A new EU agreement with Balkans

The summer of 2015 has remained deeply embedded in European collective memory: More than 1 million immigrants fleeing the Middle East conflicts moved to the European Union. The European governments' responses to this crisis were casual, very often biased, and the same approach has continued so far.

But what is often forgotten is the fact that more than 120,000 of those people who applied for refugee status in Germany in 2015 were actually Europeans, and specifically from the Western Balkans. The fact that many people from this small region travel to Germany, despite almost zero chance of being able to stay there, speaks a lot about the lack of opportunities they see in their countries.

And the pandemic of David-19, not only will it further exacerbate this situation, but it will leave the region more vulnerable to bad external powers - like Russia and especially China. By contrast, Washington's future transformation from a divisive actor to a constructive actor presents a chance for having a common transatlantic approach.

25 years after the Dayton Agreement, the time has come for the EU to offer the region a level of new association without full membership. After Yugoslavia's violent break-up, the only possible way forward for the six Western Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Serbia) appeared to be their eventual EU membership.

After all, membership in the union seemed to embed the promise of peace, prosperity, and generous subsidies - a better life. In this way, it would help stabilise the region and create a powerful impetus for reforms.

But many things have changed since European leaders pledged in 2003, it makes Western Balkan countries “an integral part of the European Union”. First, the nearly glacier progress of the membership process has brought about a growing popular disappointment in the region. And while membership prospects are becoming increasingly distant, the pace of reforms has been markedly slow.

The development adds to the growing fatigue of EU enlargement with new members, which are increasingly perceived, not as a benefit to the whole of the union, but as an additional burden. As things currently stand, it may take a long time until the Western Balkan countries are ready to join, and most importantly, to be allowed to join the EU.

In the absence of full membership, Brussels must create a new level of economic relations for this region with the bloc. In practice, this should include membership of these countries in the European Union Customs Union (EUCU), as well as an extended approach to the EU market and common budget.

Being part of the EUCU would not only imply removing non-tariff barriers, but would include adopting EU external tariffs. This is significant because it would solve the highly politicised issue of tariffs, which some Balkan states have decided against each other.

Moreover, a Balkan approach to the EU budget is particularly important for infrastructure for two reasons. First, the region's degraded infrastructure has been a key factor in curbing its economic development. Therefore, investment in public infrastructure in the region would help not only boost economic development, but would enable them to integrate into the supply chains of major Western European economies.

Second, it would limit China's negative influence in the region. Since Chinese investments do not respect any of the EU criteria, they tend to strengthen local corruption and non-transparent procurement practices. Of course, such a level of association with the EU should have a timeline and should undergo a periodic review to prevent fund abuses.

The financial impact on the bloc would be small, but would send a strong signal that the EU has not given up on the region. And such a signal is very necessary to repair the damage that has suffered the credibility of the EU in the region, with the decision to halt medical exports to Balkan countries in the early days of the David-19th pandemic.

Although this step was quickly abandoned, the impression of abandoning him will not be so easy to disappear. This, after China took advantage of the case to replace “ ” the Balkan countries with several shipments of medical supplies. Meanwhile, Russian dezinformation efforts have the chance to further undermine the EU image in the Balkans.

Moreover, as geopolitical games continue, the pandemic has also served as an excuse for reverseing democracy in the Balkans. But the election of an experienced American president and interest in the region also provides a chance to restore a common transatlantic front to the Balkans.

Coordinating their approach, the US and the EU would have found it much easier to influence the development of some positive changes in the region. In the end, the reasoning supporting the EU's commitment to the Western Balkans is quite simple: The EU will either achieve or export stability to its neighbourhood, or remain a source of instability.

Consequently, promoting the rule of law, democratic institutions and economic reforms in the Balkans are not only steps in the membership process. Rather, these measures should be considered an investment in the future stability of the European Union. The bloc's new economic and investment plan for the region worth 9 billion euros is a start, but much more will be required. Nature hates emptiness, and if the EU continues to neglect the Western Balkans, other powers like Russia and China will be very happy to fill it. / “Geopolical Monitor”