Prime Minister Albin Kurti's Material Constitution

Three are the direction of manipulation of basic legal facts on autonomy in Europe, including that of Aboriginal peoples, which are made for a single purpose of creating various legal facts to be used later in the process of producing dough for Kosovo's new material constitution as a practical expression of New contract of Prime Minister Albin Kurti with local Serbs, he did in Brussels and Ohrid, respectively. The first one has to do with a style statement. deux ex carina as Special lex 2013 Law on ratification of agreement with Serbia, redefining its report with Serbian Autonomia station East and forth, Kosovo's rematerial constitution. The second is related to extensive abuse by policymakers who circulate among us for Serbian autonomy South Tyrol (Italy) and islands Oland(Finland), all of this with the aim of establishing an original Kosovo entity, with legal-public character from Kosovo state rights, with clear state jurisdiction and competence. Finally, under three, arbitrary abuse, with the example of the citizens' rights according to Scandinavian standards, with the aim of taking in without any law and against the Kosovo Constitution. State property (public) in our country, in the function of creating an original state agency at the complete bypass of the Kosovo Assembly.

Three directions have a single goal of forming a closed special judicial regime (“slef-contained regime”), which, for this purpose, has a defence mechanism in proportion to the interventions from outside of central power in Pristina. The mechanism for conflict resolution has arbitration physicalization, in which central power only formally appears as its member, at a time that cannot have any effective impact on the formation and management of the special regime that is created by the new norms of conditionsutWS materials tW Prime Minister Kurti. It is hard to find a valid legal argument to justify such a powerful presence of such a defence mechanism in the constitutional order of a country that claims to be sovereign and independent! In transit terms for the former European communist countries, such as the little “constitution in Poland”, “transitional constitutions in Hungary”, in countries of Latin America, South Africa and so on have existed such mechanisms that have served as arbitration in the agreement between the forces of national social leaders, but precisely that they have been, therefore transitional and with internal disputes, have symbolized sovereignty of independence. In them, said February, no foreign entity protection mechanisms have existed for local constitutional order, as is the case with the Serb Community in Kosovo, legal form and Political-territorial autonomy with substance building

About certain procedural issues

Mrs. Atifete Jahjaga in 2015 was made according to a no longer existing Court jurisdiction: After this case, the practice of accepting requests that are not subject to a concrete constitutional conflict, being formulated hypothetically and abstractly in relation to future events. This implies that, first, it should be explained whether this standard is still valid and for some reason. The first, to be the authorised party, the government must make formal decisions within its constitutional competencies, so not the prime minister but the Government. Second, the Serbian Autonomist final called Community of municipalitiesShit.i (or like that, because there's no nature of a ASociationi iW Majorties Serbian) could never be the subject of constitutional control under Article 113 of the Kosovo Constitution: such can only be the statutes of existing municipalities. Finally, constitutional control can only be the law ratifying an international agreement, but not its anaxially text of an international agreement. In short, regarding the last two cases, the Constitutional Court, according to Article 113 of the Constitution, simply has no jurisdiction for constitutional control of Stoutit tW AuthenticationW SerbianWho is not conceived as law. Granted, in practice, it is more than that a new Kosovo material constitution. Such is true in the Constitutional Court report, because in a way it assigns it additional competence, instead of doing so Pavar ConstitutionWsisW. With assignment through the Serbian Autonomis station of additional competencies for the Constitutional Court, it is taught to strengthen endlessly Special Law Regime i Ow!tonomiSW Serbian nW KosovoWFighting ConditionWn PvarWsisW with its text to exhaustion.

