EU is political alliance, not set of values

Throughout the Brex process, Britain has tried to divide the other 27 EU member states. But it has failed. To the surprise of authorities in London (and perhaps even Brussels itself), the European Union has honored its name by remaining united. This show of unity over Brex is not an accident or [...]
Throughout the Brex process, Britain has tried to divide the other 27 EU member states. But it has failed. To the surprise of authorities in London (and perhaps even Brussels itself), the European Union has honored its name by remaining united.
This show of unity over Brex is not an accident or a coincidence. Rather, it says something important, why the European project is much more flexible than its critics think. The 27 small and medium-sized countries that make up the EU have a powerful common interest in protecting the common European market.
This strategic exercise will only become more pronounced in a world shaped by the two U.S. superpowers and China. Both Washington and Beijing are increasingly using trade and investment as political weapons. As individual countries, B27 know they can be seduced by superpowers.
But as the world's largest cross-border market, the EU knows it has a weight comparable to China and America, and it can again have its own impact. If America sets additional tariffs on cars for European producers over the coming months, the EU could retaliate with measures imposing nearly the same costs for the US.
The European Union is also taking a unified action, against the technological transfer imposed by China. And it has responded to the annexing of the Crime from Russia, imposing sanctions involving the entire EU market.
There is no doubt that there are deep divisions within the EU. Poland has been indicted by the European Commission for turning away from democratic principles. The Italians and French are fighting against budgets and borders. Hungarians and Germans are worried about refugees. Greece was nearly expelled from the eurozone.
But internal divisions that divide the EU27 are less powerful than outside pressures, which bring together union countries. This topic is sometimes forgotten, even in Brussels, because the EU likes to be called a “value union”. However, the idea that EU leaders are united by common values is increasingly difficult to protect.
Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Italy's Deputy Prime Minister Mateo Salvin have much more in common with Donald Trump in the US (or Vladimir Putin in Russia) than with Emmanuel Makron or Angela Merkel, the French and German travellers.
Italian, Hungarian and Polish governments love anti-Brussels rhetoric, favoured by Eurosceptics in Britain. But that does not mean they will be cut off from the Brussels line in the Brex negotiations. They realise that their economic and strategic interests are far better served by relying on the EU27.
In that sense, the European Union seems more and more like an alliance built on common interests than a union of values. Talks on alliances tend to cause concerns in Brussels, as times of war in Europe are in effect.
But in the 20th century, European countries have a clear interest in joining each other, more than against each other, as in the past. Thinking of the EU as an alliance also clarifys another confusing issue ʹ free discussions on a European “ustra”.
The formation of such an army is unlikely to happen, as the EU is not a unitary state. But a close military alliance, perhaps with a mutual protection clause, seems something feasible. Until the arrival of the Trump administration, speaking over an EU military alliance, it would look too much or dangerous since it could underestimate NATO. But being questioned by Mr. Trump of US membership in NATO makes it careful only for Europeans to think more to ensure their own security.
The EU still has a long way to become a military superpower, and may never become one. But it is already a global player in world trade, and business regulation. And this is important because in the nuclear era, superpowers are more likely to fight against each other by economic and non-military means.
The European Commission has already been brought to the forefront of the monopoly challenge of large companies Silicon Valley like Apple, Amazon, Facebook and Google. And now it's looking at new ways to police Chinese companies operating in Europe. However, China, in particular, is an expert in disrupting the unity of an alliance, offering incentives for the weaker union link.
This strategy has emerged in the Beijing Generation and Road Initiative, which seems to offer projects particularly tempting to the EU's small states in Eastern Europe. They could then be persuaded to vote against EU policy, which is becoming increasingly harsh towards China.
But the EU will survive the random division of politics against China or the US. The fact is that the package of benefits the EU offers can never be repeated by the US or China. The common European market offers proximity, size, legal security, freedom of movement of people, and a vote on new laws and regulations.
That is why countries like Poland and Hungary like to complain about Brussels are unlikely to leave the European Union. There are some people in Warsaw who predict Poland will leave the EU, the moment the EU's generous payments to the country are interrupted. But the reality is that even net EU budget contributors lose a lot if they leave. Just ask Britain.
“Financial Times” World.al










