Vuciq's actions, projections to accommodate Kosovo Serbs

Serbian issue or Albanian issue?

Under pressure from the Kremlin and pro-Russian elements in Serbia's state-owned camera, but also from the intellectual and public mood there, Vuciq repeatedly orders the Serbian Army's march towards Kosovo.

He is fully aware of the inability of military intervention in Kosovo due to KFOR's presence, or NATO.

For such a campaign, as work requires, public opinion must be prepared in advance. And when it comes to Serbia's president, Vuciq, he finds it clear that when he comes to the opinion, he addresses the South-Slav speaking public from the Alps to Gevgeli, to the border with Greece. So his audience is about 20 million. If we add this to the diplomatic presence in the region, as well as major global media homes, then the planned message has taken place.

One popular word says:” Full water, sheep number”.

The oath that the army will return to Kosovo has been held, co-operation with NATO and major Chancellors has been preserved. To another occasion!

With this manipulative behaviour of Vuciq, at least of the acts that this keeps in touch on regular grounds, the limits of “are tested to allow deep-down penetration”. Of course, to contextise his goal, Vuciq has faced acts with the same goal in Kosovo. At least that's how the current KFOR Commander, General Rystuca in La Repubblica, is presented, who has been restored to the Belgrade daily Politika in the title:” Pristina's decisions triggered a new crisis”. It's about Prime Minister Kurti and his minister, Svechla, recently President Osmani, who in a spectacular way offer ferrit ambition with the crack of arguments of the same mind.

As pollster Dusan Janjic said, with the intervention of “Little Green Man” in the village of Banjska of the Zvecan municipality in northern Kosovo, Russia shows it is already a factor involved in the security and peace of this part of Europe, as well.

We must remember that Russia was present at all phases of Kosovo's journey: In Rambouille, in Vienna, in the Contact Group, to the ICO, which was Kosovo's independent watchdog. That's where the Russian presence ends in the process. Not to be overlooked is the Russian Army's intervention, taking control of Pristina's (1999) airport, with what British General Jackson averted the conflict with Russia, „The Kumanovo Agreement“held ambassadors to accommodate the Russian military contingent within KFOR.

The total Russian withdrawal from the arrangements for the implementation of Kosovo's citizenship, as well as the NATO accession of most of the states of this geography of Europe, except for Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, has brought Russia back to the Carist and Soviet doctrine of return to the <x0-> warmer”, which falls back to the Adriatic if not directly, even though intervention or infiltrate in Montenegro internal policy, keeping Republika Srpska's president under influence, are serious threats to <xRuux <3>

The return of Serbia's army to Kosovo has an initiative to realise even with KFOR's presence, through Resolution 1244's clause, Annex 2, in which, among other things, the return of personnel under 1,000 offices is regulated.

In the most favourable case, Serbia's military would develop occupational incriminating in three scenarios:

1. Quick penetrate on Kosovo's borders with Albania and Northern Macedonia to cut off Kosovo side communications with the background;

2. Taking control of Serbian Orthodox Church churches and monasteries on behalf of preserving Serbian cultural heritage;

3. Deposit of the military by the Iber River to carry out de facto annexation.

These scenarios may even be realised in the absence of will, professionalism, or elements “villa” (intelligence factors) this is used in the intelligence jar.

Meanwhile, NATO threatened directly by doctrine plans “Ruski Mie” has already moved additional military contingents to Kosovo.

Currently, there are no ideas which project the regulation of autonomy for Serbs in Kosovo, as a way to undesign the Kosovo-Serbia conflict.

What comes to the attention is that the Ahtisaari Document has regulated autonomy for Kosovo Serbs through decentralisation of power from the current one to Serb majority municipalities. However, in a published publication of the Centre for Strategic Alternatives, headquartered in Belgrade, by Ian Bancrof and Gerard Gallucci, “Crafting a Special Staus for Northern Kosovo ʹPonning of a special status for Kosovo's north”, we face ideas which differ from a sovereign perspective that initially puts Kosovo's citizenship on the Sui generis principle, as a result of the violent undoion of RSFJ. In this view: “The International Court of Justice advisory option (GJND) for Kosovo left unanswered the fundamental political questions raised by the 2008 declaration of independence.

According to them, the Court did not address Kosovo's status as state “independent”, nor the legality of its secession from Serbia.” So it's a collapse of what the JND doesn't contest the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo, because the question from the Serb side was about the Declaration of Independence, not citizenship, or the legality of secession.

In view of this promise, Bancroff and Gallucci see the solution, as seen by Belgrade as acknowledging Pristina's existence, in practice, not the implications of what is supposed to be designed by the Kosovo side, or formal recognition, but in the context of Serbia's real progress of EU membership, without introducing Kosovo as the target for eventual EU membership. According to them, steps must be identified to resolve the practical issues of the ethnic Serb minority in Kosovo, including the implementation of decentralisation and a special status for the north. This analysis identifies the area of possible agreement (Zone of Positive Agrement) - ZOPA, but which in essence I think is not yet an acceptable common denominator for both states as the final exercise of EU integration, Kosovo and Serbia.

Analyses Bancrof é Gallucci points out that the precedent exists for a clearer and formal agreement on the division of sovereignty over Kosovo's north. This analysis envisions dual sovereignty over northern Kosovo, respectively, a separate legal and political framework, such as Brcko. Brcko is an autonomous administrative unit, whose governing competencies stem from the country's two entities -- Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Brcko belongs to both state entities, it is independently governed - under international supervision and its inhabitants are citizens of one of the respective entities.

Brcko's case is the internal solution to a state entity, so this offer is unappreciated in the conflict between the two independent states (Kosovo-Serbia), although one party, in this case Serbia has constitutional, political and military claims towards Kosovo, a state already recognised by more than the member of UN members, as well as members of many international organisations.

To sum up, Brcko's model, proposed by Bancrof é Gallucci, is not appropriate for the Serb community in Kosovo, since it initially does not treat Kosovo as an equal set of negotiations, as a state, the autonomous for the Serb community in Kosovo was unfairly divided into decentralised autonomy into the Ahtisaari model for Serb majority municipalities south of the Iber River, and the concentrated political and territorial autonomy of the Brcko type in Bosnia and Herzegovina for Serb municipalities in the north.

What should be taken in order during the overhaul of the majority municipalities of the Serb community is that linear autonomy should be maintained for all municipalities in question. Offering another kind of autonomy for municipalities in the north poses danger to municipalities south of the Iber River. The Kosovo negotiating side may not accept at all a double autonomy arrangement, which risks the Serb population in the south, to remain without any autonomy, with real possibility of abandoning settlements.

And all in the end, in the security poll, Kosovo has international presence in its entire territory, in terms of KFOR and EULEX, so I don't think any new evental mandate in northern municipalities requires new international legal arrangements.

A separate northern protectorate would create the situation outside Kosovo's constitutional and legal framework for a set deadline (without) and would therefore turn Kosovo into a negotiating table of any eventual conference as a whole. That's how we'd move from Serbia's “Qjetion issue to Kosovo “-The Albanian Issue”