Secret Document of UDB: Rankovic's terror in Kosovo, and his plan to crush Albanians

From 1944 to 1968, the situation of Albanians in Kosovo was greatly exacerbated by Aleksandar Rankovic's terror, who was chief of O ZNA, the People's Protection Directorate, Yugoslavia's intelligence service. In a report sent to the commission, Rankovic sought iron hands on Kosovo Albanians, for the great fear of joining [...]
From 1944 to 1968, the situation of Albanians in Kosovo was greatly exacerbated by Aleksandar Rankovic's terror, who was chief of O ZNA, the People's Protection Directorate, Yugoslavia's intelligence service.
In a report sent to the commission, Rankovic sought iron hands on Kosovo Albanians, for the great fear of joining them with Albania, writes FMages.net.
Rankovic: Strong hands on Albanians, otherwise there will be bloodshed between them and Serbs
For the political actions of Albanians in Kosovo, Rankovic writes widely the commission:
Because of Albania's specific situation and influence on the Albanian population in Kosovo, a comprehensive action plan to address the situation in the area has been drafted. He was familiar with the plan and agreed with the CQ. The plan went into effect. Twenty-seven thousand rifles, several thousand machine guns, guns, bombs, mines, and even two cannons were collected. It is known how many people in Kosovo have been taken with weapons, and it is also clear which actions have been taken by internal affairs authorities during this action. In parallel with our action, Albanian intelligence wanted the mood of the population to be exploited, and it intensified its activity, leaving more spies and recruiting soldiers in Kosovo to create an atmosphere to persecute and terrorise them writes Rankovic.
He also describes his plan for further actions:
I personally think that we should not be gentle with Albanians, that they all, more or less, tend to Albania, that they are largely influenced by them, and that they should follow a policy without fear, i.e. a policy of strong hands, because in any other inevitable case there would be bloodshed between the Shipors on the one hand and Serbs and Montenegrins on the other. Only such a policy in Kosovo can succeed. Everything else is wrong.
Finally, Rankovic writes about demonstrations that erupted in Kosovo in 1968:
It must have happened because Albania's influence and their network are so large in the Albanian population in Kosovo that they want the secession from Serbia and joining Albania.












