Current political and constitutional stalemate

1. Article 84. Article 2 of the Constitution of Kosovo is the only determining article on how the president of Kosovo should act after the approval of the no-confidence motion against the Kurti Government is the attitude of the misinterpretive and fallible character. This article does not force the president to take the country into elections, as Albin Kurti says. On the contrary, even if the president's role was truly like that of a swimmer, as Kurti ʹconfirmed the correct reading, both the Albanian and the English version of the Constitutional text let you see that Article 82 points 2 confirms the president's right to decide for or against the dissolution of the Parliament and, as consensus, pro or against election proclamation

2. Article 82 points 2 is part of the list of several cases that require or enable the distribution of the Assembly, including the situation of successful voting on the government's no-confidence motion. The formula is modal not the commander: “ Can to be distributed by the president of the Republic of Kosovo, following a successful government no-confidence vote.” So it says Can and no must or, in the second case, if it was thought to be a distribution, it would be said without equivoke “... following the government's successful vote of distrust... Location dismissed by President...”

The right to pro-active discretion and location is also meant in the provisions of the constitution that describe the country and the president's role in our parliamentary system. The constitution says twice, at Article 4 points 3 and at Article 84 points 2 that the president is “concerned with the democratic functioning of institutions of the Republic of Kosovo”.

3. The guarantor's role cannot be realised without the president's commitment to conveying, assessment and, when there are reasons, interference in political developments that prevent “democratic functioning of institutions”.

In the concrete case following the no-confidence motion that dismisss the Kurti Government, where it acts as the Government under limited competency, the president must have the active role, as does the Interactive role of the Kosovo Parliament with its ineffable competencies in any decision-making and dismissal of the Government.

4. The president and Parliament cannot be overlooked or acted under government command, but the opposite must happen. The incumbent government undergoes the assessment procedure that the president holds in office (the bidder is in a function Bail from traditional canonal rights; he mentioned this for semantic clarity; and the final verdict on the president's decisions gives the Parliament because it votes every key decision about the government.

5. The binding procedure for the president's decision-making discretion on whether or not he can distribute the Parliament is his consultation with all parties making the Parliament. In some countries this consultation is made at the plenary meeting of the Parliament, where the decision is made for the no-confidence motion, and the proposal of an alternative government is considered and voted. If this alternative government does not secure the majority, the automatism president decrees the dissolution of the Assembly and announces early elections.

Kosovo's constitution divided this process into two steps; the no-confidence motion dismissed the Government, but it remains in custody until the election of the next government. The prosecution of another legitimate government urgently follows. It was a relatively suspended emergency, but not almost pushed.

6. Subsequent proceedings require that the incumbent government, which has limited competencies, replace it with a government with full, totally functional powers. For that, he addresses the Assembly, which is the functioning onal and political parties that make up the Parliament. The president is entitled to the mediator's key role in the process; he finds and recognises the moods and the force report to find and proposes a new mandate that can create the government, or finds that the majority Assembly is determined for new elections.

7. Developments in Kosovo following the approval of the no-confidence motion on March 25th reflect the alternative situation: 1) the proposal for the election of the new government; 2) the dissolution of the Assembly and the decree of new elections.

The president's responsibilities is to enable the creation of a fully functional government that will replace the downloaded Government, with options: The new government of the current legislature, or new Government, following new early elections.

9. The need for affirmation of the primary role of the Kosovo Assembly as an institution allowing for exit from the current stalemate is also being imposed on the background.

In contrast to the Kurti Government, which is short and with limited competencies, the Constitutional Assembly of October 6, 2019 is a fully operational institution with 120 MPs with a four-year mandate. As an institution, the Parliament does not suffer from any form of disfunctionality that would block the entire system, and condition its breakup. The framework that has the electoral legitimacy is dissolved by self-recognition or when one cannot choose a functional government. Currently, the parliamental system is liquefying with the motion against the government, but the Assembly seeks in its composition another potential government. If you do not find this option, it is forced to explode.

10. The current president, who has the mandate until 2021 and the Assembly, which the mandate expires in 2017, have the competencies and the opportunity to repair the government's mandate as the vital institution of executive power. Understandably, after the mocon cannot return the dismissed coalition, such as it was, but the president is obliged to consult with the government to remake it start with the winning party of the October 6th elections, as well as other parliamentary parties, to see what parties and MPs want, are they for new elections, or are able to make a new government.

