About “

About “

The summit of Western Balkan leaders to be held in Durres by 20 and 21 can be seen as continuation of similar summits that have been held in the framework of the so-called Berlin Process, which is behind the beneficial performance (alternatively based on expectations) for general displacement [...]

The summit of Western Balkan leaders to be held in Durres by 20 and 21 can be seen as continuation of similar summits that have been held in the framework of the so-called Berlin Process, which is behind the beneficial performance (spectantly, depending on the expectations) of the general displacement in the region and advancing bilateral reports between Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Meanwhile, two halves of leaders of the only three countries -- Serbia, Albania and Northern Macedonia -- have been held, where a more concrete initiative of co-operation and common market creation in the region has been promoted, surprisingly without the presence and approval of three other countries. In fact, initiators did not perceive the project as incomplete; rather, they view it as a project involving six states, where even those who did not participate in the first two summits are expected to be involved in the initiative.

This project, as based on the model adapted for the region of European integrations, has been called “The Balkan Schengen Myn”. However, Kosovo, Montenegro and in part Bosnia and Herzegovina reacted to this initiative with objections and rejection of participation. Even now, before the Durres summit, it is not clear whether the full summit with six participants, or half, will be at all. Especially is the issue of Kosovo's participation in Durres complicated because Kosovo still does not have a functional new Government, and for the opinion, no concrete format and agenda of the two-day summit in Durres has been clarified. If it is about continuing the summits of the initiative's three that were held in Novi Sad and Ohrid, I think at least Kosovo and Montenegro will not be represented in Durres. Meanwhile, if the next summit is meant without imposing the strongly contested three-way initiative, and aimed at turning to Berlin Process frames, it could probably have full participation in nonconcernal binarys.

Kosovo's role in region's enlargement process

If you are a supporter of the close co-operation of the Western Balkan countries, the importance of summits, as well as of this one in Durres, cannot be denied, but it is difficult to reconcile with the half-witness initiative that caused the rift in two blocs in the region. The halved initiative contributes to something that is absolutely the opposite of good intensities because it empowered distrust and doubts that following the haste of the Vuciq Three, Rama, Zaev is hiding a risk that cannot be overlooked with blind belief that the project is inspired by good institutions. I think that Albania, Northern Macedonia and Serbia have been wrong since Novi Sad, although at that moment motivated with the fulfillment of their particular interests in relation to the EU, opened the Schengen “min” project without preliminary co-ordination with the other three countries.

The very idea of the need for closer co-operation among six countries in principle is not bad, nor may it be harmful as it is being alarmed, but it must be acknowledged that the error has been made in steps and then, when conflicting noises arose, there is no chance of being well clarified and in detail what would be the tangible short-term and long-term benefits for all countries, as well as how a joint agreement on the project without causing dissonics on benefits and eventual damage to economics, political and other areas of co-operation.

The most delicate in this process is the position of Kosovo. The Kosovo status issue cannot be overlooked in the project as to whether it will become part of the initiative without recognition of its independence from Serbia, or it will be completely equal in any aspect of negotiating agreements. It is supposed that Kosovo and Serbia should have reached a final agreement on full normalisation of bilateral relations. Kosovo would eventually be part of the initiative process in the phase of the project's idea construction, but not without the guarantee that it will not be so in the phase of its implementation. Kosovo's projected status at the implementation stage should be equal to that of Serbia and other Western Balkan states.

So, at first, Kosovo would be able to fable <x0.1> literally not recognise its independence on the part of Serbia (and, not forget, Bosnia and Herzegovina), but only if it is guaranteed Belgrade's commitment to change the pre-multipation of Serbia's Constitution that Kosovo defines as an integral part of this state, and to pledge constructive and unoptual access to the outcome of dialogue on Kosovo-Serbia's normalism, which would ensure mutual recognition.

Building Trust

For the strengthening of trust that has been damaged and has fallen to the lowest point that seems to have been marked to a constant and difficult repair state, it would have to avoid severe confrontational polarisations in dealing with the strategic interest of the Western Balkan countries that have long linked their development prospects to Euro-Atlantic integrations. but that the current EU crisis has turned into a conditional and reversed process: The EU is almost giving up its enlargement with Western Balkan countries. The current phrase of the Makron doctrine “Be must be adjusted to itself before it extends to the Balkans” where integration is no longer seen as necessary but is produced by additional conditions and even as restorable performance, the Western Balkans is turning it into an uncertain geostrategic pit that strongly hits European dreams of democratic forces in the “Schengen” area, while empowering ideological and anti-European movements.

It is interesting how the rightist opposition in Serbia is opposing <x0 minus Schengen” as well as the opponents of this project in Kosovo, with even virtually translated arguments of a mold of thought. In these anti-European and Serb regions, the design is said to be only idealising an equal status of Kosovo in Western Balkan summits leads virtually to recognition of Kosovo's independence and, in a later instance, the creation of common economic and political space for Albanians in the region, which they call affirmation and acceptance on Vuciki's side of creating “Greater Albania”. These prorus are not impressed that the Schengen “min” brings together the destructive portion of the Balkan people inhabited by Serbs, which is right in Kosovo and even wider, is being seen as the creation of a new “Yugoslavia” which would essentially be the dominant of “Greater Serbia<. “Great Albania” in these defeats are the gongs that should fear first of all northern Macedonia and Montenegro, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo of “dardanded>, from the creation of a dominant Tirana-Belgrade axis, as the reflection of the Berlin-Paris axis that has been and still remains the back of the balances that have enabled the creation of the EU and now, after the inevitable Brex, should again be re-vised as accles and the future of the EU's future to escape the domino that could reverse the two pillars in Brussels and the EU.

Mini-Sengeni and Kosovo-Albanian relations while the error has occurred in the process, it is adversely affecting and giving fire to misunderstandings and multiple misconceptions in Kosovo reports . I think these can be clarified in the meantime when we will have Kosovo's new government and clarifying talks at the Tirana ʹ Pristina reply. For me, it is informative that the special emisaries for Kosovo of the United States have supported the initiative of “Mini-Shengen”. It should be highly regarded and without prejudgmental doubts or junctures, even this aspect of support coming from Washington, as well, maybe not so openly, from the EU. Kosovo politics must lower the ball in non-progressal disputes by analyzing the project in detail and critical ways. It has always been rejected by arguments that show it as a damaging process, or require corrections for parts estimated to be a threat to Kosovo's sovereignty and economic development in the face of “playing ambitions”, if there are such things as Serbia, but also Albania. Kosovo's political, economic citizenship should and can be protected, but not in the terms of isolation that harm the neighbourhood and good interdependence of equal subjects.

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