Do not be surprised: Russia could normalise reports between Kosovo, Serbia

“In the Balkans transition is over,” said Remzi Lani, an Albanian political analyst recently. But unlike many other post-communist countries, Mr. Lan had no intention of a transformation from dictatorship to democracy. “We've gone from depressing regimes to depressive. ” He's right. Old Communists and ethnic radical nationalists have ended up; there is economic, social and political stagnation instead.

The question now is how these depressive regimes will adapt to growing geopolitical rivalry.

A day before Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent visit to Belgrade, he expressed deep disappointment with the change of Macedonia's name and accused the United States of “and several other Western countries of “destabilisation” of the region; the Russian foreign minister, meanwhile, denounced the US's “preparedness to take all Balkan countries to Nato as soon as possible and remove Russian influence from that region.” Russia wants to make it clear that this is not what people in the region want.

Seeing Mr. Putin in Belgrade and listening to his rhetoric, someone can only conclude that confrontation in the Balkans between the West and Russia is changing in nature and intensity. In the past decade, Russia was actively defending its economic and cultural presence in the region, but never openly challenged it NATO or the European Union's hegemony. This is over.

At first glance, Russia's ambitions seem unrealistic. The Balkans remain steadfastly turned to the West: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Albania and Montenegro are all members of Natos, and Macedonia is in the last steps of the road to doing so as well. Every country in the region is either a member of the European Union or aspiring to become. The European Union is far from the biggest trade partner in the region, the biggest investor and the preferred destination for migration. The conventional knowledge is that Russia can be disturbing, but no more.

The conventional knowledge could be wrong. Moscow has sensed a critical vulnerability to the Western position in the Balkans: While in countries like Ukraine, the European Union is seen as a symbol of change, in the Balkans it is seen as a defender of the quazo, which may be ready to be destroyed.

The public is frustrated and angry. Ethnic tensions are on the rise. Say every country in the region has seen major anti-government demonstrations. Economic growth is very slow in most countries, misery is widespread and depopulation is at dramatic levels: More than 40 percent of people born in Bosnia and Herzegovina have left their country; about 40 percent of those born in Albania; and about 25 percent of those born in Macedonia have done the same.

And yet, while the initiative in the region has changed, the European Union seems firm to change its approach. This is partly the result of a bureaucratic inertia and lack of political interest. But it also comes from fears that any political change in the Balkans may seem like betrayal of principles.

Wars in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia played a critical role in shaping the political identity of the European Union of the Cold Post. Europeans saw the near tragedy not as a clash between states or nations but between two principles: the principle of ethnic nationalism, sponsored by Slobodan Milosevic, and the principle of multiethnic democracy, embedded by the European Union. In turn, European Union policies towards the Balkans are more ideological than in other parts of the world. Europe's ideological stability is admirable, but it's partly responsible for the paralysis of this region we're talking about.

This is best illustrated by the EU's role in the ongoing diplomacy between Serbia and Kosovo. Dialogue was initiated and encouraged by the European Union because everyone understands that mutual recognition between Belgrade and Pristina is the only way to remove obstacles to a deep economic co-operation that would pave the way for Serbia and Kosovo to enter the EU. But when Serbian President Aleksandar Vuciq and Kosovo counterpart Hashim Thaci began addressing the sensitive issue of “correction” of their borders in order to reach the final agreement, the major European capitals quickly claimed they would never allow that.

Change of borders is never a good idea, especially after the traumatic experiences of ethnic wars in the Balkans. But, I told the elected leaders that they can't form relations between their countries, it's a bad idea. Thus, while European fears are legitimised on how changing Kosovo's border with Serbia would encourage other states to do the same, and the EU has the right to insist that any change of border should be supported by the majority of the population in their countries, the message that comes is still poor. Sounds like Europe is telling its neighbors to stay away from sharp objects. And that's why this has been controversial. The chances of Serbia and Kosovo reaching agreement today are much smaller than it was a few months ago, and the risk of ethnic confrontation is greater.

That's where Russia comes in.

Last November, Mr. Putin met Mr. Putin. Thaci, despite the fact that Moscow does not recognise Kosovo as a state. The meeting gave the signal that Russia does not view its role in the Balkans only as Serbia's protectorate, but also as a potential power dealer. That is why Europeans should not be surprised if Russia soon produces its map for normalising Serbian-Albanian relations. [They should also not be surprised if Turkey expresses interest in such an initiative of Russia].

In other words, Russia's actions in the Balkans are not only ruining the games. Moscow wants to shift the European Union as the mediator for resolving regional conflicts, and also to replace the United States as mediator in the Middle East.

On Friday, after 27 years wasted in disagreement, the Greek Parliament finally approved Macedonia's new name, Northern Macedonia, ending one of the conflicts that was being greatly persecuted during the Balkans. It was a big victory for European strategy in the region. Now, Europe must find similar energy and flexibility to push Serbia and Kosovo to find their compromise. This is the only way to remain relevant in the region and not just being a force that holds the status quo.

♪ Periscope from The New York Times.