10. The president is the size of the mood and pulse of the Parliament to find a preliminary answer to the one who instructs Article 82 at the provisions of 1 and 2 of the Constitution: “If two-thirds of all MPs vote for the distribution, the distribution is by decree of President” (Nini 82.1); but the president has the decision on whether to decree the break-up after the notion of distrust: “Assembly can be distributed by the president of the Republic of Kosovo, after successful government no-confidence vote.” (Nani 82.2)

So, after approval of the motion that downloads Government, as we now have the case, the president consults with all parties that make up the Parliament, to see whether they are for the dismissal of the Assembly and selection, or prefer opening the procedure for mandateing a new prime minister and government.

11. President Thaci, in accordance with the Constitution, has made consultations and heard the parties' answers to it all, except the LVV, against the dissolution of the Assembly. The LVV's position has not been a secret, this subject has been publicly declared that to it the only option is to dismantle the current Parliament legislature and announce early elections.

Meanwhile, it has not been a secret either the position of other parties, that they are not for elections except for the PDK, which has recently asked for the elections. We do not know what attitude has been The PDK during consultations with the president, perhaps they were still undecided. However, most parties, according to the president, have been for seeking a new government and against elections.

In this proceedings the president has followed, there is nothing unconstitutional and less vetoist, as LVV deemed.

Twelve. President Thaci has been in his right to decide with the care of respecting the will of most of their parties and MPs in the Assembly, who should also be declared individually, that they prefer the creation of a functional government as soon as possible without going to the elections.

13. However, this proceedings for overhauling the Government triggered major disagreements and conflicting interpretations of the Constitution.

According to Article 95 of the Constitutional Court, as well as a 2014 Constitutional Court decision about the situation, though not only identical to what we have today, it has been confirmed the right that the winning subject of the elections should have the advantage of the candidacy proposal for prime minister not only in the first attempt after the elections, but the second time in situations when the country remains without prime minister, if the country fails to vote if it resigns, is dismissed, or for other reasons can no longer exercise its duty.

14. President Thaci, after the dismissal of Prime Minister Kurti, has respected the right directive that the LVV, as the winning party of the October 6th elections, bring back the candidate name for prime minister, to prove once again the establishment of a ruling coalition.

But a problem has been presented in this because LVV, its chairman Albin Kurti, respectively, declined to respond to the request, calling in a failure the Constitution has, where it doesn't figure out the deadline for sending the candidate's name to prime minister.

15. In fact, Albin Kurti requires new elections, not a new mandate for LVV, even though he could have rerun himself. Kurti and LVV thought that the Constitution is in their favour, as it does not impose on him the deadline of the declaration. However, this stance conflicts with another consequence, that the approval of this performance requires the preliminary dismissal of the Kosovo Parliament, that is, the burning of valid mandates of elected MPs on October 6th 2019.

16. The president, after consulting the parties, learned that the mood of the majority of the Parliament is not about declaring elections that meant making the Assembly itself. So he sent five letters to Albin Kurti, where he desperately asked for the mandate of prime minister and after 20 days, when he became convinced that LVV would not send the name asking for elections, or even because he did not see the possibility of creating a new coalition.

The president then came to the conclusion that the second possibility of creating the LVV-led government has been exhausted and decided that the mandate of the LDK is offering, as the party that has been second to the votes and seats in the Assembly.

Ldk after day sent the warrant's name with testimony that it has the support of the majority required of MPs to establish new coalition and functional Government. Without delay, the president decreed Avdulah Hoti as candidate for Prime Minister and Parliament would also vote him in the country's next session, if the LVV did not submit the complaint to the Constitutional Court, where it called for suspension of the decree and assessment of the president's constitutionality.

17. My view of the Avdullah Hot's decree process is that, in principle, everything has been in order in the essential steps the president has taken: 1) He has consulted parliamentary parties and found that the overwhelming majority is against the new elections. 2) He has repeatedly invited LVV to propose the candidate for prime minister. 3) After having received no answer on a deadline he considered reasonable, the president passed the invitation to the other subject, the LDK, and this responded positively.

18. The only conflicting moment in this performance that is envisioned with the Constitution has been the lack in the Constitution of the first party's response terms. It is reason to assume that this failure during drafting the Constitution has not been in any way in order that the aludon LVV, but remains as a casual concession. The LVV, meanwhile, insisted that the Constitution gives the constitution undeterminated time for delays and failure to respond to the president's invitations. This tactic was favourable to LVV because the dismissed Prime Minister Albin Kurti and his incomplete government left him in office and power, while the president also does not have the opportunity to proceed with the option the LVV sought for him to declare early elections, for what preconditions was the dissolution of the Parliament. A vicious circle was created blocking the process.

