Choice or Solution?

Choice or Solution?

During the 11 years since the Republic of Kosovo has been declared any making and undoing of governments revealed gaps in the Constitution and Kosovo laws, which caused confusion and delays in developing processes. Even currently, following Prime Minister Haradinaj's irrevocable resignation, a power vacuum was created. No one has clear answers on how [...]

During the 11 years since the Republic of Kosovo has been declared any making and undoing of governments revealed gaps in the Constitution and Kosovo laws, which caused confusion and delays in developing processes. Even currently, following Prime Minister Haradinaj's irrevocable resignation, a power vacuum was created. No one has clear answers to how this vacuum should be met, whether Kosovo has functional governance, and with what competency, whether it is a transitary duty of the resigned government, or as another mechanism for the period until the inauguration of the new government, which, according to previous experiences, could last several months.

Part of the responsibility for the created situation should be addressed by President Thaci's two-week neglect, from which he was expected to act immediately on the authority of those responsible for overcoming the ruling vacuum. There is no point in reasoning with the lack of rules written about such cases. As the authority to protect the country's interest, action was expected by the president, and not the silence that in the opinion created the impression of political maneuvers for “buyback time”. Consultations with political parties have had to start immediately to hear opinions and attitudes about the two options the Constitution has envisioned for exceeding the power vacuum: 1. To assess, during consultations, the possibility of a new mandate for prime minister, which would lead Government in the next two years, until the end of the current Parliament's mandate. Understandably, the president only holds the mandate proposal, while to become prime minister the candidate must win the Parliament's vote of confidence.

2. If the president is convinced during the consultations that parliamentary parties have no mood for the new mandate proposal and prefers the early election body, he immediately decrees the dissolution of the Assembly and announced the date for holding elections.

So the question is, why was the President, in this case, determined for inaction?

There have been two reasons why they held back from taking immediate action. The first is related to the concern of MPs, but also of parties, that the dissolution of the Assembly should not happen before August 3rd, the date when the current Parliament is fulfilling half the mandate. The question is that the Parliament must legally be functional at least half the time of mandate, so that this mandate is considered complete, with which MPs provide considerable privileges.

For MPs and parties to overcome “Pragut” on August 3rd has been important, not only because of not harming their personal interests, but parties themselves worried that a part of the deputies of “damaged” (uncertainly, the party will run again, and even if they do, that they will get enough votes to become part of the new Assembly), they can prevent it by their vote dissing the Parliament.

There was also a major reason why the president preferred “to buy the time” and not to act. Although the majority of public statements gave the impression that the inevitable process leads to the announcement of early elections, the president has not had the ease of reducing the first option available to him, that of restructuring Government with the proposal of another prime minister. According to some sources, international diplomacy has also pressured the president not to rush off with election proclamations without draining the possibility of the first option. According to diplomats, even in polls on the access to electorate, the elections would only be a waste of time, because Kosovo could be left without the Government active several months, perhaps by the end of 2019. Their analyses included the next sad fact, that Serbia too has scheduled regular elections in the spring of 2020, and given that government creations last for several months there too, would be an additional obstacle to continuing Kosovo dialogue -- Serbia.

However, it is known that for international factors, dialogue is the most important political priority. So diplomats advised Thaci (and not only that): forget the elections, they are usually not decidities and end up with similar or similar reports of forces, but concentrate on continuing and ending the dialogue on achieving the final agreement.

For the final foreign agreement, they are much more optimistic than the parties in Pristina and Belgrade, which must negotiate it.

Concrete advice to Kosovo political subjects (someone experienced it as pressure) is for Kosovo to be defined for a new prime minister, either by coalition structures PAN, either by creating a new, broader coalition, which would include subjects outside the PAN, primarily the LDK. For the latter, the tempting offer would be to hand over the prime minister's position.

Even this idea of the LDK's key to the longer-term loss of the domestic vacuum could be an additional explanation for the president's two-week hesitation. He has expected August 3rd to see the election epilogue in LDK, what will be the winner and its leader in an extremely nervous race ( Isa Mustafa or any other contender, to then request it once again “sacrifice for major interest”, respectively, the establishment of a tax duty unity government: suspension for the period 4 to 6 months of tax on imports of goods from Serbia and BiH, complete overhaul of difficult relations with the US and EU in normal strategic partnership tracks, and eventually, as an epilog, following the opening of the road to continued dialogue, reaching the final agreement on normalisation of bilateral relations and mutual recognition of Kosovo-Serbia.

On the basis of this speculation, the facts speak the facts that currently in diplomatic circles again, thoughts are very loud that continuing and completing the dialogue is absolute priority and urgency; where even the final Kosovo agreement -- Serbia is seen as the “programming” to be carried out quickly, most recently by spring 2020!

Is there any chance of such an optimistic projection? Or is this a course of madness, as the pessimistics believe, that they view this scenario as very dangerous?

The argument in favour of speculation <x0]optimistic” is that in analyses of the current geostrategic processes, the idea is being insisted that Kosovo should take advantage of the relatively convenient current conflict in geostrategic reports among major powers, where the possibility of universal recognition of Kosovo's independence can be opened as a priority for the state of Kosovo.

The idea of conjucture can be deemed suspicious if US-EU-Russia reports, such as the central axis in the current geostrategic superstructuring, are seen as statistical and irreparable reports, and not as dynamic reports that are currently looking for ways of displacement. The point is that skeptics among us believe that the conflict among superpowers faces the Kosovo issue has more elements for concern than optimism. Russia is working for Balkan unrest, not decomposition, they say.

However, other signals, for example, are parallel to the center of deployment. that in US-Russian relations, there are efforts to defuse where in the margins of “pazarts” for the timing of the crisis consequences in the Near East, on the Black Sea base with Ukraine and others, opens up even the possibility that empowering Kosovo's independence will be part of the accords as it is the important element for rounding up the security system and stability in the Balkan region.

In our context, the sensitivity for global developments and careful listening to the counsel of strategic partners has been lost, perhaps because they are not enough to co-ordinate and agree. Similarly, it is hard to predict even internal developments in Kosovo following extremely tense reports among political subjects, who, even because of personal resentment and resentment, lack elemental co-ordination about strategic claims of national and state interest.

In this context, the suspension of the tax is probably not the only rational alternative for blockades that were artificially created for apprehending the gaps that Kosovo is facing on the road to stabilisation and progress. It would be the highest-level, even the temporary suspension of the idea that elections are salvation and lead to the right epilogue. It would be more beneficial to postpone elections and provide them with more than the result of making governments with intestines, resentments and mandatory non-progressive coalitions. The elections could be held next year, and now it would be easy to concentrate on internal co-operation and strategic partners to get the best possible out of the negotiating process.

P.S. I had completed this comment when news came that Kadri Veseli, Kosovo's Speaker of the Parliament, has sent the letter to President Thaci saying the coalition has told President Thaci. PAN has no other candidate for prime minister and invited to hold the Assembly of the Parliament's Headship to prepare the Framework Destruction Senate.

The elections now become inevitable, unless the Parliament votes against self-destruction.

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