Emmanuel Macron alone

You can be talented, handsome, able to speak, and politically bold, yet suffer again. In the long term, discretion and content are essential components of a successful leadership and there are exactly these two qualities that, so far, French President Emmanuel Macron seems to lack.

Macron wants to lead the European Union in the 20th century. But he will succeed only if he does not overstep the bounds. If you don't hold your hand, you will open up challenges to other growing political leaders. That could happen if Germany emerges from its domestic political crisis, if other member states decide to form a coalition against France, or if Macron creates hostility with many key players within the EU. The bigger Macron's ambitions, the greater the danger to his political future.

Politically, Macro is a contradiction. As a vocal anti-populist using populist means, he has removed traditional political parties and has called for politicians to be replaced by ordinary people. Therefore, he insists that La République En Marche is not, in fact, a political party and that he is neither left nor right. The main difference is that his programme is not nationalist, but pro-European, almost cosmopolitan, and that he opposes other populists. But his pro-European stance goes as far as allow French economic interests, as he indicated when choosing candidates for key EU posts earlier this year.

Moreover, it is worth remembering that Macron directed the push for stricter rules for “workers posted” Especially did those from Poland and Hungary in 2017 and that his worst attack on Central and Eastern European populists was done by a French factory Wolpool, which was scheduled to move to Poland. The Macron can sincerely desire deeper European integration, but this did not prevent him from nationing a French shipyard to prevent his purchase from being purchased by an Italian firm.

Recently, the Macron has sought warmer relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and has indicated that NATO is the dead “tro”, a language that was most likely applauded by the Kremlin. Macro warning to NATO was understood as a call for Europe to secure its defence autonomy.

Thanks to Macron's efforts, Russia returned to the Council of Europe in June, following its suspension in 2014, following the prosecution of Crime. Later, at an ambassadorial conference in August, Macron voiced support for Russia's return to G8 and warned French diplomats not to prevent his proposals for Putin. And, in bilateral talks with Putin at Fort de Brégançon, France, in the same month, was Macro, not his guest, the one who talked about a Europe stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

But EU-Russia diplomacy is not the only area where Macro is making “strong”. In October, he imposed a surprise veto against EU accession negotiations with Albania and the Republic of Northern Macedonia, and has since described Bosnia and Herzegovina as a “mina with clocks”. Both movements contradict his pro-European stance and no doubt enjoy Putin.

In fact, Macron's recent maneuvers are clearly in his personal interest. His approach to Putin is likely to start a challenge by far-right Marine Le Pen, its financial supporters in the past, including Russian banks with ties to the Kremlin. And by blocking the entry of northern Macedonia and Albania, it is preventing further strengthening of the EU's Central and Eastern European bloc, which could highlight France's voice to the European Council.

More broadly, France and Macron found themselves in a geopolitical vacuum created by Brexit in the United Kingdom, the establishment of populists and nationalists in Italy, the Catalonism in Spain, and the consolidation of non-liberal regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The only reliable players left in the field are Germany and countries like the Netherlands and Denmark. Because a Le Pen victory over Macroni would strike a deadly blow to the EU itself, Germany has tolerated the French president's ambitious initiatives. But her patience is coming to an end.

At the end of the day, the rules of the game in Europe still hold Germany, and more precisely Chancellor Angela Merkel. The problem is that Germany is too small to lead single Europe, yet too big to do so. That's why Macron would continue with his choice of candidate for the head of the European Commission only when he found a German. Germany could not impose its candidate, so it had to accept Marco's German for the post (which Ursula now holds von der Leyen, a former defence minister).

However, Macron's recent behavior has made things more difficult for the Germans, who want additional changes rather than revolution. His Warnings for NATO means Germany will have to expand its defence capabilities, for which there is little support among German voters. If Macron is too persistent, he can provoke German anger and resistance.

But, Macron, like many others in Europe, has had enough bias on the part of Germany on issues such as accepting refugees from Syria and Iraq, or stopping arms exports to Saudi Arabia. He probably wants to make an agreement with Merkel's successor whether German Defence Minister Annegret Kramp-Carrenbauer or someone else on the EU budget, the issue of expansion and the role of French firms in building Germany's defence.

Historically, French diplomacy shines in large markets. But, under Merkel's direction, Germany has avoided such agreements, preferring the status quo or additional changes, because it usually ends up paying extras. For his part, Masron's hyperactive diplomacy exposes a complex post-Perandoral inferiority, whose symptoms are both Brexit or Putinism, and are hindering the normalisation of Europe and hindering EU mobilization to balance China and the United States. Macron's rhetoric suggests he wants to fight these symptoms, but his recent actions seem to be adding to them. /Buriment: Project Syndicate/In Albanian by: BIRN/