing Secretary of State Warren Christopher three times a year, while Berisha had been away for months but Adem Demach.

Rugova's meeting with Sali Berisha took place on November 25th, a day after Demac. In Berisha's office statement, no one seems to touch hot themes. “Presidents Berisha and Rugova stressed that the start of the work of Parliament and other institutions in Kosovo constitute important stability factors that contribute to the peaceful resolution of the Kosovo issue”. 10,000

This has undoubtedly been Berisha's most difficult sentence to put into conversation. Ibrahim Rugova has been through without much emotion.

During his announcement ceremony “Doctor Honor” from the University of Sorbonne in Paris, speaking of the BBC in Albanian, Rugova explained why he did not get involved in supporting protests in Serbia, as Tirana requested.

As soon as he arrived in Tirana, Berisha was careful to meet Rugova again. He was already the only interlocutor of Albanians with the US, and Berisha needed to appear involved.

In announcing Berisha's office, the “presidents thanked the US and praised the meetings that Mr. Rugova developed with State Secretary Christopher, with congressmen and other senior US administration officials, and considered them as consolidation of US engagement and interest in resolving the Kosovo problem. Presidents Berisha and Rugova stress that Serbia's democratisation of democratic and peaceful ways is an important positive development not only for Serbia, but also a direct and real contribution to peace and stability in the region”.

The announcement of Berisha's press office was careful to present in each case the two presidents “, especially the point of protests in Serbia. But they had separate public attitudes. This was evident in an interview Ibrahim Rugova gave to the prestigious French newspaper “Le Figaro”

Rugova's last night in Tirana that late December was very tense. I didn't expect things to go that far.

As I went back to Willa 31, hoping that this time she would give an interview after her visit to the United States, I saw the situation seemed tense in the hall of the villa. His associate, Adnan Merovci, had left a guard officer who wouldn't let you go upstairs without announcing it. The Gazidede Union was sitting on a couch a little further, angry. I greeted them without knowing why he was there.

) Where are you going?

And then he shook his head toward the top floor, like to tell me “to Him?

Yeah. I told him. I left a half word for an interview...

Shake your head so disappointing. It seemed like he was ready to tell me “why it was in vain... ”.

Ibrahim Rugova was just in the room watching TV. He signaled me to sit down. I told him he was waiting under the Gazidede Union. Maybe it was for you.

I told Adnan I was busy. It's all work I have to do at other levels.

The inconvenience he was talking to seemed like I had to change the subject while he was pretending to be looking for the bottle of whiskey.

The whole scene inside his room and the tension that the one waiting in the lobby could even knock seemed to be strong.

Then the conversation would go on the road of no real importance.

I saw I was failing. There was no question of an interview.

Are you interviewing the “Voice of America”? I made him feel uncomfortable again.

No, no! What an interview! Good to see you. There, I found whiskey! We're having a drink...

And then the conversation completely changed. I couldn't get Berisha in either, Demacchi or Bukoshi, nor the Tirana dispute Pristina.

Berisha's attempt to conceal the conflict with Rugova. How he raised students in Pristina against him.
Sali Berisha had felt the danger. Seeing the spread he had received in the Kosovo press, the conflict between him and Rugova, the entire weekend conference two days before the New Year, cost Ibrahim Rugova. He did what he could to make it seem like nothing happened between them.

“will reconfirm here, ahead of you estimates of the undeniably, very important LDK contribution, as well as President Rugova's on the Kosovo issue”. He said at the beginning of the press conference.

Then he began saying terribly cautious sentences from what Berisha never used to say. It was like he was taking a test in front of someone.

“I have supported the policy pursued by Kosovo political forces, by President Rugova and I support them again. But the chosen ones, when seeking a vote from a oppressed people, must carefully count all the honors and the consequences of this vote. Constitution of Parliament is an extremely important development in Kosovo's political life, as opposed to the constitutionalisation of all other institutions”.

His word was clear. In a way, he was accusing Kosovo leaders of not gathering parliament and redoing the government, in fact putting their interests ahead of Kosovo's interests. The word “should well calculate all the honours and consequences of this” vote, was a clear attack.

In the quality of “American voice”, I looked for the microphone.

Some time ago, in this hall you have called on Kosovo Albanians to give up their maximum demands, while now encouraging them to realise their national goals. What's the difference? And second, it seems that Ademi Demac in Kosovo is consolidating a new political bloc in opposition with President Rugova. Do you support this, what is your opinion?

The first response was extremely confusing. Not a single sentence ended till the end of it... I made an optimum solution, but not everything that's right, it's possible. Expressing optimism solutions, I have never ruled out the best solution Albanians want for themselves, but it always has the condition of understanding with the other side. I don't know any case of two countries being divided peacefully without a common consensus. So, a democratic Kosovo and a democratic Serbia, I am convinced that they will make increasingly reasonable decisions, rather than an occupied Kosovo and a totalitarian Serbia. That was the essence of my statement. Regarding Adam Demach, I don't see any antagonism as you see journalists. I don't see any excess to ignore the general. Demach is fully defined for the peaceful movement, so his platform is the civilised, democratic platform, which is actually kept in terms of a peaceful resolution”.