The dilemmas are only resolved if the Court explains the status of its trial in November 2015 from the beginning. This, however, will not happen: under no circumstances will it enter The Act of 2015 as the basis for interpretation of draft-Stoutit tW AuthenticationW Serbian. That act belongs to history and brings trouble if it enters the preamble of the text of the final statue of Serbian autonomy. There is another chance, if the Constitutional Court really wants to address Kosovars' concerns, and it can only be realised if documents in the doctrine of constitutional trial are used as parameters to control constitutionality. work Preparation (<x0) These include all letters and documents on production performance ConstitutionWsW New material Kosovo, which is available to the prime minister KurtiGod. Mirolsav Lajack And those who were involved in this. There's no secret here, there can be no secret! Consequently, the first job the Court has to do is to ask the Government and the parties for documents as follows, as the only ones showing the history of forming the Serbian Autonomis norms structure in Kosovo. It is said in public, by government and EU officials, and it forces them legally to surrender Work Preparation ) that Kosovo's new material constitution has three norm structures for its resources: autonomy in Italy and Finland; peoples' rights Sami in Scandinavia (the slaughter of Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama); and, finally, the Belgrade draft. Otherwise, the court risks becoming part of the policymaking and ratings designed in the draft-Stitutin as the subject of constitutional control. This is no professional honest thing, but neither in terms of constitutional patriotism, which she and all of us should defend together. In addition, we repeat here, it should clarify whether it holds the v's Act in force. 2015, which in no paragraph matches draft-Stitut, the constitutional control object. In the operational part, this act, as it is known, has ordered the formation of the Association/Unition of Serb majority municipalities, not speaking in any country about the concept of substatic autonomy (civile and religious), local Serbs. Exactly. for The fact that does not speak for kWiW, Act of 2015 W%s: %sW Eliminate as baseW yWComment. It's not true at all, we strongly stress, Plan Ahtisaari speaks of the right of local Serbs to build legal entities from public or religious law on Kosovo territory: that document has never been and can never be a legal basis Agreement SW Brussels i n Anexi tW Ohrid. Those who were in Vienna talksWS and who today advise Mr. Kurti, in their own books and writings have shown that the tendency to create Serbian autonomy, which is now becoming a reality, has existed ever since but has been strongly rejected by local and international factors. One such book is published in Albanian by “COHA” For these reasons, repeated, there is no possibility thatThe 2015 Act to be the source for interpretation of the Constitutional Court, which, at the same time, is added additional competencies to the Serbian Constitutional Court, beyond any judicial logic. This increase in competencies is designed to wear out even more text ConditionWsW PavarWsisWNot to empower him. If this were the last one, then it would be worth it. The 2015 Act as the basis for reference, no Resolution 1244 e KWtnoonWSecurityW UN. The 2015 act eventually belongs to history and is of no value except to those who study Kosovo's constitutional history.

SEpisode as Special Reading of the LawW 2013

In the Independence Constitution, the law with which an international agreement is ratified has no norm power. With ratification it implies the introduction of an international pledge that forms an agreement (or other similar document) in domestic law. The problem is then to determine the power and place that the agreement or document has in the domestic constitutional system after it enters this system. This is the constitutional standard of the vast majority of countries with the continental system of law - virtually all of Europe. Kosovo and a large part of the countries equate the acts ratified with the country's law. At times, they are even equal to the National Constitution (suppose, Holland). This means that any law contrary to the law on ratification does not have judicial powers, but provided the ratified act has clear provisions that can be implemented without the extraction of additional acts. This effect is achieved through the rule that the later law deregulates the original law - not according to the effect of special law. Bad news for those who are saying that the 2013 Law constitutes a special law, meaning to absorption any other law that is of general nature and that conflicts with it, are unaware that in the Constitution of Kosovo there is a clear provision in Article 19.1 that says “... International agreements ratified by the Republic of Kosovo become part of the internal judicial system after it is published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Kosovo. They are directly implemented, except when they are not self-compliable, and their implementation requires a law.” We note that this article is found in the vast majority of the constitutions of former socialist countries and other countries in Europe, so the article showing that when a ratified agreement has self-metable standards, it applies directly.

