Dialogue with Serbia, Kosovo prime minister's irresponsible behaviour

Prime Minister Kurti's recent meeting in Brussels not only showed that he is continuing to avoid dialogue, but even testified that he wants to instrumentalise in campaigning. His conduct and statements in Brussels did not have for the targeted audience, neither Serbia nor European mediators within the dialogue, but the Kosovo electorate, within the local elections that are approaching in October. With the wounds of war still open, it is natural that dialogue with Serbia is one of the most unpleasant and unpopular things a Kosovo political leader can do. Negotiations with enemies are like dealing with hot potatoes, even if they don't burn you, they make you black. The massive unnecessary emotional wave itself, with which Bregovic's concert is being dealt with in public opinion, is eulogic how difficult and difficult it is to deal with Serbia. Thus, Kurt shuns real dialogue like the Devil incense. But the good captain is known in the storm, and it is the distinction between the passing mediocre politician and the historic statesman.

The best difference between politician and statesman has been made by American theologian James Clarke two centuries ago. According to him: “A politician thinks of future elections; a statesman for future generations. A politician seeks the success of his party; a statesman of his country”. This is also Kurt's concrete case, which by thinking about his upcoming elections and his party, is neglecting the interests of future generations and of Kosovo.

In politics, the first weeks in power are seen as the Mijali's “muay of the leader, where the opposition, media, civil society, parliament and all other factors give him great freedom or tolerance to settle down in the chair, and to give him the opportunity to prove by bringing about changes in the way of government. But that honeymoon is passing away to say that it was exhausted last year when you first ruled. It can already be said without fear that, in terms of dialogue, change or “the greatest” of Kurti was the departure of the US as the main negotiator of the process. So, denouncing “thics on map” that hosted Kosovo at the White House and the other actions he took next managed to take it away as a priority from Washington to take Brussels. Thanks to him, the United States now no longer has an ambaador as the president's special envoy for the peace negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, but simply supports the process in which the brokering protagonist is the European Union.

Without wanting to manifest ingratitude for the EU's role, it is well known among international relations experts, that this transfer towards the EU from the only world superpower that is, fortunately, our main ally, is a deterioration or type of “task option”. This is considered <x2nd> an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm” (lit literally by former Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens in 1991). So without connecting to Kosovo, The EU itself does not have any good reputation or performance as negotiators for conflict solutions. The Balkans have suffered this alone on their backs with numerous failures of European peace plans during the early 1990s.

What makes that fact more serious is that the EU has already failed in some cases with Kosovo, such as visa non-liberalisation or the EULEX show that did not extend to the north. Moreover, it has not advanced with non-recognitional Kosovo countries and the two key persons dealing with Kosovo -- Borrell and Lajcak -- come from these states.

For a good part of Albanian society, the honeymoon or the enthralling of Kurt after his electoral triumph is still strong, and this fact explains why his irresponsible and harmful conduct within the dialogue has been surprisingly commented on by all praise and admiration. Therefore, several weeks have passed and blood has cooled somewhat by commentators' executions following statements in Brussels, it is good to do a more serious reflection and analysis of his actions and consequences for Kosovo.

First, the release with surprise proposals, bringing them out as hidden letters under the sleeve, shows a non-recognition of the process so far. Likewise, the claim to start all over again, the rasa tabula, affecting state continuity, judicial security related to state commitments already taken by his predecessors, show a lack of state culture, tarnishes Kosovo as a non-serious state and constitutes an insult to international mediators. All of this harms Kosovo's negotiating position and undermines our report with allies, who have been crucial to any achievements and are desperate for Kosovo's survival. The European Union has spent endless resources and energy for a decade to move forward first with technical negotiations and then with political ones. Foreign policy representatives Ashton and Moghrin have spent endless time to move this process forward, and it is certainly very insulting that a new Balkan populist leader, a state that has benefited endlessly from the generosity of Western friends, emerge all arrogance and ignoring the work done so far.

Second, the casting of these proposals also shows a lack of recognition of the format and goals of negotiations. But on the other hand, when he met with Vucinqi, he did not even speak of his long-term pledges that he had set as preconditions to negotiate with, with which he had received the votes, such as begging or reciprocity. The current dialogue has had a strategic goal of reaching a comprehensive agreement aimed at mutual recognition and paves the way for membership in the UN, the EU, NATO, etc. The intense, comprehensive word, is no coincidence at all. There are two types of key approaches to negotiations, or broken so little by little as the EU entry chapters are or were the chapters of technical dialogue that were finalised in April 2013. In contrast, one step-by-step steps someone secured deals on each subject or individual issues one at a time. Or the next version where all topics are exhausted within a large comprehensive agreement. This is the current format of dialogue based on the principle,” didn't agree on anything if we didn't agree on anything. The first approach is more problematic because when negotiating gradually, the negotiator makes concessions in early stages, then finds that there is not enough shopping left for the most extreme demands and the heavy topics that come later, and the process is blocked. However, there are objective reasons why this format has been chosen to avoid procrastination and to keep tails out so that tomorrow the day after tomorrow, it would be used to undermine peace and delegate agreements. It is not this country to enter into more detail to show the superiority of this approach, of importance is that this is the form of dialogue for which Kosovo has agreed with its partners and the opposing side now and how many years, and the extraction of specific proposals, which should be a corresponding part of the comprehensive agreement, indicates non-recognition or the non-understanding understanding of the format of negotiations.

