Why does Russia love the frozen conflict in the Balkans?

Russia agrees with many frozen conflicts and political chaos in the Western Balkans so that it can generate a lever in its calculations for other geopolitical benefits in other geography around the world. To achieve these goals, Moscow has strategies and plans for the Western Balkans. The Kremlin is guided mainly by three strategies: across and Sundo, the use of political elites and religion, aphiliated with Russia, and the benefit of unrealistic political and economic expectations of citizens throughout the Western Balkans.

Russia's goals of getting access to “the warm “through the Balkans blocked the West under US leadership with their interventions through the Dayton Agreement, the shelling of Serbia, the liberation of Kosovo, the independence of Montenegro, Kosovo independence, the entry of Albania into NATO, Montenegro's NATO accession and the arrival of the Greece-Macedonia agreement, resulting in the membership of North Macedonia in NATO. Consequently, Russia now finds it impossible to restore it to <x2). But what is Russia's goal in the Balkans, and how does it aim to achieve that goal? Russia has begun the most pressing return to the Balkans sometime between 2010 and 2014 because the United States had less attention on the Western Balkans. After the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, Russia has in a way begun a type of a cold “fight with the US for the Western Balkans. As noted earlier, since Russia is unable to recover to “The warmer “”, the purpose of this “fighting if” in the Balkans is to stop the integration of Balkan states into NATO and EU as well as trying to remain one of two dominant powers in the region (support NATO.

Russia agrees to have as many frozen conflicts and political chaos in the Western Balkans as possible so that it can generate a lever in its calculations for other geopolitical benefits in other geography in the world. To achieve these goals, Moscow has strategies and plans for the Western Balkans. The Kremlin is guided mainly into three strategies: carrying and sundo, exploiting the political elites and the Russian-adphiliated religion, and benefiting from unrealistic political and economic expectations throughout the Western Balkans. The first strategy finds easy implementation due to historical rivalries, political, ethnic, cultural and economic divisions, which are present throughout the Balkans, with particular emphasis on the division in Bosnia and the strained relations between Serbia and Kosovo. As for the elites, Russia has supported corrupt political clicks like VMRO DPMNE in Macedonia, Dodik in Republika Srpska and the prides of the Serbian Orthodox Church, because all of them together battle the western presence in the region. While, when it comes to exploiting unrealistic expectations across the region, Kremlin believes that in the coming years there will be great opportunities for the masovisation of populist parties due to the despair of measures with corrupt political elites and despair of the EU integration processes. As a result, any kind of self-created local political chaos (even without Russian investment) can be misused by the Kremlin for the realisation of their goals, respectively, for some geopolitical benefit. Now, following the failure of the coup organisation in Montenegro, organised by Putin's friends, Nikolai Pattrusev (at the time secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council) and Leonid Resknikov (a former senior KGB official and former Russian Institute for Strategic Studies) and failure to influence the outcome of the recent elections in Macedonia, (so that Montenegro and Northern Macedonia's failure to undermine membership in NATO), for Russia the last change of influence in the region remains in Kosovo.

Russia has no reason in any way to support reaching the final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, because except that it would gain nothing from such an act, it could even lose its influence in the region. Within the above context Russia, therefore, agrees to retain the frozen “conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, guaranteeing Russian interests in the Western Balkans and not Serbia's interests. This is an argument that also supports Maxim Samorukov, a Russian columnist for the analytical portal “Crnegie” in Moscow. He wrote last year that “support” unlimited and “security” that Russia makes Serbia that it will not allow the loss of its territorial integrity, due to its steadfast friendship with Serbs, is actually Russia's passive sabotage of reaching the final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.

Consequently, Serbia needs to be released from this “iron hug<x1 Russian> that is in fact narrowing Serbia. But, as Samurakov says in his analysis, the Serb leaders themselves are guilty of this relationship, as well as of the burden they have placed on themselves with Kosovo, because for years they have created a schizophrenic relationship with Russia, asking them, at any meeting, to block the international recognition of Kosovo. Every Serbian politician has made uncontrolled praise to Russia, resulting in an almost religious cult of Putin in Serbia. However, such benefits of the past from foreign policy have now turned into serious restrictions for Vuciqi himself on the domestic level. Now when the agreement with Kosovo needs Serbia to pave the way for EU integration, the Serbian leadership does not know how to get rid of “of” or that “iron embrace” Russian because it is difficult for Serbian voters (about 90% prorus) to appear less patriotic than the Kremlin itself. The official Moscow is aware of this, so they continue to issue statements of the type that they will not allow Kosovo to secede from Serbia and that any agreement should be based on UN Resolution 1244 (which does not recognise Kosovo's independence) and that these statements force the Serb leadership to take firm positions regarding Kosovo. Russia thus provides the status quo and the frozen conflict, just what it needs to realize its own interests. Thus, every attempt by Vucinqi, for the agreement with Kosovo to end with Russia's reconciliation, is blocked by this Russian stance. So Putin's popularity in Serbia is already seen as an obstacle to Vuciqi in whatever inspiration comes to this one for reaching the final agreement with Kosovo as the necessary step for Serbia's EU membership. As a result of this situation, it is logical if it is found that Vuciciqi does not dare to reach agreement with Kosovo without the Russian “po”, because Russia will easily be able to destroy it as a politician. It's enough for Russian officials to take the position for, ” Russia as a sincere ally of the Serbian people”, unlike” The planned sold at West” will continue to defend Serbia's territorial integrity by refusing to recognise Kosovo and keeping its veto of Kosovo's non-membership with the UN Security Council. That kind of means that the bid for agreement with Kosovo cannot come from Vuciqi, but from Washington, while Washington differs from the EU. It has made “offert” through letters President Trump has sent to Thaci and Vuciq presidents, in which he has clearly stressed that the essence of the deal at the end should include mutual recognition. However, suppose, if Serbia recognises Kosovo, it still would not free Vuciqi from major Russian pressure, because it would put the credibility “<x15 of Moscow's foreign policies in question. It is unrealistic to expect that as a result of such a situation, Russia will recognise Kosovo and the US to recognise Russia's sovereignty in the Crimea. Russia, therefore, would not simplify the situation enough to recognise Kosovo unconditionally and thus would not be reconciled to the realisation of its geopolitical interests (not only in the Balkans), questioning its policies of frozen conflicts. Official Moscow, therefore, is not naive enough to believe that, if Russia recognises Kosovo, it would mean that the EU and the United States would accept the fact that the Crime is in Russia, or that they would recognise the independence of Donbas, South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Transnistria. Neither does Russia itself agree that the areas cited as separatists will be recognised internationally, because on the other hand, they will cloud the possibilities of being pressured by Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine to not join NATO.

Consequently, Russia will apply “iron embrace” for Serbia, using the Serbian population's session of NATO intervention against Serbia as if to continue to take over “preserved” “the Kosovo issue”. This would ensure Russia continue to realise Russian economic interests in Serbia and secure space for maneuvering for Moscow's policy towards its neighbouring countries with a Russian minority, while the same interests could not be maintained in the event of reaching a final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia.

(Autor is politicalologist and professor at the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pristina Faculty of Philosophy)