Autonomis statueW Serbian nW KosovoW , how ConstitutionW new This materialiIt is not a formal law, but an act of sublaw with the name of a statute that can be derived only from law. - What?is Codenames jurisdiction and competence by state rights As is the case in Kosovo, the judicial act in the statute can never stem from an international agreement. There is no doubt that what is being created constitutes a serious constitutional violation: an entity being formed by state law (public), not by constitution and by law, but by statute as an act of lower judicial power than the second. The 2013 law can never be a special law, and for several reasons, based on Article 19.1 of the Constitution of Kosovo. First of all, never does the law on ratification have the norm powers known to whom and how it applies in practice because it usually has two or three articles that speak for the title of law, the appointment of a document that is ratified, the date and time of publication in the official newspaper, and its entry into force. That's it. This is the standard applied in continental Europe. This has been clarified by the Constitutional Court in 2013 with its decision to reject constitutional control of the 2013 Agreement for lack of jurisdiction by Article 113 of the Constitution. There are similar decisions of European constitutional courts. Since modern - day power is often mentioned CroatiaW, better demand an extremely professional decision on the issue, which Croatian colleagues have made following the decision as early as 2013 of the Constitutional Court of Kosovo. Second, the 2013 Law cannot be a special law because it ratifys an international agreement that has nothing but the formation of Associationt/TogetherWsisW SW More municipalitiesicW Serbian, but a series of other issues and, in addition, do not contain self-disputed provisions in terms of Article 19.1 of the Kosovo Constitution. How can it be treated as a special law, a law of three articles, without any normistic power, ratifying an international agreement that for object is not just forming Association/BashkWsisW SW Multiethnic municipalitiesWSerbianAnd four more themes? What kind of lawyers are these? Self-sufficient there are only provisions dealing with the external organisational structure of the Association/United Serb-run municipalities. The sentence that recognises this entity's right to general oversight of certain issues cannot be self-disputed, because clearly a law is required: all the issues mentioned there and known as the right of the Association/Unibility of Serb majority municipalities are the object of legal regulation, because the Constitution of Kosovo in Chapter III has clearly rated the same things. Afterwards, they have been broken up with sectoral laws, which need to be changed. Nothing else. These changing sectoral laws make up lex specialisNo, no. Statuyou i autonomyW Serbianwhich contains the laws of God ConstitutionWsW material iW KosovWS. That's what we're still talking about. Here is enough to stress that, from 2013 onward, Kosovo has had and has international obligation for formation of Association/BashkWsisW SW More municipalitiesicW Serbian, which covers the fields specified in the 2013 Agreement and is under full supervision of it, but always through the release of various laws and meets existing laws issued in the continuation of the provisions implemented by Chapter III of the Constitution, or through the release of completely new laws that apply these constitutional provisions.

Extensive Abuse of autonomyW European

For everyone now it seems clear that the treaty between the two Germans has not been a sticking point for the establishment of the Brussels Agreement, as promised at the beginning of the year. No formal and negative similarities between the two Germans' agreement and the Brussels Agreement exist: at the end, the parties address each other as states, nor in their constitutional form, nor in the sense of international law; there is no sign of mutual recognition between the completely opposite parties, the Serbian side clearly has put reserve at this point and has found powerful support from the facilitators of dialogue, with the reconciliation of our side; the object has a transitative character for differences between the parties. In the context of the agreement between the two Germans, disagreements have been significantly and indefinitely regulated and included all reports between the two states, which are seen by the following protocols between the two countries, with which vows from the text, laws and other internal acts put on the sides for that purpose are put into place.

Let's go back to the next abuse with European autonomy. As known, it is publicly said that the standard of regulating Serbian autonomy in Kosovo, civil and religious will be based on autonomy in TirolW South (Italy) and Oland Islands (Finland ). Those who know these two autonomy, but the one in Spain, which is truly unique and full of success, despite timely difficulties, know that the imposed model is even further than the model with the agreement between the two Germans, and that for several reasons: first, Austria and Sweden never contradicted the state of Italy and Finland; the second, the reasons for the existence of autonomy in these two countries, but others in other European countries, have with the use of individual rights of ethnic groups, language groups, and other religious frameworks in the countries, respectively, where they live in terms of individual groups, not to individual groups, where they become rights to individual members, not to individual groups, are available. collective right toW Minorities; No European document for minority protections other than as follows, except for the rights of the Aboriginal peoples, which are being abused in the context of Serbian autonomy in Kosovo for another purpose of the noble purpose for which Aboriginal peoples enjoy autonomy and rights in the political, socio-economic, cultural and other areas. So, what is the abuse of autonomy in Italy, Finland and elsewhere across Europe?

