Turkish Democracy, Turkey's major election winner

Sunday's local elections in Turkey brought a major defeat to President Rexhep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling coalition. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the nationalist MHP party in the coalition lost Turkey's major cities in the face of an opposition that initiated an era of change at the local level.

The political transition to Istanbul and Ankara is important because these cities have been held since 1994 and to date from the political tradition “family” of Erdogan. Loss in Istanbul is also charged with much symbolism, in terms when this city is linked to Erdogan's climbing towards the top of political power in Turkey.

He entered national politics, like Istanbul's new and promising mayor, winning a tight race 25 years ago. So now the question is how a invincible leader so far and his political movement has lost the electoral base, even being able to consolidate power for so long.

The first explanation has to do with the state of the Turkish economy, which in many ways proved to be the best “ally” of Turkish democracy. The elections were held against the background of the economic recession, the first in the country in a decade.

Families were beginning to suffer the consequences that the domestic currency crisis, lira, last summer, led to higher inflation, and reduced living standards. Economic slowdown diminished employment prospects, with overall unemployment as high as 14 percent in November last year, and youth unemployment at 24 percent.

Unlike some authoritarian institutions, Turkey is not a state that can rely on good revenues to buy the political loyalty of its citizens. Turkish governments must create conditions for a stable and functioning market economy in order to meet the electorate's aspirations.

Any long departure from the principles of good governance that include degradation of rule of law, transparency and accountability, as well as political and economic freedoms will initially bring economic costs, and then inevitably political costs. The latter happened last Sunday.

The second explanation concerns a dramatic change in Turkey's permanent opposition performance. This time around, the opposition managed to overcome Erdogan and his party. First, the IYI centre left, in alliance with the centre-right nationalist CHP, did better than the government coalition in terms of attracting voters.

In countries where there was a common candidate from the CHP ranks, the party's electorate IYI voted overwhelmingly for the CHP, and vice versa. By contrast, MHP electors shared their support for AKP candidates, especially in the metropolitan areas of western Turkey. The opposition coalition already had a very good result, even because of the pro-Kurdish HDP electorate tactical voting.

An even more important factor was the candidates themselves. In both Ankara and Istanbul, the opposition presented candidates who were willing and able to gain support outside their traditional bass. In Ankara, Mansur Javash received the majority of nationalist votes. In Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu was able to take part of the conservatives' vote. He consolidated his image as a developing leader, with his wise management of the crisis on election night, when the AKP candidate, former Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, declared his victory prematurely.

The consequences of the opposition's victory in these local elections will be significant. But they must be settled in the right context. Despite this obstacle, Erdogan and the AKP remain the dominant force in Turkish politics. On Sunday, the government coalition received 51 percent of the national vote. But victory in these local elections will encourage political opposition.

It will benefit from controlling local governments, and much of the Turkish economy. The opposition now has the direction of cities, accounting for 65 percent of the country's GDP. Its immediate challenge is to reach and exceed service delivery standards, achieved by local AKP governments over the past few decades.

In a longer term, it will have to cement its alliance at the national level, something that will be eased from a more comprehensive model of local government, including merit-based policies, to replace the auspices based on AKP ideology.

For Erdogan, the challenge will be overcoming the perception of weakness, following a major election loss.

His immediate concern will be the state of the economy. His political fate will depend on how fast he can bring Turkey back on the road to sustainable growth. Risks are not negligible, since surface steps will not suffice. Also, deep reforms will be needed to address Turkey's democratic deficit and rule of law in the country.

Local elections have shown that although it has achieved an extraordinary degree of power centralisation, Erdogan and the AKP remain vulnerable to economic and political changes, as should happen in a normal democracy.

So in many ways, the winner Sunday was the image of democratic order in Turkey, both inside and abroad. Despite being burdened with major problems, Turkish democracy showed its sustainability and flexibility, and hinted that there is a future, beyond populist and divisive politics.

“The Guardian” World.al