Albin Kurti: The Victory of Populism and Metamorphosis for Power

Albin Kurti won the election.

Alone against all. Just populism.

That's the truth.

In one of the first interviews given by Albin Kurti after winning the 6 October elections, at “Opion”, a few days before receiving the mandate to form Government, he had the opportunity to present a concrete plan for the challenges that await Kosovo in the coming months and years and the way a government led by him and the VV will address. But he didn't say anything.

No concrete plan for dialogue, no concrete plan for Kosovo's north, no concrete plan for national unity, ideal this on whose basis the VV was founded and increased, and no concrete plan for the state effort, which has been the main slogan of Movement all the time as it was in the opposition, and on whose behalf it has led violent protests consistently and orchestrated a whole public link campaign. The incoming prime minister of the Republic of Kosovo, who has not accepted any symbol of Kosovo's citizenship until this moment, left to imply that the same would only be agreed upon taking office as the country's prime minister. So, he accepts Kosovo's citizenship symbols only on condition he is prime minister.

Some issues Albin Kurt addressed in this interview reflect the immediate and almost radical change of his attitudes on which he has also exercised violence for over a decade.

1. Commission Rights for Forming Government

After October 6th, Albin Kurti, without any dilemma, accepted the 2014 Constitutional Court's decision that the right to form the government belongs to the election winner. He accepts that decision because it is in his favor now. But it's just Albin Kurti and his subject who had authorized the Constitutional Court in 2014 after making that decision, trying at any cost not to leave the election winner with over 30% of the vote, PDK to form the government. Kurti has won the election by approximately 0.5% more than the second party, with a total vote amounting slightly higher than 25% of citizens who voted and 10% of the entire registered voter body. Against euphoric interpretations of grand victories, the VV's victory is relatively relative at the real level of the percentage, and is certainly closer than all elections in Kosovo after 1999.

More importantly, despite the VV's standing up as the first party, the Constitutional Court's decision does not grant Kurt the exclusive right to form the government, as he continues to insist. In fact, he insists that he alone can be prime minister according to the 2014 decision, which has already been transformed into the divine text for the VV. This is completely unstable judicially for two reasons. First, Constitutional Court ruling gives party or pre-election coalition victory Priority to nominated the candidate for prime minister, which is not necessarily the pre-election candidate for prime minister. Let's remember that it is, in 2014, PDK as the first party had nominated Isa Mustaf as candidate for prime minister on the basis of post-election coalition agreement PDK-LDK. So even under the circumstances where the VV has emerged the first party, this does not mean that only Kurti as VV's pre-election candidate for prime minister has the right to be nominated. Since the post-election coalition is inevitable, the 2014 ruling does not rule out the possibility that the VV, on the basis of a post-election ruling agreement, nominated another candidate, or even the LDK, as potential governing partner.

The second, if the first nominated candidate does not secure the votes needed for forming the government, then it is in the discretion of the president of the Republic to consult the parliamentary parties/coalitions to mandate a candidate from another party. In this case, if the LDK refused to enter a coalition with the VV, the formation of Kurti government would fail, and the LDK as the second party could take the opportunity to form the government. Albin Kurti as the winner of the already and (bad) elections affects the Constitutional Court's constitution and decisions only in his favor or Government's lead with VV, or elections, bypassing the possibility of other options that the Constitution allows.

This approach is, in the best case, the disproportion of a highly selective thought in interpretation of the highest law in the country and democratic rules, and, at the very least, the presumption of the state by ignoring relevant legal and democratic rules and procedures yet without taking the prime minister's mandate. The democratic governance that Kurti continues to promote has essentially observed the Constitution, law and democratic procedures, even when they are not in favour of a party or an individual, in this case of VV.