This response is provided by each of the draft stateates for autonomy that have circulated over Kosovo in recent months. This answer, above all, you give it yourself Anex Ohrid and the concept of autonomy sanctioned there. Purpose consists of Creationn 1W Kosovo's original entity, with the judiciary-public character, Kosovo's state-run (public) chain of law, with legal jurisdiction and clean state conditions. This clearly unfolds in the regulation of the statutes rating the political representation of the Serbian community: it is the original representation derived from the current constitutional framework as a whole, because it is based on Delegate systemSo not in direct elections. The delegation system does not exist anywhere in Europe, will be reinstalled in Together HouseWsisW Serbian for the first time: the idea is for the Serbs in the municipalities to choose their delegates in this assembly, as a formal and political representation of their autonomy. The framework has a constitutional nature, from the day of its formation to the execution of its competencies, which are completely different from the competencies of the municipalities and in its relations with central power. The Assembly exercises new and original competencies, defined not by the Constitution of Kosovo, not by law, but by Stattooin Serbian Autonomia. On the territory of the Serbian municipality's Union, Stattu will be the highest judicial act. Imagine, the statute being higher than the Constitution of Kosovo (like!). It is usually the constitution that determines the hierarchy of internal acts, sometimes even laws, but statutes never. This is happening in Kosovo.

Another aspect of abuse with European autonomy standards concerns the executive of the Serbian Community, administration and justice. The executive executes general norms and individual decisions of the Serbian Community, that is, not of the municipality; the police must be local and give cadrovic responsibility to this administrative structure-the government's administrative structure; as far as courts are concerned, they have the appeal and every panel consisting of Serbian judges for subjects dealing with local Serbs. This is easily changed and local community courts can be formed, according to the Italian standard, since this requires changes of legal nature, not constitutional nature.

As seen, then, all these above show clearly that Ohrid Anxiety is producing one ConstitutionW iW 2ndW yWr SerbWt local in Kosovo ʹthe new material constitution. This overall conflicts with the 2015 Act. As for ConditionsutWS SW KosovoWSVery few contestants are presented: kgovernmentChoose a working directorymaterial It is not born within the existing constitutional framework, but parallel and in rivalry with it; in our case, the new material constitution regulates completely constitutional matter because for the purpose of the rating are the relations of power between Kosovo and February 17th 2008 on one side, and local Serbs, which were not present when the state of Kosovo was created on the other. In political science, this step of Mr. Albin Kurti represents one checkChoose a working directoryiWiW social cloudW him SerbianWt local, bypassing constitutional procedures in their entirety.

Cynicism with itW the rights of Aboriginal peoples

Finally, we have abuse of the rights of Aboriginal peoples of Scandinavian countries. There are some things from Italian and Finnish autonomy that cannot be used to draft the provisions of our country's new material constitution. Among them is the issue that concerns Property statusWpublic(state) in Kosovo. Aboriginal peoples have regional and international protection. At the international level, defence is less effective compared to the regional level, meaning the continent where we live in the first place. In general, these communities imply peoples who historically have bad stories of living in their native lands, which are usually specific places, which in many cases are related to hunting, agriculture, fishing, the right to free public taxes, and so forth. In Scandinavian countries this goes further: a category of people called Sami enjoys a status of greed, a complete self - determination. They have their own parliaments, which are national parliaments' agenda, so not the administrative structure on the executive subordinate, as have the designers of Edi Rama's draft-Status. The administrative structure presented in the draft-Rama does not replace the Serbian parliament, which is exercised by the Serbian Community Assembly, but its judicial-administration person with the status of state body/agency subject to oversight and control of legitimacy by the prime minister. With draft-Stutin Rama, the office of Prime Minister of Kosovo is added to a competence, among other competencies -- this office remains in service 24/7 of the Serbian Community, on any subject it sees necessary (like! ) Anyway, this one doesn't carry weight because it's a natural consequence of abusive approach that doesn't stop.

