Is Kosovo locked in a crisis without an alternative?

Kosovo is a place that seems to be stuck in its democratic childhood. When the stagnation is transformed into a state and the inability to act threatens everything, not a committed youth can do much. Now it's about everything or nothing.

Perhaps it is not the worst thing that Kosovo, at the end of 2025, again faces a crisis. Maybe worse is the fact that it doesn't surprise anyone anymore. They hear of another failed attempt at forming government in parliament and people just raise their shoulders. They hear about another diplomatic clash with important allies and they think, of course. You hear about another scandal that's not even finished telling and you're speechless, not because there's nothing to say, but tired.

Deception in a democracy leads, not to revolt or revolt, but to drying. When people are just tired, they no longer expect anything from politics. And when they don't expect anything anymore, they sink into resygnation, into a fatal <x0-realism”: they're no longer surprised at anything. Thus the stagnation becomes a state form. Place of sleep.

To remember: Kosovo is a new state in an old geographical space. The Republic has been independent since 2008. But a normality such as in consolidated democracies mostly relatively stable, reliable institutions, a cautious tone of political debate, there is no such thing. This is not related to the <x0mentality” of people, but is the result of history and geography; the result of the experience of war and a fragile economy; and the product of external influences, such as the still open issue of recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by all 27 EU states; and, above all, the unresolved relationship with Serbia. Internal and Foreign Policy in Kosovo is not in separate drawers they are held in the same space.

There will be elections again on December 28, 2025. Nobody wants an election campaign at the end of the year. But since the February 9th 2025 elections, the alleged winner has failed to secure parliamentary majority. The country has been headed by a government in office for months. Politics has not been able to make a decision in either direction. For foreign observers, this may look like domestic political theatre. For a small country like Kosovo, which must answer the big question of security and EU membership, this means a existential crisis. Without majority there is no government, no budget, no long-term planning, no delayed reforms. There's only press statements.

In the February elections, there was a winner, but not a triumph. Vetevendosje remained the greatest force, despite significant losses. But that did not suffice for forming the government, because 61 out of 120 votes are needed in parliament. The figure 61 is not technical detail, but the strong line between the ability to act and paralysis. Anyone with less than 61 seats can talk a lot, but can't govern.

The difficulties in forming governments are not even unknown in other countries. Germany too has experienced lengthy coalition negotiations and brittle majority. But the difference is in the consequences. In Berlin a first failure to elect the Chancellor costs political nerves. In Pristina, continued inability to form governments costs political capital to the international community and precious time for economic development. A republic since its birth struggles for investment, jobs and international credibility cannot afford the luxury of entire months of stagnation.

Months after the elections showed how fast politics in Kosovo can turn into ritual. Votes that fail, candidates that are constantly submitted, negotiations without results. In a country facing continued migration, poor economy and fragile security situation, each month without decision means contraction of the future. It's not spectacular. It's banal. And that makes it so dangerous. No barricades or burnt cars remain. There are blocked projects. Infrastructure is not modernised. Reforms don't start. The tenders are not treated. The state only manages itself.

Kosovo has a social energy that is rarely found in Europe -- a new population, large diaspora and financially strong, vital civil society. But this energy has to be channeled. If politics does not do so, it finds other ways: migration, cynicism, radicalisation. A country may live in temporary crises, but not with a reality where only crises exist.

The president, after months of political blockade, announced new elections. She justified this and financially: budget, international agreements, investment loans and public projects everything was frozen. A policy that is only about itself sooner or later receives the bill. And this bill is not paid by parties, but by citizens: expensive energy, poor services, lack of jobs.

Albin Kurti did not by chance become the central figure of this phase of paralysis. It embodys its style, language, and method. He believes he gains political weight by constantly hitting on “moral cendo”. He sees himself on the side of the clean and the people, in front of the old and corrupt elites.

But democracy is not the doctrine of purity. It is organised imperfection: compromise, balance, humility towards institutions. Who replaces the negotiations with “cleansing”, does not produce force, but blockades. As an opposition, this strategy could mobilise measures. As the failed prime minister, it returns to a toxic routine that needs new enemies to defend themselves whether the media, civil society or institutions themselves.

Isolation and Loss of Faith

Kosovo lives historically, politically and economically by alliances. The US, the EU, KFOR and Western institutions are not foreign “structures, but part of internal security architecture. He who ignores it pays the price in faith and money.

Partners in Washington and Brussels have already reacted. Strategic dialogue with the United States has been suspended. The EU holds punitive measures against the government Kurti and conditions funds with incomplete reforms. Kosovo risks isolation and financial loss.

Choices of Normal

On December 28th, voters will not simply decide who governs. They will decide whether Kosovo becomes government again. If politics goes back to work and not to permanent self-species.

Kosovo needs minimal political maturity:

Coalitions are not shame, but the essence of democracy.

Institutions are not tools of power, but our common home.

Western allies are not spectators, but part of our security.

If the electors choose responsibility rather than noise, something new may begin. Not great salvation, but something far more precious - normal.