2. Law - Rule and State Obligation

In the Republic of Kosovo, the courts have been repeatedly punished by the VV. Its activists have refused to answer to the courts, failed to obey their orders, have authorized judges and prosecutors for decisions they have made. With their coming to power, the rule of law sector is expected to be a priority and to undergo a profound reform that the VV has never detailed. But that VV criticisms have not turned into concrete alternative and showed interviews in question. Albin Kurti cited four concrete proposals to unscrew the judiciary: New law for prosecutors; New criminal procedure code; The anti-mafia law and training and promotions for judges and prosecutors.

There are two fundamental problems.

First, Kurt gave no concrete proposal on the contents of these laws, leave them with facts the effect they could produce in practice.

Second, it reduced the state capture problem to approval of these laws.

The law on prosecutors has been amended in 2018, with the assistance and support of the EU and US; The new law on criminal procedure went into effect just months ago and was drafted with the support of the EU and US; The anti-mafia law is in procedure, while considering the great focus international organisations have had in Kosovo in terms of rule of law, judges and prosecutors have been and are intensively and consistently part of training. This does not mean that training should not continue, but it is symptoms of power as a mechanism to turn Albin Kurt from revolutionary to institutionalist within a week and still without taking the mandate. It has already reduced the capture of the judiciary with a lack of training and amendment of laws.

If the VV's statements during the campaign were carefully heard and Albin Kurti's interviews after the election turned out to be quite clear that against radical disks, the VV has no clear idea Where i n as It should intervene in the justice and police system to improve the rule of law in Kosovo. In fact, pre-election statements of the type: “Procuror Elez Blakaj will return it to Kosovo, make it the chief state prosecutor and will not dare to threaten”, or express in populist frazeology: Let Lumez [the current chief prosecutor] walk in to return Elesi], best spread his authoritarian instinct to be an all-powerful leader who personally decides for the leaders of legal institutions. Such an approach is deeply problematic because it conflicts with the basic democratic principle of separation of powers and violates the independence of the judiciary.

In the absence of a real strategy for fighting crime and corruption, Kurti tries to convince the public that his presence in power in itself is enough guarantee of success in the fight against corruption. This is just a typical act by the global policy - making reactor.

3. Lack of North Plan

The question of Kosovo's North, which holds Kosovo's development respectively, the integration of Kosovo society, the full extent of state sovereignty, which has not been resolved for 20 years despite numerous discussions of Kosovo government, the commitment of Mitrovica municipality heads, and furthermore, international commitment to finding a sustainable solution. Millions of euros of foreign development agencies have been invested in finding a solution. What has become clear is that resolving the North issue is neither economic nor social but political and ethnic. All those who have dared to propose a solution for the north of Kosovo have been lynned as traitors to the nation by the VV. Now, the “day was” for VV with Prime Minister Albin Kurti to find a solution. The interview revealed that he does not have one.

Albin Kurti reduced the solution for Kosovo's north to a) Dialog from bottom-up; b) Meetings of Albanian and Serbian farmers to discuss problems facing agriculture; C) Building new bridges over the Iber River; and d) Return to their properties of Serbs living in the north, but who are from other parts of Kosovo.

The ease through which Kurt gave these naïve proposals faced a frozen conflict for nearly 20 years implies either non-recognition of the complexity of the situation or, to the worse, that he intends to keep the status quo and do nothing. Ethnic-based conflicts have so much symbolic power that under almost no circumstances can be reduced to ethnic problems. The resolution of political conflicts is the fundamental condition for peace, co-existence and integration, while improving the economic situation is helping, but by no means replacing for the first. In fact, this infantile political approach faced a very complex problem that has been lasting for more than two decades reminds me of the “Golden Solutions” it proposed in 2007, at the time of negotiations on Kosovo's status. At the time, Albin Kurti was so convinced that the process led by Martti Ahtisaari was designed to leave Kosovo under Serbia's sovereignty and eternally under the international tubule that it was fully committed to the implementation of the process, even at the price of political unrest. Founded in the face of a very basic question by a journalist's colleague for the alternative he proposed, Kurti had declared that he would organise mass street protests and even enemies of Kosovo's independence like Russia would back off before the determination of 200,000 Albanian protesters on the streets of Kosovo! What a genius idea!