The Main Reason for the People Sami Motive method used to create autonomyW Serbian substance In Kosovo it is quite another: standard Scandinavian, but also American and Black, Australian and other, is that property, pasture, and other natural assets of autochton peoples cannot be state property (publics) and, therefore, cannot be discovered and taken without their permission. This standard, Edi Rama, with his sliders, has put him into draft-Sttut with the intention of taking, without any law and against the Constitution of Kosovo, all state property (public) in the country, and the creation of an original state agency as the other owner of this property, entirely to flee control of the Kosovo Parliament. That in practice means that, on the day of creating Serbian autonomy, Kosovo agencyWprivatisation It must sit with its Serbian partner and list property and assets that are in possession of Serb Community member municipalities. The establishment of the Serbian administrative agency in Kosovo is not only related to this issue, but also to its execution of policies and acts involving urban and spatial planning, which reinforces even more its unconstitutional aspect.

Why do Aboriginal peoples have this privileged status in European and international judicial order? They have been historically persecuted by the governments of the countries where they live, so this privileged position has been created in order to address historical injustices against them. So says the constitutional and legal acts of last century's K70 and 80 end years, in all Scandinavian countries. The same is said in every UN international document rating this matter, which is of the same time. The Aboriginal peoples have never in the past had their own country in any case or country. Does he need to abide by this power with the most nationalist discurs he has had compared to all Kosovo governments that local Serbs and in general Serbs in the Balkans cannot be the category of persecuted and marginalised historical people over centuries? Serbs have been a state-forming nation, a people that created empires in the Middle Ages and, unfortunately, as our neighbour, its leaders have international certificates confirming that they committed genocide in the middle of Europe, the first after. Hitler. Croatians have had a beautiful expression for Serbs when they say they're a gendardar people! Determining on Article 57.1 of the Constitution of Independence communities has been used in an abusive way by Edi Rama's draft status, without any basis and logic: raising to the status of the Aboriginal peoples of this European and international category of a Balkan people who have terrorized and continues to terrorise an entire region really constitutes cyismismismismist. Why is that? The answer: All this is done to shape Kosovo's property and its assets, perspire of entire corruptions, on the property of Serbian autonomy in Kosovo. That needs Serbian autonomy yWvW iWrWsishWm and iW Independent of the Center, linked to the Serbian state, not with Kosovo; it needs comprehensive constitutional category control, the overall command of urban and rural spatial planning.

In the end, I must say that I agree with those who say the statute and other acts are not contrary to the Constitution of Kosovo, reconciliation not because the voters are the diplomats of the country we love so much, but because this is: no part of the matter that has rating MarrWwidowshBrussels i n AniOhrid xy It is not the substance rated by statute, but with the Constitution of Independent Kosovo, then with sectoral laws (from the law on budget, finance, state administration, spatial and urban planning, education, health, municipal boundaries, intercommunal co-operation and so forth; and in these sectoral laws enter the laws from Chapter II of the Constitution of Independence, which must be adjusted to the Constitution of Serbia after its application is launched, not vice versa with the Law and the Constitution of Independence). As a result, it is about two separate judicial lines, which, if trains have separate tracks - one for the north and the south of the country - with little chance of meeting each other. Their only job is in rivalry and overlap, when the north train -- figuratively said -- has two locomotives, one of which is tied at the end of the south train with an effort to push as much north of the country as possible and beyond into Serbia.

Perhaps it would be understandable if the Independence Constitution had been violated. However, building laws that do not exist as applicable only to AuthenticationW SerbianIndeed, this constitutes legal ugliness: laws for education, culture, health, laws for state administration in Kosovo, and all sectoral laws are being built with the statute of Serbian autonomy, not the will of the Kosovo Assembly. In addition, special laws exist in Scandinavian countries, as in Italy there are constitutional laws rating the autonomy we have clarified above, which the laws later are broken with acts of sublaw. In Kosovo in hierarchy, after Stoutit tW Serbian autonomy Special regulations and acts are introduced to flee the Kosovo Assembly, which constitutes standard mega unconstitutional that nowhere in Europe can be encountered. This approach forms special judicial regimes that have no constitutional and legal grounds, in Kosovo and elsewhere. It is known where special regimes lead and how they are corrupted! Even if the Constitutional Court finds they are unconstitutional to provisions on the mechanism for resolving disputes, Special regimesi iW Authentication Serbian have a lot of immune mechanisms against any intervention of central power, which is conceived as foreign and foreign in its constitutional order.

