Time for Peace Talks Between I SIS and Al Caedas

After nearly 17 years of focusing on the threat of terrorists, the American Defence Community, under President Donald Trump, turned its attention to powerful states. But this may be temporary: the terrorism of jihadist groups remains a powerful threat.

At the very least, the future is likely to bring about more conflicts, combining transnational terrorism and civil war, more co-operation between jihadists and non-jehadist local rebels, and more expansion of “universi” jihadists.

It will be impossible to eliminate terrorism through military force, as the United States must have learned very well already. But possible alternatives to management or control of the threat are few. Therefore, the United States may still be on time to consider the possibility of negotiations.

The United States is willing to support the development of talks with Afghan Taliban. It is worth considering whether the same spirit can be extended to other groups linked to al-Qaeda or even to the Islamic State. The number of conflicts involving rebel jihadist groups, which struggle to overthrow the ruling regimes, has steadily increased over recent decades.

Military intervention in most Muslim countries, dating from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Afghanistan War after 2001, and then the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, opened up opportunities for jihadists to fight foreign invaders and their local customers. It is noteworthy that Al Qaeda began as a movement to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and gained fame, rejecting the invitation of Saudi Arabia and the United States to send troops to protect the kingdom from Iraq in the 1990s.

After Al Qaeda brought the war to the West on September 11, 2001, as the United States and its allies struck with what they called the <x0); the global war on terror”. But this conflict mobilized jihad's supporters as much as punished or discouraged them.

In fact, it helped promote al-Qaeda's growth. And ironically, one of the first branches formed in Iraq after 2003 was the predecessor of the Islamic State, which eventually invaded Iraq and Syria in 2014. Another branch, founded in 2007, was Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb of the Algerian jihadists, and now is a source of division between North Africa and the region of Sahel.

The Arab Spring gave terrorist groups more opportunities to win their war. For example, the riots that began in Syria in 2011 allowed the Islamic State to establish a territorial California in the territories of Iraq and Syria. Military march at a swift speed in the face of an Iraqi army trained and armed by Americans was impressive.

Although the group's territorial ambitions may have sabotaged, the main combat operations ended only this year, and the US Army says the campaign against Islamic State is in its final phase.

But the Islamic State, there are still about 30,000 fighters in Iraq. His most stable jihad contribution could declare Califat, as weak as it inspired terrorism and drew foreign fighters from around the world. Although the rebel cause is on a significant decline in Syria, jihadists are still big players.

Local groups have a strong presence in Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Tunisia, Somalia, and Yemen. As its attackers have hit Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and other targets.

But many divisions and other disputes divide jihadists. The inner struggle of power undermines unity, just as doctrinal and strategic disputes do. For example, Al Qaeda insisted that the Islamic State declaration of a potassium in 2014 was premature.

Even devoted jihadists, who agree that violence is essential to protecting Islam against the West, and that democracy is essentially non-Islamic, opposed the ISIS atrocities. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda has experienced its internal divisions.

In Syria, the original faithful of Al-Qaeda who made up the Al-Nusra throne were separated from the al-Qaeda centre in 2016 on whether the war should focus on the enemy of “acre” or “from”. While Al-Qaeda had always defended an international revolutionary jihad effort by jihad, its Syrian branch preferred to focus on Syria.

This lack of unity among jihadists can be interpreted as a sign of weakness, and governments often try to stir up contentions in the ranks of the opponent. “Split and Sundo” is a useful slogan. But in fact, competition between rival rebels or terrorist factions often makes conflicts more difficult to resolve.

One alternative is to try to solve the root causes of the problem by eliminating conditions that make jihad attractive. But even if they can identify the numerous political, economic, and social causes of violence, their treatment is a costly effort, requiring much patience and persistence, which the current US administration has in short supply.

Under these conditions, negotiations can be a possible option. The traditional view is that jihadists are generally against the talks. For example, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Sayman, both former government officials and authors of the 2003 book “Holy Terron”, argued that today's terrorists do not want a seat on the table; They want to destroy it.

And in fact, some negotiations are completely pointless. In Syria, the most extremist jihad groups rejected any compromise, including ceasefires to allow civilian evacuations.

However, some relatively moderate groups within the overall jihad camp have made arrangements. In fact, Lorraine Al-Sham (a group that is sometimes ally of the Al Nusra Front) has joined Turkey for negotiations with Russia and Iran. And even representatives of the hard line of Front Al Nusra have been divided, whether or not they would cooperate with Turkey's efforts to unify Syrian resistance.

In addition, rebel organizations can sometimes be overlooked and damaged if reconciliation offers are made to individual members. In the Algeria civil war, the Algerian government offered individual amnesty for the rebels, causing many people to desert and cross with the state, or abandon the war.

In the face of a strong military offensive, the reduced organisation also became very brutal until it was expelled from within by leaders who opposed the killing of other Muslims. It was that moment, when the new group took over Al Qaeda's “vagon”.

Of course, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are not Taliban. And today's Taliban differ from the organisation that housed Osama bin Laden before the September 11th attacks. It has new leadership, has not sponsored Transnational terrorism against the United States, and generally attacks military targets within Afghanistan.

But that doesn't mean that the United States should have some illusion about their ultimate intentions, nor should we forget that Al Qaeda is a loyal supporter of the Taliban. But it just doesn't seem like there's any alternative to some kind of compromise in Afghanistan.

The same logic can apply to the chosen groups. A coalition with the jihadist cause.

At least, costs and potential benefits of engagement should be assessed. After all, a military defeat of the Islamic State in Syria and even Iraq would not mean the end of terrorism and extremism.

ISIS has pledged to continue his war, and has called for new attacks in the West. And Al Qaeda and its network of allies will benefit from the decline of their most prominent rival in the Middle East. Meanwhile, most of the fundamental problems that led to the establishment of jihadist organisations continue.

There is no simple answer for implementation in the face of such a complex, extended, and unstable threat. But all options, including negotiations with elected parties, are worth considering.

Note: Martha Crenshaw is an associate at the Centre for Security and International Co-operation at the Freeman Spogley Institute, and political science professor at Stanford University.