4. Agreement with Serbia

The final and mutually binding agreement that would result in mutual recognition between the two countries is the fundamental priority of the European Union and the US for Kosovo. Years of EU-led dialogue and different government and negotiating teams have preceded this possible agreement. The US administration only last month has appointed the Special Representative for the Western Balkans and the Special Representative for Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue, who without filling Kosovo first week in office. But, for Albin Kurti, based on what he said during the interview, despite this intense story of negotiations and discussions, everything starts from zero and in total disregard for the achievements so far and the attitudes of international partners.

He provided no concrete alternative or plan for how to approach this dialogue, on whose behalf, as has been done in other campaigns, has led even violent protests and lynching anyone who has been part of this process.

Only two concrete proposals cracked Albin Kurti in this regard: a) Dialogue will begin with “Dialog for Dialogue”. This will have to do with Josep Borrell, the EU Foreign Policy Representative, who comes from a state that does not recognise Kosovo and is very biased towards it in relation to Serbia, and who puts Kosovo in the immediate disadvantage; and b) there will be no agreements without dialogue (indicating that everything before it is unacceptable to it), there will be no dialogue with maps and there will be no maps with surrounding President, implying the full exclusion of President Thaci from the process, despite the fact that there are constitutional restrictions on this aspect.

Asked what his bid would be, or on which point he is willing to negotiate, Kurti replied that his bid is a list of requests for Serbia. While his demands, including the unskilled, are perfectly legitimate, the fact that he claims to sit at a dialogue table with Serbia, led by the US and the EU, without being willing to accept any compromise, show that he or she claims to block the dialogue completely, or reads, probably, completely out of context of geopolitical reality in which Kosovo and the region are found today.

To say that the agreement suits only Serbia in its European integration process, from the prospect of a Kosovo prime minister who knows that international recognition of Kosovo is limited, which does not recognise 5 EU states, which has no visa liberalisation, which is far from the UN seat, at a time when international support for Kosovo is not in its best days dealt with is dangerous political gullible.

Moreover, Kurti, who emphasises the importance of history in politics, in maintaining such an attitude reduces a centuries-old history of hostility between Kosovo and Serbia in Serbia's interest in getting more funds from the EU. The story he refers to well shows that the problem between Kosovo and Serbia is at least financial. Above all, it is a conflict of territory, national and ethnic rights, but at least in the last two decades, geopolitical problems as well.

In the end, despite not long ago being against any negotiations even with the international community, let alone with Serbia, dialogue is no longer disputed whether he himself is prime minister and his leader. Even, Kurti claims he will represent Kosovo at the negotiating table in a unique voice, through a negotiating team that includes the opposition. It is extremely ironic and ironic, because it has not only rejected any international agreement in its report with Kosovo to date (from Rambouillet, including Kosovo's declaration of Independence), not only has it refused to be constructive opposition to any process of importance for Kosovo (even boycotting the Parliament even when a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU was ratified in 2015), but its movement has been practicing political and physical violence consistently. It is ironic how Kurti expects today's opposition to be constructive in relation to him and to enable him so easily to represent the unique <x0-dimensional Kosovo” on the negotiating table.

Another political solution Kurti offered, which is actually just a slogan without content, is the idea of full reciprocity with Serbia as a mechanism that replaces the 100% tax on Serbian products. It is clear to anyone who, unfortunately, Kosovo and Serbia are not in the same position as political power, economic diplomatic, or in relation to each other. It would be of great interest to all of us to know what complete reciprocity means and how it will work in practice. For example, will Kosovo lobby for Serbia's recognition? Since Serbia continues to control parts of Kosovo's territory, will Kosovo do the same with the Presevo Valley?

