Serbia, the factor destabilizing Balkans

Although almost 30 years have passed since Yugoslavia's destruction, the region has not yet been consolidated, which makes it harmful. This largely contributes to the current international context, which in a manner Su generis is translated into the Balkans. The liberal international order, on which the Balkan architecture is established, is markedly at ruin. The region has again begun to sink into instability, with the deepening of threatening crises, both within certain countries and bilateral relations. Nearly every state of the Western Balkans has the potential of „internal crisis“, which primarily stems from the lack of democratic tradition and the unfinished transition process. In addition, the regional context is characterized by the unconventional legacy of war and by unquenchable territorial and ethnic aspirations. Leaving the European perspective reinforces internal and mutual frustrations. In this direction, in global confusion, the Balkans have become the point of developing geostrategic races of powerful members of the international community.

It has already been seen that the European Union and NATO have no key impact on the Balkan countries' internal policy flows. The EU has humiliated other international actors' geostrategic interest in this space. As Bulgarian politicalologist Ivan Krastev says, Russia and Turkey are actively politicising ethnic and religious strains in Balkan countries. The Western Balkan political elites have not shown maturity and responsibility in consolidating the new states. The same have failed to become responsible international subjects with vision of its future. For this reason, the EU, regardless of the current crisis, should clearly define its policy towards the Western Balkans. More is needed than rhetorical support without clear intentions. The greatest support of all the proEuropean social segments is necessary.

Serbia is the key factor of destabilising the region until it does not leave major state nationalism. The Serbian National Elite has targeted international circumstances that, with Russia's help, would enable the rounding of the national project. In keeping alive this important illusion, Russia plays a role, because it has penetrated very deep into Serbian public opinion with the theme that the „Serbs should be very happy that they are not in the EU“. Keeping the Western Balkans out of the EU and rekindled local disputes for Russia represent the undermine or crushing of European unity and the EU's own credibility. Serbia's claims surface both Bosnia and Montenegro and Kosovo and Macedonia. They have become more vocal since the Western Balkans increasingly are treated as unrecognised „ “ (unfinished business). Belgrade still has a destabilising role when it comes to former Yugoslav republics. Despite the agreement signed with Pristina, Belgrade continues with the campaign against Kosovo and Albanians, which is contrary to the spirit of the Agreement. He conducts an international campaign against Kosovo's accession to international organisations, in particular in U NESTO, as well as a special campaign against Kosovo's accession by states that still recognise it. Insulated hysteria, connecting to „Greater Albania“has shown Serbia's true attitude towards Albanians in general. The simulated readiness for dialogue and sincerity in that stance has been the result of EU pressure and the benefit Serbia has had from it. In fact, the Brussels Agreement has been a precedent that has fallen but since the crisis has deteriorated. The pressure of the EU, which as soon as the Kosovo issue is resolved, increases Belgrade's frustration that it has expected the international community to reconcile with the division of Kosovo, which is, as far as Belgrade is concerned, has been the only option on the table. Foreign Affairs Minister Ivica Dacic has defended this option, whenever Kosovo's status is discussed. The president, Aleksandar Vuciq, has not been suggested for the solution and has always prolonged the expression of his stance. He has launched the so-called dialogue for Kosovo, where the majority stance has been crystallised that Kosovo should remain a frozen conflict, so that international circumstances would also take into account Serbian interests (the partition of Kosovo). Defence Minister Aleksandar Vulin has the same attitude. The lonely rational voices against division come only from the civil sector and from some people with renomes.

That Belgrade does not give up the partition has become clear when President Vuciq, following the tour of several western capitals (US and EU), returned sharply disappointed because he had not received support for compromise solutions, responsible for partitioning Kosovo. That world he said: “I hoped in a greater consensus, not only for Kosovo Serbs, but also for Serbia. I honestly say I'm not happy with what I've achieved in the talks, because the great Western powers and decision-making people with whom I've had deep talks, I think they stand firm in the principle of preserving Kosovo's independence, which is very serious for us.” Interestingly, at a meeting with students he has confirmed that he wants talks on Kosovo to be held only between Serbs and Albanians, without the interest of other powers, and that in that case the problems would be easier to solve. This declaration scatters the efforts of both sides to negotiate behind the back of the international community, as speculated in the fall of 2017.