Third, the advances themselves were wrong and even harmful. The first proposal was that six Western Balkan states advance CEFTA to SEFTA ( South-East European Free Trade Agreement) under the EFTA-EEA model. So Kurti for the Kosovo dialogue, Serbia, was sufficient to propose as a precondition for all Western Balkan countries to give up long-term aspirations to join the European Union to select a bloc similar to Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. States that have refused to enter the EU have established another Inter-state organisation (EFTA) and that, with the exception of Switzerland, have entered into agreement with the EU within the European Economic Zone. He stated more bluntly, “I do not enter into dialogue unless it is forced to capture Montenegro or Northern Macedonia to give up the current process of European integration and suffice with an alternative trade block. Kurti as one of the many prime ministers that Kosovo has had and will have, has no right to deviate from the orientation of the European integration of the state, let alone pretend to do so even to neighbouring states.

The second proposal for a non-attack pact that is often interpreted as a peace deal is even more naive because it represents an attempt to produce some concessions that are actually part of the topics put on the table, without entering the talks yet. In addition, the concern of the <x0surresponsive” attack has directly addressed the Kumanovo Agreement, Resolution 1244, and the guarantee of KFOR's presence is understood. Kosovo needs a comprehensive final agreement with mutual recognition, everything else is deviation from state interests.

The next proposal, for Serbs in Kosovo to have their National Council, as do Albanians and Bosniaks in Serbia, is even more strange. This proposal runs counter not only to multiethnic principles sanctioned by the Constitution of Kosovo, but also harms fellow Albanians within Serbia. Pristina and Tirana must have priority to strengthen and improve the position of Albanians in the Presevo Valley, possibly bringing it to the level of Kosovo Serbs, rather than the contrary. So before the reduced rights of Serbs are required, we must seek the fulfillment and advance of Albanian rights within Serbia.

The next proposal was then also in vain, demanding that the Veljko Odalovic delegation be removed as political leaders in Kosovo during the war. What a beneficial meaning a personal official has to remove when Milosevic's former propaganda minister, Gebels of the genocide regime, leads the delegation, as it were. Even this demand somehow clears Vuciqi's image, saying only Odalovic has a stain on the past in that delegation. This amateur action, seeking these non-substantiial concessions, produces Vuciq constructively and gives him the opportunity to then ask for substatic wools in exchange.

The second meeting continued in the spirit of sight, only thankfully some proposals did not repeat except that of a preliminary peace agreement for internal electoral consumption in Kosovo. There was no way to expect Serbia to accept it under conditions where the format is “we don't agree on anything, if we don't agree on everything. Another portable electoral innovation of the second meeting is offering three books dealing with crimes committed by Serbia in the past.

For the sake of truth, the theme of past confrontation if handled seriously is the only one worthy of attention and there is room to improve Kosovo's negotiator position, giving it a moral advantage in the international arena. That's even why the former chairman The PDK, Kadri Wessel, took the initiative two years ago to form the state commission to confirm, research and classify the genocide committed in Kosovo, as well as the decision to establish the genocide museum and the expulsion one. That initiative then did not receive Vetevendosje's support, but that does not mean that it does not resume. This subject cannot be handled superficially by donating three books to show before the electorate, but through a radical, multilateral state strategy similar to what Israel does with the Holocaust or Ukraine with the Holocaust.

This strategy would require the construction of museums documenting, storing and exposing crimes; research centres making serious publications in and out of the country; financing documentaries or academic grants for rigorous scientific studies; stock exchanges programme to develop locals with the necessary expertise of war crimes and transitional justice projects; organising textbooks to increase civic awareness; preparing sensationalisation programmes of diaspora and diplomatic body; financing of art and artistic works with the painful subjects of past; preparing teams for cases of schooling to increase the universal friendships; preparing for Kosovo's policy and other criminal prosecution procedures. But Prime Minister Kurti wants only electoral shows and has no intention of doing any of these serious actions to confront the past as he has testified, envisioning no penny of these ideas in any of the three budgets he has drafted as prime minister.

The only thing left to hope for is that this irresponsible behavior has to do only with its electoral interests and not with its inability or paying to face seriously the challenge of dialogue. It stands to see whether after local elections it will act responsibly. It's certain that by then the honeymoon will be quickly surprised, especially with internationals.