The final agreement on Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, with recognition or with Association?

For more than a decade, Kosovo and Serbia dialogue among themselves. With various negotiators and mediators, a number of agreements have been reached over the years in many areas, some of which have found application and others have been implemented in part or at all.

The performance of this process has been sluggish, while parties beyond agreements on more technical issues have shown great interest in finding common language for a final agreement on political nature. Meanwhile, even agreements that have been reached have been criticised and rejected in both Kosovo and Serbia, especially by the most extreme political forces in the respective countries. Their discussion has been with content and accusations against negotiators for national treason and with interpretation that their side of the country has surrendered to the other side.

In Kosovo, particularly the discussion has brought the Serbian majority Communist Association Agreement signed in 2013. The opposition at that time named the outcome of this agreement as fatal for Kosovo, until opposition to it was made with institutional mechanisms, but with other means, as far as violent resistance. The latter was especially highlighted when the Constitutional Court had come up with the conclusions that some of the provisions of the Association Agreement were out of harmony with the Constitution.

Despite this and the other fact that dialogue was stalled for a while, until Kosovo and Serbia had seemed to agree with that “status quo”, international mediators were interested in increasing the dynamics of the process and were aiming at reaching the final agreement. Such a spirit took off especially in 2020, when Slovak Miroslav Lajcak began his mandate as the European Union's mature emissary for Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. The latter was extremely optimistic about quick results.

However, two years later progress is small, a result of which there is reason. During these two years, in the Kosovo state, a political party and prime minister came to rule, who have their history filled with controversy over negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia. Even without even coming to the top of the government, but even when he was elected as the first Kosovo executive, Prime Minister Albin Kurti had originally said that he would become part of this process, and then he had no dialogue among the first priorities. In addition, the first Kosovo executive modified the position, adding that it would only be included in a dialogue that has the recognition of Kosovo from Serbia to the centre. While interest in increasing the intensity of the dialogue did not even show the Serbian side, while attitudes in relation to Kosovo (especially in terms of recognition) had not suffered a millimeter movement.

But the point is that these minor achievements in the process came largely as a result of continued pressure from EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell and special envoy for dialogue Miroslav Lajcak. The two of the union have consistently pressured the Kosovo side to return to dialogue and implement agreements reached earlier. Similarly, pressure has been addressed to Serbia to show constructiveness in this process, constantly conditioning dialogue with progress on the road to the EU.

Meetings with mediation from Borelli and Lajcak between Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vuciq, but also those of the level of chief negotiators Besnik Bislimi and Petar Petkovovic, produced results in implementing several earlier agreements. The main area had the energy deal and the last one -- for the plates -- which in Kosovo also sparked tensions among the Serb minority living in the four northern Kosovo municipalities.

And in the recently signed agreement on plates in Brussels, there was a sentence within it that is quite significant for the further flow of dialogue. It is decidently specified that the parties will have the obligation to implement earlier agreements, which naturally includes the 2013 one, for association. And for this very deal of 9 years, concretely, dozens of times has been called upon by international mediators to be implemented in a precise manner.

Such a step seems to have given a direction to dialogue. The situation in this process is not at the same two-way crossroads, where one aimed at a central recognition dialogue that could result in procrastinating the process; and, the other, it required a process of dialogue where there is discussion and foundation of association, which further opened the path “major decisions” or the final agreement. Taking into account the Kosovo side's positions for Association, this move on their part implies a pe-dation.

Happened in this situation, what should be done is what is the final agreement? Such a thing has remained unclear since the launch of dialogue between the two states. So far it's never been shown what the “severe decisions are.” Neither the Kosovo nor the Serbian side has done this, not a single international one. Of the latter already has a proposal, the product of France and Germany, known as the Franco-German proposal.

It is hard to say, however, that through the Franco-German proposal, the emphasis on dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia can be reached. First, in such a document initially in public came through the media, which is controversial to its seriousness. Second, the same was interpreted into different forms, and its contents are still unclear. Third, it does not seem that the parties have the same attitude over him. And the fourth, as well as known for it, does not seem to bring final normalisation to Kosovo-Serbian relations.

In the end, the priority in this dialogue is to form association, while through the Franco-German proposal it seems that even indefinitely what is called the final agreement would be mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia will be delayed. /Zelfije Zeneli '% Student at the Faculty of Journalism/