The answer he gave me justified his support for a democratic Serbia, as according to him if the Serb opposition defeated Milošević, they could resolve the Kosovo issue on a democratic path -- quite the opposite of what Rugova found. Rugova considered the Serbian opposition equally aggressive and nationalist towards Kosovo. He presented the Serbian obsession for Kosovo as a national race against Albanians.

Berisha's sympathy was open in the Demaci part, and he placed it as a personality on Rugova's figure. Clearly, the breakup had taken place.

An ordered question read by a reporter from the newspaper “Albany” made Berisha's concern more clear. The reporter asked:

) From the way you reacted, Mr. President, to protests in Belgrade, it seems you hope to decide the solution of the people of Kosovo in Belgrade. Do you mind Albanian-Serbian relations, especially relations between Pristina and Belgrade?

They were questions scattered by Berisha's spokeswoman.

Berisha knew what he was going to say. He didn't take his eyes off the paper. “They protest against a regime that is undoubtedly the biggest -- the most anti-Albanian in all time -- against the one who, with tanks, took the rights of Albanians in Kosovo. Therefore, if Belgrade demonstrations are backed, we should not forget that Belgrade students have one or two rights to protest, while Albanians have many times the right to protest their denied rights and freedoms and violated by that regime. And it's not about two geographical units placed in one South Africa and the other in Norway, but it's about the same regime. Even if Albanians enjoyed all their freedoms and rights, I think that for the sake of values based on democratic society, we could not help greeting the democratic movement in Serbia”.

Berisha here advanced. In a way, he accused Rugova of seeking to win the Kosovo issue by sitting back and repeating the call to support protests in Belgrade, envisioning the student protest in Belgrade as protesting Kosovo's freedom.

Then Sokol Olldashi intervened, at the time journalist of the newspaper “Albania”, reminding him that political forces in Kosovo have negative response to this position of Berisha.

I have no knowledge of the negative reactions of political forces in Kosovo to the support I have given to student demonstrations and protests in Belgrade and confirms them today. I consider a very controversial support and know that, overall, political forces in Kosovo have expressed themselves positively to this movement.

Regarding the Pristina student petition... He is a petition that, as reported in the press, addresses President Rugova. I have full confidence that the President will treat him with the utmost seriousness, with special respect to the students... Students no doubt make up the highest quality grouping of Balkan societies. This end they proved to be liberals, missionaries of the liberation of the peoples, leaving them 148x0>.

But if you took a look at the student petition, it seemed to have been dictated by Berisha and written by Demach by hand. It was all that Berisha and Demaci were publicly articulating against Rugova.

The petition, with about 500 signatures, was handed over to the revision of “Buyku” for publication and the only one who made public comments about it, was Sali Berisha in Tirana. The petition had nine points to President Rugova.

1. We ask the President to insist on getting school objects.

2. We seek the constitutionalisation of the parliament of the Republic of Kosovo and strongly support the current thirty-one MPs, as well as the first three who sought it.

3. We ask President Rugova to urgently accept Adem Demaci deputy in Parliament.

4. In the event of further non-compliance of the Parliament, we seek from all MPs to resign publicly and seek forgiveness for the fraud they committed, knowingly or unconsciously.

5. Requesting a break in censorship in “Buyku”, QIK, VAT satellite program.

6. We ask political prisoners engaged in the LDK and other parties to wake up from sleep.

7. Requesting stabilisation of the reports, President Government.

8. We seek to reactivate the functioning of the Albanian Political Party Co-ordination Council in the spaces of the former Yugoslavia.

9. We seek to end the Casta policy, feudadalism in Kosovo respectively.

Berisha's attention and to those “rights in Kosovo” showed that he had taken Kosovo's use as a rescue springboard against the US embargo on it seriously. He needed another leader there who could sow conflict with the United States for Berisha to become a mediator himself.

But he had also taken the US as seriously, taking Rugova to his auspices and severing ties with Berisha.

The conflict with Rugova, the openly unfolding of Berisha's ambitions to move him and to control the situation in Kosovo to use it to rebuild broken US reports, cost him dearly. Several months later, he would leave power and with US support, while Rugova would continue to be their trusted man.

Sali Berisha closed in 1996, trying to use Kosovo to escape the crisis in international reports, following what had happened to elections and worsening reports with the US. But early in 1997, he underestimated everything. Events in Albania were perceived so quickly that Berisha's moves to delegate Rugova, to support Demac, or to get the European support line from the Serbian opposition, did not work anymore.

The speed with which Albania was slipping into the abyss is now turning into a problem for Kosovo. And it seems that this hurt Adam Demach more than helped him.

Ibrahim Rugova, whose greatest power was the failure to respond, shattered Berisha's bid with his silence. Within the LDK, especially at Rugova's immediate circle, a spirit of failure was created for official Tirana, and primarily Berisha. But Rugova never gave up. He simply ignored all the conflict that Berisha tried to create and continued his personal reports with the US.

He was in daily contact with American diplomats for any development in Kosovo, and especially the combination of this crisis with the battle of the Serbian opposition in Belgrade. Typically, the tension created after several killings in Kosovo and American suggestions for Rugova and Bukoshi.

(Mero Base: First Republic. Kosovo political history 1989 1999)