Vetevendosje's responsibilities for delaying government formation in Kosovo

Vetevendosje's responsibilities for delaying government formation in Kosovo

Kosovo has since July 19th, 2019, with resigned governments, and only in the fourth month after the October 6th elections was achieved a new government. Finally, an agreement between LVV and LDK was reached after an excessive crawl. The Vetevendosje movement in view of the frustration that sparked the delay [...]

Kosovo has since July 19th, 2019, with resigned governments, and only in the fourth month after the October 6th elections was achieved a new government. Finally, an agreement between LVV and LDK was reached after an excessive crawl. The Vetevendosje movement, seeing the disappointment that sparked this delay in public opinion and the discouragement of its sympathies, tried to excommunicate the responsibility for this delay by placing various institutions with responsibility PDK, president or LDK.

This version of Vetevendosje's tale amplified by various opinion-makers who romanticised this negotiation as if it were a “attempt to prevent the radical transformation” that led to the 6 October elections. There are numerous voices of media and civil society that are based in harmony with Vetevendosje's institutions are trying to remove the burden of responsibility for this party's unjust transfer of other actors.

The truth is, for the delay in making the majority the only one responsible was to the party that has won by competing alone and that it alone had received the mandate to create a majority in parliament. But let one and the other analyze an alibi built by Vetevendosje and its satellites to camouflage and repack the failure to build compromise and form a new government.

For one thing, the Vetevendosje Movement has no logical possibility of blaming the Democratic Party of Kosovo, as it is trying, because it has left no way to claim involvement in the formation negotiations of the new ruling majority. On the contrary, The PDK has shown super constructive has even taken actions that have made Vetevendosje much easier to take over governance.

First, president of The PDK, Kadri Veselini during last summer, led the country directly to early elections following Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj's resignation. If it were “obsessed with power” and “prepare for any device” to stay in power, Wessel as a mandate would have replaced it Haradinaj's AAK with Shpend Ahmeti's Social Democrat Party (PSD) and would have formed a new government within the past parliamentary legislature because the PSD eventually had 13 deputies, as was the AAK. So the PDK consciously did not create a government designed to continue until 2021, but willingly reversed the legitimacy of governance in citizens by facilitating political rotation.

Second, The PDK took another move that facilitated the LVV's taking power, acknowledging the loss of elections and the opposition showing only two hours after the voting process ended, even though the PDK secured nearly 22% of the vote, there were many irregularities and differences with other parties was minimal (LVV 26.27%, LDK 24.55%) On the other hand, under similar circumstances Vetevendosje has acted quite differently.

After the 2014 parliamentary elections with only 13.6% of the vote, the VV not only rejected the people's verdict, but immediately tried to block it. The PDK in receiving the government mandate it won as the first party with 30.38%. He was even involved in a violation of the constitution to elect Isa Mustaf as mayor. This attempt by the group of missing parties called V The LAN plunged the country into six months of political deadlock, even accepting a coalition with the Serbian List to achieve that goal and deciding as AAK Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj.

In addition to these, another additional favour the PDK has done to Vetevendosje to enable the formation of governance was President Vessel's invitation to vote on next year's budget and vote on the newly created parliament if the LVV could not form the majority. This invitation has brought water to the mill of Vetevendosje, which has consistently used the possibility of early new elections as a means of pressure on the Democratic League of Kosovo.

During all this time of negotiations with the LDK, LVV leaders have always mentioned that if there was no deal, Vetevendosje would get much more votes than on 6 October. Even the rhetoric of this period of negotiations has sounded more like a pre-electoral campaign to blame The LDK for failing to make government, rather than as a real effort to build a spirit of trust and co-operation with the LDK.

The attempt to blame the president for a potential failure of the deal was an even more childish attempt because the president's role in the process was completely peripheral and formal. Even Vetevendosje fell into a very ridiculous position because they initially complained that the president set the date for the constitution's constitutional deadlines of 30 days and not earlier. But then, it changed 180 degrees of attitude and in the inability to make the deal with LDK, tried to buy time by avoiding meeting with the president and stalled taking the government mandate.

For the sake of truth it must be said that the Vetevendosje Movement has not had many words or legitimate rights to blame either the LDK for any potential failure for two fundamental reasons. First because forming the government is the sole burden of Vetevendosje as the first party, the LDK is a losing party, and beyond efforts forced to sell its next defeat in 2019 as a success, this party has no single parliamentary victory since 2004. Consequently, it cannot be considered responsible for translating the October 6th vote into government.

The gross mistake here lies in the fact that Vetevendosje has burned bridges with other parties and led itself into a dead end, claiming that the ruling coalition will only do it with the LDK. The claim that only with LDK, Vetevendosje can bring about change is tragic because in these two decades of freedom and democracy in Kosovo, The LDK has been in power almost 16 years (a year less than the PDK) so completely co-aware of all the goods and evils of this country. It should be added here that it was founded on December 23rd of 1989, being the first political force created across the sceptre lands, which translates as best representing the new past as trying to sell it.