The second aspect of why our international friends do well when they say that Serbian autonomy does not conflict with the Constitution of Independence as a formal constitution is that the material constitution exists and co-exists with the formal constitution. At least it usually doesn't work out that they're compatible because their lives are separated. This has been true of Italy, Spain, and Finland, but also of Scandinavian countries with regard to the people Sam. Very late, decades later, these countries with constitutions and constitutional laws have rated the position of autonomy. I disagree, however, when these friends tell us that the Constitutional Court must make decisions and give permission to do so. As I tried earlier, the Constitutional Court can never break the 2015 precedent with professional arguments. It can do such a thing, but only by using extra-unconstitutional criteria and standards, political nature, sociological and other, as it did in 2015 when it changed its standard of non-conventional thinking for central government organs, or by decisions of breaking standards VLAN, overthrowing prime minister Avdullah Hot, the collapse of the vote of Kosovo communities and its equalizing each voter's vote as if Kosovo were completely without communities, as well as several other cases. Judgment of Constitution  Auto StatisticsOmii  SSerbianWith the parameters of the 2015 Act is completely impossible! My disagreement is not related to this: The Constitutional Court always has the way out for the deployment that gives the political will of the founders to power  New Material Constitution i n Kosovo. Such a decision doesn't mean and doesn't mean avoiding the unconstitutional situation, because, as I said, she can interact with it. The Constitution of IndependenceUnless the conflict between them gets so tough that one eye wins by ruining the other. This, however, is another subject that we may return to. It should be said that it is dishonest if the Constitutional Court takes over something wrong on its shoulders but even more dishonest those who impose such a burden on her, completely unjustly. Anyway, like I said earlier, Serbian Autonomia statue has released the Constitutional Court from this unnecessary stress that has eliminated from the reference The 2015 Act , throwing it into the basket of history of things worthless. In his place. ResolutionW1244 of the Security Council as well as some other legal texts that, under no circumstances, dare and cannot serve as grounds for assessment of constitutionality Serbian Autonomis stationJust because they're legal. Info ResolutionWs 1244 , along with laws, as the basis for interpretation of constitutionality AuthenticationW Serbian, and the simultaneous guarantee of the territorial integrity of Kosovo's territorial sovereignty, is nothing more than a brutal cynicism equivalent to joining the barotite with fire. Resolution 1244 guarantees the integrity of Serbia's territorial sovereignty, not Kosovo's (like !). Kosovo's laws cited as the basis for constitutional interpretations -- totally arbitraryly -- and this should be noted -- do not serve as a public (state) law of institutional mechanization of Serbian autonomy, which will have the shape of TogetherWsisW SWSerbian municipalities. Their application and implementation in practice, meanwhile, is completely perishable, cannot be implemented in the form that they are should be changed one by one.

I'll prefrarate you Hugo Grocin, his 1625 saying when he published his monument book “De jure bell ac pacis”: In the foreword, to escape church condemnation, he denied everything written if it conflicts with good docks and time habits. As an ardent supporter of it and of rationalized natural right that never faces deities that only prophesy the understanding of our international friends on such an existential issue for our dealings with neighboring peoples, ourselves and all those who come after us. Well had one of the founding fathers of the US Constitution expressed this in a similar historical context. Thomas Jefferson, “[...] The mortal have no power or right over the constitution”. Likewise Thomas Pain had stated “[...] Generations of all ages should be free to decide for themselves, in all cases, as others have done before them”. The essence of these thoughts, said briefly, learns to find the answer to the question of how it is possible that the dead who have made the constitution decide once and for all the fate of the coming generations. While known as the late-hand “ ”, with a sense of refusal that a generation, however wise, decide on the fate of others who come after them, not allowing the changing of the basic text. This should be changed, basic text, if you really want stability and prosperity for all Kosovo communities.

(Autor has been the first Constitutional Court president and is professor of law and international relations)