Nineteen. I believe there's been an intermediate step for the rendition of artificial blockade. The president has been given the opportunity to seek to keep the Assembly meeting where MPs would declare whether they are for new elections and self-determination, so you can make it transparent that the option is the Parliament. Obviously, it cannot be denied the president's right to disrepute, because even with his proceedings, the final decision is sent to the Parliament, where the respect of the majority will still become transparent. This stance draws closer and meets the inevitable constitutional role of the Kosovo Assembly in the creation and dissolution of the Government.

20. The president in principle has the right to request LVV's plea in a deadline that he saw objectively, as I assess in discretion that the non-responsability and delay of the LVV is not due to objective and reasonable causes, but it is a voluntary obstructive act that leads to destabilising the functionality of state institutions, for protecting whose functionality the constitution mandates the tax warrant Pressenidt.

21. So, to recapitalize, the fact is that the LVV was not deprived of the re- running priority for prime minister and given the possibility of making the new coalition with any subject of the Parliament, as it did the first time with the LDK, but that their government lasted only 50 days.

22. Failure to respond to the president's invitation to a repeat mandate, even though the Constitution does not specify the deadline, however it is the act of manipulation and avoidance of responsibility, with which the possibility of LVV to make a new coalition. The 2/3 assembly had voted the no-confidence motion, and LVV was unlikely to find other partners to re-make the government.

23. On the other hand, the Assembly of October 6, 2019, enjoyed its composition, had full legitimacy and decision - making capacity, and could not be deprived of the right to seek another formula to govern, which the Constitution authorizes. The Assembly is the main authority of the country and the governments, the institution with full mandate, even sovereign employers and both the Government and the President, because they are elected by the Parliament and given responsibility, and it doesn't happen the opposite, that the Assembly depends on the president or the government.

24. The allegations that President Thaci, with the second party's candidate nominated for votes in the October 6th election, has made <x0mandation <x1ndancing <x1nd of the constitution, have no meaning. It is true that the formal nomination does not have tax support in the text of the Constitution, but cannot be denied that it is a verdict in line with the spirit of the Constitution and of the parliamentary system that Kosovo has.

25. The president has the right to disrepute the decision to break up the Assembly and proclaim elections, and this weight right is more important than the decision that after 20 days of LVV's waiting for an answer, the decree to name Abdullah Hoti. This “rambitrate” The president's position, may be disputed, but it is understandable and reasonable in his interest to return to full office the location of the Assembly, which remained blocked by an unsensive failure in the text of the Constitution, and the failure to set the deadline for LV's declaration, even though deadlines exist in several other similar articles during the government's process of creation. Like. Article 95 points 2 says: “Canada for Prime Minister, not later than Fifteen (15) days After the appointment, it represents the composition of the government before the Kosovo Assembly and requires approval by the Parliament.” And Article 95 points 4 instructs: “If the proposed composition of the Government does not get the majority of necessary votes, the president of the Republic of Kosovo, within. ten (10) daysdoes not name the other candidate according to the same” procedure.

26. So, if Abdullah Hoti's nomination is considered to be illegal and character objective of “the constitution's statement”, as Abin Kurti puts it, I think arbitrariness would be much more serious if the president decided, according to the request of the LVV, that the Assembly of Kosovo practically be excluded from the country for such an essential issue of self-request. The LVV's request that the president announce elections after the motion of no confidence in the government (the failure of Article 82 points 1) would also be an even more arbitrary and serious violation of the Constitution.

27. The president, in accordance with the essential competencies he has, made decisions to unlock the situation, preventing claims that the Assembly be delegateed and become dysfunctional, as he has addressed the government's actual dysfunction, which by March 25th caused 2/3 of the vote in the Assembly, thus preventing Prime Minister Albin Kurti's goal of remaining in office unrestricted, “and in the <x1 elections.

28. Setting <x0) The president of the LVV's candidate name deadline can't be regarded as a violation of the Constitution, but it is a rational decision based on the right to the discreciation that the president has as the steward of the functioning of institutions. He acted correctly in a situation where he was allowed to wait for the answer that everyone knew he would not receive. Indeed, the president would make capital violations of the Constitution if he did not proceed with the appointment of the LDK candidate, because with the expectation of response and inaction it would contribute to the overthrow of the balloon and the functionality of the vital system institutions and parliamentary order.

SP

Warning for Readers

This analysis of the situation of solving the driver where the president has the key role is of contextal character and not the President's apology; with the president, it is not ascribed to wrong and harmful actions and decisions during his long political career. But for these mistakes and damages, investigative actions and others from relevant state institutions must be undertaken.