Under the conditions when he has declared that the government will do it only with the LDK and no one else, the LVV has no longer the right to complain that the LDK granted him big demands. By excluding other alternatives to the ruling majority, he has granted monopoly status to the political market, which in the absence of natural competition takes prices to the stratosphere. The PDK is not worth it as an alternative because it has stated many times and without any equivocation to stay in the opposition until it enters the government as a loser.

But on the other hand, The LVV has had the potential coalition solution with the AAK, which emerged from these elections with 13 MPs. The 29 Vetevendosje deputies along with 13 AAK and 20 minority deputies made 62 deputies who could easily form the new majority in the Kosovo parliament of 120 deputies. If it kept the coalition open or possible with the AAK, the LDK's claims would certainly have been reduced.

When it comes to the blame that the LDK is blamed for failing to make the new government because of the alleged exaggerated conditions or demands, it should be said that for the sake of the truth that even this alibi does not drink water. Experience in Kosovo's new democracy shows that these are not abnormal or inflated claims, rather, are relatively modest compared to similar circumstances earlier.

As a consequence of Kosovo's electoral system and institutional conjuture that accommodates minorities with reserved positions, the party system is highly fragmented and it is almost impossible for a single party to form a 50+1% majority. To illustrate this argument, we simply mention that in the 2004 parliamentary elections, The LDK received 45.42% of the vote, or 47 deputies, and the prime minister's post gave to the AAK (three consecutive prime ministers Ramush Haradinaj, Bajram Kosumi and Agim Czechu), which received only 8.39% or 9 deputies.

When it comes to the president it's enough to remember that in the 2010 general election The PDK received 32.11% of the vote, or 34 deputies, and left the president to the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) of Pacolli, which had 11.04% of the vote, or 12 deputies. The need for compromise's sake has been present after any election process, including the early elections of 2017, when to form the majority, the PAN's winning coalition was forced to give AKR 4 ministries in exchange for the vote of two MPs.

In short, the LDK's demands for position are more normal compared to previous legislatures, considering there is only one MP less than LVV.

Finally, the next alibi preparing to disguise Vetevendosje's delay in reaching a ruling compromise is the false claim that LVV will not violate principles. So political opinion is being prepared with the illusion that the LVV didn't give in to LDK for principal reasons, not because of power appetite and the desire to have as many governing chairs in hand.

In the case of the president, the LVV already violated this principle, agreed to give, but requested that the interior ministry that translates into simple chair numbers in exchange for the LDK. Actually, the LDK agreed to pass the LVV post of interior minister, but only when the president was elected. All this shows that the LV agreement The V-LDK failed in December only because Vetevendosje has refused to hold the interior minister for a year and a month until the president's election in 2021.

When it comes to whydo-Progress claimed by LVV there is no way of not showing moral hypocrisy or logical paradox, how the leader of this party agrees to sit down with the Serbian List (according to it created and commanded by Belgrade) and refuses to sit with the PDK, The AAK or the Initiative, which are Albanian parties originating with the Kosovo Liberation Army.

It is equally shameful that the party created for the “established itself in a war against the international neocolonist system, as well as in opposition to the inferiority complex and servilism of foreigners, has called for mediation by Quint (five Western countries) ambassadors to pressure the LDK to accept the deal.

The same was true with the coming of EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and European Commission Deputy Chairman Josep Borrell, who is also trying to be used as pressure on the LDK to necessarily make a government agreement. Foreigners' commitment to making a ruling agreement by the party that once rolled UNMIK and EULEX cars is nothing but a surrender of sovereignty and a return to the international protectorate before the declaration of independence. So under these circumstances there is no moral right on the part of Vetevendosje to say that he is acting principledly.

The list of arguments demonstrating that responsibility for the delay in forming the government lies only with Vetevendosje could be extended further. Today, a day before the deadline expired, the agreement between LVV and LDK was made possible to make a parliamentary majority together. But what can be said with certainty that all of Vetevendosje's efforts to avoid moral responsibility to citizens for the excessive delay in forming government and selling as victims in the process are shameful.

What makes it even lower is the LVV's claim that the agreement is not being carried out on principle issues, which is extraordinary falsehood because the four-month deal was held only by the chairs as the programme was learned within a day, even though they have anti-ideologie orientation (a radical left party and the other right party part of the People's Party).

However, even if tomorrow the government is formed along with the LDK, it will continue to worry about how the LV is to govern in conditions where it is so unable to reach compromise and consensus, as well as to co-operate or negotiate with rival political factors. In our liberal-democratic system these are necessary skills to make decisions and make the state functional.

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