The essence of Kosovo- Serbia

Never should the hazy of the clear picture of reports between Kosovo and Serbia be allowed, who was here occupant and who was captive, who fought defensively, who had aggressors, who was on the right side of history and who was on the wrong side. Between the nineth (of the century [...]
In the mid-term (last century), when the peaceful political Movement for Kosovo's independence had started to show its limits, which were probably inevitable when it became known to whom we had jobs as Kosovo Albanians, President Rugova, in an effort to somehow preserve that Strategic Determination of the people of Kosovo (as we have applied at the time and we did not really know what it is like, or this Strategic Development, in politics and diplomacy), had started to talk about a political and historical convention.
The political struggle for freedom and state creation then stated Dr. Rugova, it may last longer than we have expected and remembered, but the goal will come to an end if we, as a people and as political organisation, maintain patience as we make the main diplomatic investment in the US, from where political and diplomatic intervention for the solution of the Kosovo issue is expected.
In the years that followed, from all of us, it was understood that the historical flows in behalf of Kosovo's liberation will be faster than calculated in those 1994, 1995.
Their accelerator would appear in the form of war, which the peaceful Movement tried to avoid, or at least postpone, for years when we would be a little more prepared for it, and when those wars in other areas of its h - RSFJ would have ended (which will happen at the Dayton Conference in November 1995).
So will it.
The war in Kosovo arrived at the right time (if it had come earlier or later), it would never have had that conclusion known to all of us), when it was understood, among us, in Serbia itself, but even in the West, that it is the inevitable epilogue of a complete impasse in addressing and resolving the Kosovo issue, which, for that then power of Serbia, did not exist as a problem.
Serbia's power said at that time that it is true that Kosovo has problems, but Kosovo as such is not a problem, it is not a matter.
The war therefore emerged as the last tool (final), and necessary, the only remaining one, to define what will be done with Kosovo, or who will succeed in this political fight: The people of Kosovo, or the state of Serbia, which that world had the last name of the RFJ.
Otherwise, we fought, as a people, with a country, not with a power and its regime.
If all that was then with Kosovo and happening in Kosovo were connected, as you were wrongly interpreted, less among us in the West, with a name and surname of a politician (what was that of Slobodan Milochev); and with a power then in Serbia, then his shift or his going to Milochev from power would bring him the dramatic change of reports between Kosovo and Serbia, separately when Kosovo was already liberated, and here were tens of thousands of KFOR (or the North-Atlantic Alliance Mission), and there was also an international mission here. UNMIK.
So, if it were any different, or if everything in this relationship between Kosovo and Serbia were a reflection of a power or regime in Serbia that objectively was responsible for all the wars fought in the spaces of the former Yugoslavia, at that time arch between 1991 and 1999, then, without any doubt, immediately after that democratic revolution in Serbia (in October 2000), a new chapter would be opened between Kosovo and Serbia.
That didn't happen then. This was not even marked in those years of the Vienna Process, when, under the leadership of President Ahtisaari, Kosovo's future status and reports between Kosovo and Serbia were negotiated.
Among us and Serbia, it was not only a abyss filled with mass cemeteries caused during the last war years, it was not only the hard story, nearly a century of successive tragedies in Kosovo that were the result of that vicious occupation of Kosovo by Serbia, but it was also the great factory of history in Kosovo and around Kosovo, which was on the grounds of the formation of Serbia's contemporary state from the beginning of the XIX century and beyond.
So, it would be understood afterwards, and this lesson is in force even today, that reports between Kosovo and Serbia, or between Albanians and Serbs as people, are much more burdensome and more complicated than those involving a change of power in Belgrade, or the departure of a leader who was once uncontended in Serbia (Sloan Milocevic), and the arrival of another politician (Zoran zein içeiçit), who intended to transform Serbia into a European state and a pro-Western.
These relations are such, without any guilt or responsibility of Kosovo Albanians. This should be repeated over and over again.
Never should the fog of this clear picture of these reports between Kosovo and Serbia, who was here an occupant and who was captive, who fought defensively, who fought the aggressor, who was on the right side of history and who on the wrong side.
There can be no change and re-defining of this interpretation of the new history of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
In this context and full consideration of this explanation of the history of these reports between Kosovo and Serbia, the dialogue between representatives of Pristina and Belgrade, which re-initiated these days, cannot have another epilogue after the one who will go to the end of this serious and tragic history, and recognition of the reality created in Kosovo and internationally confirmed, in 1999 (with the liberation of Kosovo), in 2008 (with Kosovo independence), and in 2010 (confirming independence from the ICJ, or International Court of Justice).