For the moment, Belgrade holds high expectations in US President Donald Trump's undefinated policy concerning the Balkans, in particular after the Trump-Put meeting in Helsinki. Since no one knows what he was talking about, a broad field of speculation has emerged. The US administration still operates on the lines of its predecessor. But, meanwhile, there are also various lobes in action ( East-West Institute, which takes a more flexible stance on Kosovo and advocates policies that should not be based on the old “thes and on unrealistic conditions”. President Trump's National Security adviser, who has claimed that he would not object to the exchange of territories if both sides agreed to this. For recycling the idea for “correction of borders” (which is an old idea) summer emptiness has been used. All relevans have expressed themselves on this issue. President Vuciq, for the first time, has openly supported this proposal, which has triggered major reactions of the Serbian Orthodox Church and nationalist centres. Part of the united opposition has taken a negative stance, accounting for the collapse of Vuciqi. Serbian and Albanian political leaders discretely analyse the possibility of exchange of territories. The same idea circulates for years in Belgrade, but before long it has attracted the attention of Albanian leadership circles. Vuciqi and Thaci have long negotiated divisions, but both, in particular, Thaci, face serious objections.

When it comes to international actors, the difference between EU members -- who, first of all, Britain and Germany -- still show their opposition to changing borders in the Balkans, while the United States is losing its old sharpness in this regard. Germany's officials, in some cases, have claimed that partitioning Kosovo could have destabilising effects on the region and on a wider scale, and therefore Germany unilaterally speaks against partition. Chancellor Angela Merkel, a stance Vuciqi has experienced as a serious blow, has repeated this stance. Serbian analysts consider that from reduced and weakened Serbia, through shelling, sanctions and constant pressures, is expected to become a small and completely harmless member of the European Union. Simply, as Vladislav Jovanoviqi, minister of foreign affairs of Milosevic's time, “would like us to be obedient, accept the defeat and independence of Kosovo.” Many international experts for the Balkans, such as Daniel Server and Janusz Bugajski and others, have also expressed controversial attitudes against division and changing borders. The former Swedish prime minister and high representative for BiH, Carl Bildt, sees the division as a game of fire, which may be a danger to the whole region. For Bildt, the new proposals for partition are recipes for <x2 geopolitical instability”, “opening the Pandora box” and risk for peace in Bosnia, Macedonia...
Russia's view of Kosovo remains principled, which is repeated by Foreign Affairs Ministry spokeswoman Marija Zaharova, who has stressed that Russia does not give up its stance based on international law on respecting Serbia's sovereignty and its domestic lawmakers, adding that Russia will respect the decision of the Serbian people.

The Western international community, aware of the risk of involvement of other actors, who risk the European option for the Balkans, has been the key actor for current developments in the south of the Balkans, supporting the overcoming of the domestic crisis in Macedonia and trying to resolve the name issue with Greece. It has reacted quickly even with Montenegro's NATO accession. For these reasons it can be said that the EU Strategy for Enlargement of the Western Balkans presents a long-term vision for the region, but this is not enough guarantees. Meanwhile, Macedonia and Montenegro have become carriers of the new <x0-seconds in the Balkans”. These two countries, despite many instructions, both internal and external, have accomplished their intentions in various ways. The EU needs to most seriously support such positive trends in the region, in all Western Balkan countries. It is necessary for the EU to react to all impulses in the region from time to time. It should be noted here that Brussels' response to Macedonia's membership talks, ahead in June 2019, is not very encouraging. Despite the internal crisis, EU reforms must be developed in many lanes, including the future of the Western Balkans. Meanwhile, the fall of Euro-entism in public opinion in Serbia is the result of slow progress towards the EU and the prospect of membership, at least for now. The general prosperity and discontent go well for the current president's populism and authoritarianism. The EU should also take into account the character of Balkan societies and show greater historical patience for their problems. By contrast, Russia will sabotage the Western Balkans' advancement towards the EU, it will try to maintain the disfunctionality of countries from the space of the former Yugoslavia, because the Russian role in the Balkans, except the energy sector, is not important for economic engagement. Russia is a mirror of unsuccessful transformations and transitions in the Balkans. The alliance with Russia is based on frustration and resistance to the values on which contemporary Europe stands.

And, in the end, we find that Serbia, as long as it does not give up major state nationalism, will pose a danger to the region and will remain the key factor for its destabilisation. Of course, Serbia will play such a role until the international Western community follows a policy of attracting this country to itself. International policy, until now, has, among other things, not produced visible results, because Belgrade always finds ways to avoid negotiating. Critically, however, is the proposal that the Kosovo issue be passed to the Security Council under the pretext that Mogerini has not been successful. The goal is to bring Russia into play, which at the moment as an interest is for Kosovo to remain a frozen conflict. It would be important that the EU, the US and NATO finally conclude this unfinished issue (unified business) of the Western Balkans, adhering to the framework they already work with for three decades. If there were curves and setbacks on key issues, the Western Balkans would roll towards new chaos.