sovereign will deadlock

Kosovo again faces the blockade of political decision-making that, in turn, produces a prolonged government crisis. Even though the October 6th vote seemed more determined and clear than the other times because the two parties -- LV and LDK -- won enough votes for the creation of a stable majority for governance -- did not turn out that way, as their leaders are not negotiating common governance. Albin Kurti and Isa Mustafa are not fulfilling voters' expectations, nor are the promises they gave easily when it was believed together provided most of the seats in the Assembly.

Indeed, if at the last moment the CEC did not verify and condition the Coalition Initiative's entry - AKR-PD in the Assembly (with a percentage month on the threshold!) the two winning parties could make the government themselves, without asking for additional parliamentary votes from parties that had put the <x0-line red lines to” for co-operation. But also with the current report ( LVV 29 + The LDK 28 = 57 deputies) was averted from the Serbian List deputies (which conditioned and limited the Haradinaj Government), because the 4 MPs' negative could easily be compensated with MPs from other minorities.

Yes, it is that even the clear statement of the electorate in favour of LVV and LDK, so far, did not bring about merit compromise that would reflect the will of most Albanian voters. Negotiations have been stalled for weeks, even though leaders of these parties promised that the agreement is a matter of days, if not hours. Granted, it is still likely that the agreement will be reached against reactions, but in the opinion frustration and the impression that the talks are not heading towards reconciliation compromises, but that the opposite is happening, reports are becoming irritated and confusing almost. Instead of compromising about the president's post and even some real level of weight of ministerial posts and others, the parties are now turning to zero when everything is becoming discutable.

This irresponsible behaviour of the winning parties, otherwise, with the statements of red lines of coalition with the three PAN subjects in power, leaves no room for other combinations of making the ruling majority. This is also the key factor that narrows maneuvering spaces and produces blockades. In other words, LVV and LDK could also talk separately with PAN parties, who together have 43 deputies, for alternative governments (based on numbers are two possibilities: LVV+PAN= 62 and LDK+PAN=61) So, mathematically, these coalitions would be at “Comode” that the coalition currently negotiating (LVV+LDK=57) that would make the government even without the votes of minority deputies! In this list of open options, there are other coalition combinations that give a lot.

But that is not because of solid interpretations of the Constitution, which does not clearly define procedures in separate cases when the split of votes creates difficulties for forming coalitions. An earlier interpretation of the Constitutional Court has fixed the right to the government's mandate belongs to the subject that has the most votes in the election. By the time this interpretation was made, which is now mandatory, it had been favored earlier PANI, currently the winning LVV party. It is also expected to officially send Albin Kurti's name to President Hashim Thaci so that he can mandate him as prime minister. It has been three months since Kurti himself and others see him as prime minister, but formalisation has not yet taken place, and the two-week deadline is not yet being extended until he is granted the candidate for prime minister to garner his support for his election to the Assembly.

For more, the Constitution does not clearly define, (or interpretations about this are different from experts), nor the president's procedure and competencies if the first mandate fails. The concrete question is how will it be prosecuted if Albin Kurti fails to secure the majority votes and returns the mandate? Or even appears before the Parliament, and most do not vote. Does the President have the right to mandate any future candidates and who is the subject? Some say it should be from the same winning subject, some left open, for the president to assess which subject and which of the leaders will most likely ensure the minimum support of 61 MPs.

Since the constitution does not recommend procedures for complex situations created in practice, it would have to be completed or determined by special law.

What determines the current government's constitutionalisation problem and the election of the prime minister is artificial reduction of the electorate's will in two winners that do not have the automatic majority of control of power, and that up until today have not been able to make even the flawed coalition with 57 MPs, where then they could even seek additional votes from MPs from other parties, usually the minority parties, but it could be any <x0pelivan <x1) from the missing parties, as it happened earlier.

When I say that there is a reduction of the will of the electorate, I remember that currently all options of power relate to LV and LDK, while the new Parliament as a whole still has several other options, even though mathematical and theoretical, for the establishment of alternative coalitions, which would no longer be a lesson than the LV coalition with the LDK.

But the question here is, what if Albin Kurti and Isa Mustafa don't make the government, should they necessarily go to new elections?

I think in case of failure, the president is dutying to pave the way for other coalition alternatives, by anyone who brings him a minimum of 61 signatures that he can make the government. However, it is the great odds that this attempt would fail, but the concerns he has as president force him to seize all opportunities that give him the total will of the 6 October vote, which cannot be exclusive property of relative winners, which in this case together have 57 MPs, however more than the 43 deputies of the former The PAN, but by October 6th, they have competed separately and in principle cannot be denied the right to party in government, if there is mandated to invite them to an algorithmal coalition.

However, the advantage of the relative winners becomes logistical and valid only if the LVV and LDK reconcile the coalition, not if they don't understand and want the country to take it back to the polls. In that case, the alternatives for other coalitions should not be completely blocked, but allowed the possibility of creating any majority of MPs without prejudiced orientations and <x0 red lines of non-co-operation between them.

I think that Kosovo's president, not like Hashim Thaci, but as a symbol and advocate of the country's unity and principled superparty figure, should have the right to disrepute the appointment of a second mandate if it fails first.

Kosovo's constitution has not detailed the procedures of possible disutual situations, for example. If the report between LV and LDK were not on October 6th 29th: 28, but that of total equality, for example. both parties win by 29 deputies. This isn't disfellowshipped, is it? Even October 6th. In that case, it may have to be given priority to the subject who has won even 1 vote more than the other subject, only that it would have to be justified as such in the form of written rules.

But what I believe should be reflected on the situation created is that after any result of the starting elections, the starting point should be the entire electorate, because only the whole of voters becomes the legislative sovereign of the elections. So I talk about the relative and not absolute winners of elections, which some even confuse in the report between LV and LDK, when the first subject is considered the bearer of the will of the people and sovereign. No, the LVV does not represent the will of the sovereign, but only a little over a quarter of that will, and neither the LDK together does not make up the will of the majority, but they stop at 57 black deputies, and they need <x0-pateries” of the invitation to other subjects to make the government.

If LVV and LDK fail to reach agreement and want to lead the country to new early elections, the president would have to have the disrepute right to start consulting with all parliamentary political subjects to ask for the eventual alternative candidate, which guarantees the majority's collection of minimum 61 MPs. Only if LVV and LDK, even after additional consultations, are declared to refuse to make coalitions with former parties PAN, plus minority parties, would then be forced to announce new elections.

However, I think the president would also have to have the right to seek a third alternative, to avoid elections in short terms as the law defines it, by consulting a Prime Minister and technical government with limited mandates, within terms and deadlines with which most political subjects would agree.

Another important thing that would have to be considered in efforts to improve the legal framework and advance our parliamentary system is to examine the possibility of increasing the number of MPs being elected by the vote of citizens outside the quotas reserved for minority deputies, currently in the report 100: 20 (83.3, % with 16.7 %), with a report that is most representative for the Kosovo population structure. The Kosovo Assembly would have to be added to at least 20 or 30 deputies, of whom 18 or 28 would be majority representatives, while 2 minority communities that are not yet constitutional categories (Montenegrin and Croat citizens) and where the proportion even further would remain more favourable for minorities compared to population composition: in the first case, if the Parliament had 140 MPs, this report would be 843: 157, while in the country with 150 MPs it would be 85% by %7. %7.

More material from Mr. Maliqi can read on the blog The triggerman. com