Middle East After America's Escape

It was August 5, 1990, just days after Saddam Hussein's Iraq invaded Kuwait, and American President George H.A. Bush could not be clearer, speaking from the White House: “will not be accepted, this aggression against Kuwait.” During the next six months, Bush proved to be a man who kept his word as the United States sent half a million soldiers to the Middle East and led an international coalition that freed Kuwait.

Three decades later, a very different American president embraced a very different American policy. In the course of abandoning its Kurdish partners in Syria, who had braved the defeat of Islamic State terrorists (ISIS), the US held back as Iranian fears and missiles attacked oil installations in Saudi Arabia, temporarily putting out half its capacity.

Welcome to the post-American Middle East. To be fair, the phrase is something exaggerated, as the US has not withdrawn from the region. In fact, recently it has sent additional troops to prevent and, if necessary, helped protect Saudi Arabia from future Iranian attacks, and possibly respond directly to them. But the fundamental truth cannot be ignored that the US has reduced its presence and role in a region where it has dominated for nearly half a century.

The roots of this trend date back to President George E. Bush, whose decision to launch a poorly-advised and poorly designed war against Iraq, proved to be a turning point in US foreign policy. The high costs and poor results of that war turned the American public against military involvement in the region, which influenced President Barack Obama after he chose not to implement the warnings he himself made to the Syrian government, that the use of chemical weapons would be a violation of a <x0) red” and Od to bring serious consequences. Obama also decided not to proceed with NATO-led intervention in Libya, which brought down Muammar al-Qaeda's regime, but left behind a divided country and a failed state.

President Donald Trump shares this controversy over military involvement in the region. Furthermore, increased domestic production of oil and gas has reduced the direct importance of the US Middle East. Also, the new rivalry of great powers has increased the need for the US to shift resources and attention to Europe, to oppose Russia, and to Asia to deter China.

The Trump administration has distanced from the Middle East in countless ways, except it has demonstrated a reluctance to use military force or deploy soldiers to conflict zones. Diplomacy is largely lacking. Trump has chosen to ignore human rights violations in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and his administration has made no serious efforts to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The biggest source of uncertainty in the region includes Iran. The Trump administration withdrew unilaterally from the 2015 nuclear agreement, despite Iran's compliance with it. The administration then introduced a policy of <x0 maximumpression”, which consists mainly of severe economic sanctions, which have a visible impact on Iran's economy by some estimates, His GDP dropped by nearly 10% last year.

But if the impact of sanctions is obvious, their purpose is not at all. Clearly, Iran will respond to America's economic struggle with its own. In addition to Saudi oil installations, Iran has already attacked the traffic of tankers moving across the region, and is gradually giving up restrictions imposed by the 2015 nuclear agreement. As economic pressure on the regime intensifys, the US and its allies must expect further reactions from Iranians.

This faces the Trump administration with a dilemma. His undeclared but obvious preference is to change the regime in Tehran, but 40 years after the Iranian revolution, the regime remains standing despite public protests. The military response to Iranian action could lead to the kind of conflict Trump does not want, pending US presidential elections in 2020. But allowing Iran to break free from the limits of the 2015 nuclear agreement increases Israel's chances of attacking Iran, while the United States also draws into war. Even if that doesn't happen, US inaction may lead one or more of Iran's neighbours to provide nuclear weapons, balance Iranian capacities and the possibility of the US withdrawing further from the region. Such a development in what is already the most unstable region in the world would be a nightmare.

The best way to move forward would be for the U.S. to articulate what political changes they require from Iran in terms of its nuclear and missile programmes, as well as its conduct throughout the region, and what it is willing to offer in return. Such a policy must be announced publicly, thus forcing the regime to explain to frustrated citizens why it is giving up on the ease of many sanctions to continue its destabilising activity in the region and nuclear and missile programmes. In the face of strong economic and political pressure, the regime could simply agree to negotiate, just as it did when it agreed to put an end to a recent war with Iraq. However, so far, no such American initiative has been introduced.

In short, the Trump administration is learning that withdrawing from the Middle East is neither easy nor without risks and costs. The United States still has an interest in combating terrorism, nuclear spread, supporting free flow of oil, and promoting the security of Israel and American partners in the Arab world. It is clear what is needed: the US's greatest willingness to use limited military force, if necessary, and a tendency to join sanctions with diplomacy. Less clear, it is whether such a political mix can be expected soon. / Project Syndicante ? World.al