This too means the logic “s per eye, the tooth for the tooth” that is being developed by eloquence like”reciprocity”.

5. Joining Albania

Perhaps the most scandalous part of Albin Kurt's publication relates to an issue that in many ways has defined the very existence of the VV: joining Albania. From a constitutional element of the Movement, this issue has become inexplicably unprincipled (something that can wait for an indefinite time) and something that can be reduced to co-operating of Kosovo-Albania intergovernmental commissions and working groups.

In fact, if there is an issue that exemplifies the empty political rhetoric of VV and Albin Kurti, then this is the issue of joining Albania.

The national union is the empty, or floating VV target, that takes meaning, importance and priority according to the occasion and need, but that never is clearly articulated, let me turn into literal political strategies that contain ideas, steps, time terms, etc.

These days Kurti declared: “I believe Kosovo should join Albania once it is a successful state”. From a staunch denial of Kosovo's citizenship, including its symbols and judicial order, now that it is close to the prime ministerial office, Kurti sees Kosovo as a self-sufficient project that joins only after it is achieved as a success.

Earlier, Kurti has seen the union as the precondition of development, while now seeing development and success as the precondition of the union.

So he is saying that Kosovo should develop as independent of Albania, while on the programme says Albania's union with Kosovo is a historical right exceeding all economic benefits. Similarly, Kurti claims he will accept Kosovo's anthem if the text is placed. However, earlier he did not oppose the anthem because there was no text, but because it was not Albania's anthem. He accepted nothing but Albania's anthem because he considered the abyss between Kosovo and Albania growing with him.

In fact, in VV Manifest (https://www.vetevendosje.org/wp-content/unloads/2019/01/Manifesti-1494292623.pdf) made at the beginning of its establishment, it makes no mention of joining Albania. There is no mention of the word “reunification” nor of Albania as reference. Even separate words. Neither the Presevo Valley nor the Albanians in Montenegro, Macedonia and Camerie are mentioned.

Only “Vetevendosje Rights” is mentioned. When Self-Determination Rights was realised in 2008 with its declaration of independence, the VV came to mind that Albania exists and began legalising the necessity of joining it.

Now he has no priority and seeing the possibility that Presevo can join Kosovo in an agreement to exchange territories, Kurti says he will commit to advancing the rights of Albanians of the Valley within Serbia. He says the Valley Albanians should use the EU chapter 23 and 24 for Serbia, which concerns basic human rights and the functioning of law and order. He has said he will commit to respecting their rights within Serbia. He has also suggested that they use chapters 23 and 24 from the EU for Serbia. It is therefore seen that Kurti is currently hiding and interpreting the issue of uniting Albanians in accordance with the electoral agenda.

I say “combination of Albanians”, not “with Albania”, as Kurti speaks of the ideal of a joint state of Albanians in the Balkans. It wants a nationalist project that matches the national entity with the political entity, where no three residents of Albanians remain outside the Albanian state.

These relatively brief interviews serve to understand Albin Kurti's political metamorphosis and its unstoppable slide toward the populist disk, where the presence of the leader in power is enough, and all political, economic, and social problems end forever. That's because Leader is the sole guarantee of any success. Because that is the most meaningful expression of the citizen voice for changing and rooting of the past system. Because he's different from any other political leader. Because Albin Kurt and VV. Because. That's enough.

Albin Kurt's political story is the story of a political fanatic in pursuit of lost causes and the story of an unprecedented political metamorphosis on behalf of a dream of power, glory and a name in history. Today, Albin Kurti is near the prime ministerial office of a new state, which he first tried to prevent and then destroy on behalf of the entire Albanian national ideal. He is very close to making the dream and only cause that he has followed for more than a decade: power.

Since the foregrounds of power, numbers, percentages, legal regulations, programs, strategies, and principles have no representation.

In the face of power, all other issues of national unity, anthem, flag also formally lose significance.

They're no longer priorities.