What awaits Turkey after the crackdown on Erdogan?

Sunday's local elections in Turkey resulted in a major blow to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling coalition. Justice Development Alliance [ The AKP] and the nationalist MHP coalition lost Turkey's largest cities to the opposition promised a spirit of change at the local level. Political transition to Istanbul and [...]
Sunday's local elections in Turkey resulted in a major blow to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling coalition. Justice Development Alliance [ The AKP] and the nationalist MHP coalition lost Turkey's largest cities to the opposition promised a spirit of change at the local level. The political transition in Istanbul and Ankara is critical, considering that these cities were held by Erdogan's political family since 1994. Loss in Istanbul is also linked to symbolicism, as the city relates to Erdogan's climb to the top of political power in Turkey. He ran into national politics as a promising new Istanbul mayor, narrowly winning the municipality 25 years ago. So the question is how a leader so far unbeatable has lost power, even though he managed to consolidate power for so long.
The first explanation concerns Turkey's state economy, which in many ways has shown to be the best friend for Turkish democracy. The elections were held until the recession was taking place -- first in the country for a decade. Turkish families have begun to suffer from the impact of the recent summer crisis, which led to higher inflation and eroded living standards. Economic slowdown has left employment scars, with total unemployment as high as 14% in November and youth unemployment at 24%. Unlike some authoritarian jurisdictions, Turkey is not a state dependent on loans To buy the political loyalty of citizens. Turkish governments must create conditions for a stable and functioning market economy in order to satisfy the electorate's aspirations. Any long break from the principles of good governance, which include degradation of the rule of law, transparency and accountability, as well as the violation of political and economic freedoms, will have the first economic and then inevitable political price. This is the friend who came to the surface last Sunday.
The second explanation relates to a dramatic change in Turkish opposition performance long underrated. This time, the opposition managed to deceive Erdogan and his party. Firstly, the CHP centre's left and centre-right IYI performed better than the government coalition in voter behaviour. In countries where there was a joint CHP background candidate, the IYI electorate voted all for CHP, and vice versa. In contrast, the MHP voter was divided in support for AKP candidates, especially in the MHP areas of western Turkey. The opposition coalition also received major impetus from the tactical vote of the pro-Kurdish HDP electorate.
Even more important was the issue of candidates themselves. Even in Ankara, but also in Istanbul, the opposition placed candidates who were willing and could reach voters beyond the electoral base. In Ankara, Mansur Yavas took the majority in the national vote. In Istanbul, Ekrem Imamoglu was able to take part of the conservative voters. He consolidated the image of a new leader when he was cautious on the night in which the old prime minister's politician recklessly declared AKP's victory.
The consequences of the opposition victory in these local elections will be significant. But it must be established in the right context that, despite the crackdown, Erdogan and the AKP remain dominant in Turkish politics. On Sunday, the government coalition received 51% of the national vote. But victory in these municipal elections will strengthen the political opposition. It will benefit from controlling local governments in the heart of Turkey's economy.
The opposition now has cities in command that make up 65 percent of national GDP. The immediate challenge is to reach and pass the standard services provided by local AKP governments in past decades. She also wanted to cement her alliance on a national level, something that would be fascinated in a more comprehensive modern.
For Erdogan, the challenge will be to overcome the perception of weakness immediately after this electoral loss. The immediate concern will be the shape of the economy. His political assets will depend on the speed at which he will turn Turkey on the path to sustainable development. Risks are not negligible to consider that the surface steps to something like this will not be enough. Deep reforms and rule of rule and law will be appreciated.
Local elections have proved that despite achieving an extraordinary degree of power centralisation, Erdogan and the AKP remain vulnerable to the economy and politics, as should be in a normal democracy. So in many ways, Sunday's winner was the image of Turkish politics, both at home and abroad. Despite many major problems, Turkish democracy has shown its stability and vibrance, and has signaled beyond populist and divisive policies. /Periscopi
Opinion was taken from The Guardian. Sinan Ulgen is executive director of the EDAM think tank.










