THE UNITED CENTURY THACH (February 1999)

Note:

Hashim Thaci's “Lekura “was published on February 27th 1999 in the week “Voice”, on the most critical day of the Rambouille's Conference, when the “ulmation” of international people to sign the peace agreement. The question was that the agreement was rejected by the Serbian side, while the Kosovo delegation had hesitations, liked the political platform that envisioned the creation of Kosovo's self-government bodies, but lacked tax guarantees -- the first -- the right of self-determination for Kosovo (released as an open process) and, second, the Kosovo delegation was required the sacrifice of KLA's dissolution, because the role of security guarantors to pass international force -- was later installed as KFOR.

I'm reprinting the script, with the idea that even today, for example. At the peace arrangement in Ukraine, the fight's apple is becoming “security reserves”. Today, we have the opportunity to reconsider the behavior of the great powers, especially of the United States, that as our ally, even 26 years ago, has not been able to guarantee our full sovereignty, but did not cut Hashum Thaci in trust with security competition, KFOR remains in office, indeed, is apparently impartial, but of importance has been the bias of US and European policies, supporting Kosovo, especially Hashim Thaci, for independence to be declared in the co-ordinated political process. Even in achieving complete sovereignty, friendships with your allies have had to be cultivated with care and respect. But what did our illusionist sovereigns do? Those with dilemmas in policymaking chose to have that myore of miscalculations for the huge miscalculated assessments of Rambiu, the Ahtisaari Plan and the declaration of independence as failures! And what my own sovereigns do now with the United States captured by a political cast that acts with the principles of brutal transactal trade, that the security guarantees for Ukraine conditioned with trillions of mineral assets, with what Kiev leaves incomplete sovereignty, because Russia must also be satisfied, as the power of nuclear weapons. >

Are Rambouillet a success or a failure of Albanians? A firm answer can hardly be given in this question. Each will provide the answer from his own box of recognition of positive aspects (which, however, are numerous, even historical, or negative.

Legalization KLA

But in these early moments, when we just received the delegation's principled agreement with the Agreement, I would focus first and foremost on the main character of this conference, which also came to the center of the contradiction. I mean Hashim Thaci, leader of KLA. Not only was it definitely legalized U. The CK as an armed formation of Kosovo, but also its leader, despite some vagueness over what remained, was elected head of the delegation, which marks the climax of its personal affirmation as a politician and as the new potential leader of the national movement of Kosovars. From diplomats' statements, it is known that Hashim Thaci left a powerful impression on them. Even all the work of the Albanian delegation is said to have been wonderful, which can also be related to the fact that Thaci was at the helm. Granted, this harmony had to contribute to other members of the delegation, especially those known as leaders. However, it happened that neither Rugova, up until yesterday the unassuming Kosovo leader, nor Qosja, with his ambition to appear as the father of the nation, rejected Thaci's leading role in Rambouille.

Why did this happen? Of course not only because they became convinced (this especially applies to Rugova) that the KLA has become the main governing force of movement that could control the political sector as well. They respected the force report, the fact that the KLA has become a motor factor and guarantor for resolving the Kosovo issue, but also had some more refined political projections. First, Rugova, but also Qosja and others who would claim the leader's role, who earlier knew that the Rambouillet Conference in no way promises the realisation of the Albanian maximum aspirations, and therefore sought to sign the sacrifice of autonomy to make KLA leader, who had little experience in politics. Rugova, likewise, with this concession for the first time demonstrating (demagogi or genuine conviction?) the sense of conscientious politician, placing national interest in the leader's personal interests. This will certainly have its own effect, especially if it was something for which he was consulted by his external swivels. If Rugova is ambitious in power even in the coming period, during and after the transitional phase, this current concession he made in Rambouillet, in relation to his supportive opinion in Kosovo, has not been a sign of his weakness (many said his political star is dying out), but the opposite, that he is already occupying the position of the politician of historical format. Rugova thus managed to establish the belief that not Thaci's ability and the co-operability of others brought the big turn of the unique representation of Albanians in Rambouje, but that this was achieved at his own credit, because it issued its rightful place, according to all criteria (was the only personality selected with the direct vote of Albanians) to a new leader, for the sake of the issue.

Pressure to Sign Agreement

But, back to the KLA leader's awkward position in Rambouille. In recent moments when the second ultimatum was passing, Thaci was the only person in the Albanian delegation who still opposed, despite all pressures from collaborators and representatives of world powers, to accept the agreement. A situation was created when the other 14 members of the delegation were convinced, while Thaci was reluctant to break. I believe that even Hashim Thaci was objectively convinced that the agreement is good, that it was offering the maximum possible in existing circumstances, with a set of guarantees (still not enough, but negotiated and reachable) for its implementation in behalf of citizens and as a historic step towards the final resolution of the Kosovo issue. But he faced a major problem that with accepting this agreement, he cut off the branch at which he was sitting. The agreement in question, indeed, called for the Albanian delegation, either in this or in that way, the undoing or conversion of the KLA! This was indeed a tremendous challenge. The KLA leaders were required to give up his creatures the Kosovo Liberation Army, but it is understood for the sake of the purpose for which that army was created.

It is known that earlier Medlin Albright, in the conversation he had with Thaci and the KLA delegation, had advised them that, since it was foreordained that Kosovo in the transitional phase should control NATO, he and his friends would form a political party that would fight, by political means, for the purposes for which they took arms in their hands and successfully resisted the Serb conqueror. And with this proposal The KLA was advised to turn into a partisan force -- that is, enter into competition with other political formations -- in order to reconfirm its position through the vote of the people. This offer overturned the revolutionary logic with which the KLA entered the war, under which the legitimacy of all things stems from the revolutionary act of representing the people's true interests. From this revolutionary position of legitimacy provided with blood, they also opposed any legitimate claims of parallel institutions of power that they had created The LDK and the other spectre parties of Rugova supporters.

Creating New Reality

Fate The KLA, therefore, has been one of the main topics of conversations in Rambouille. This even conditioned the so insistent insistence on guarantees of the agreement, both documents -- that of the three-year interim status -- and that of security measures and security measures -- be approved as a whole. Serbs did not differ much, except in some key elements, the political agreement, but demanded at any cost that it be separated from the security and guarantee agreement, which envisions the entry of about 30,000 NATO troops into Kosovo.

All the time in Rambouille was created a vicious circle on these issues: To sign the political agreement, Albanians demanded that the security agreement be signed simultaneously. Serbs, on the contrary, insisted that the political agreement be signed so that it can then be discussed on security issues. Meanwhile, the mediators, who also viewed the problem as a whole but also as something that could be accomplished in two steps, did not know how to overcome the problem, since neither Albanians nor Serbs saw the key points that would take the process further. Finally, the media found that political pressure (for them to sign the political agreement) can succeed in Albanians, so that the possibility of military pressure on Serbs can be opened, because those about the security arrangement would not agree without more serious pressures than would be attacked and forced to accept the plan as a whole. Diplomats, therefore, advised Albanians to sign the political part, because only this and not their stubbornness opened the door for activating NATO and Belgrade's obligation to comply with the Contact Group's request.

In general, the negotiation process has been serious. I congratulate Hashim Thaci for his courage. It is important that the agreement be reached as soon as possible. Although it does not satisfy Albania's maximum aspirations, it marks the beginning of a historic turn. The main point is that Serbian police will leave Kosovo. The international community is creating a completely new environment from Bosnia to Macedonia for achieving regional security. We have to participate in this process, so that even in Kosovo, but also as a nation as a whole, we can gain a time for consolidation of institutions and reactivating potentials.

Voice, February 27, 1999