Can Europe Become Nuclear Power?

“Do we need nuclear bomb?”, asked last month on its first page “Welt am Sonntag”, one of the biggest German newspapers. In one essay, politicologist Christian Hawke replied “po”, arguing that “for the first time since 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany, is no longer under the US nuclear umbrella”.

It's an extraordinary thing, that the peace-loving and anti-storging Germans are playing these ideas today. For 70 years, the NATO coalition has relied on the latest on trust, that in extreme circumstances, the American president would be willing to risk the destruction of Chicago to protect Berlin.

However, Donald Trump's catastrophic attack on Europe this summer when he told coalition leaders that if Europe did not comply with Washington's demands, the US could see its own “ ” has made such belief inappropriate.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin's estimated aggression campaign against Europe, and its repeated display of willingness to use all the means to design Russian power, have reaffirmed Europe's need for a reliable nuclear barrier, as the only alternative to accepting a chronic threat situation.

But this with a German bomb? Nobody wants this: not Germany's allies; not the international community, which realizes that preserving the Treaty for Nonproliferation of Nuclear Arms (NPT) is in the common interest of humanity; and most importantly, not the Germans themselves. However, the nuclear weapons of France and the United Kingdom have the technical capacity to provide a preventive umbrella for Europe.

The idea that the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain may become a kind of European “barrier is not new. Paris and Berlin, they discussed this issue in a voice, in a few moments during the 20th century; Germany even rejected its ratification of the 1974 of NPT, with a clear reserve to the “creation of a European Union, with the proper ability of”.

Of course, it is difficult to predict a reliable offer of a French-British nuclear umbrella for European allies and partners, who are either accepted in the near future. After all, the United Kingdom is on the run from an EU that is barely inspiring confidence; while France does not even carry out its nuclear duties in NATO.

As for future beneficiaries, most of them have not had to think about nuclear issues since the end of the Cold War, and they would prefer much that things remain the same. But it will probably not take long for Trump and Putin to make the approach of the head-to-head “into the sand”, and to force Europe to face what will require its newly proclaimed ambition of “strategic economy”.

And in terms of two nuclear powers, Britain could manage to fulfill Brex, and fulfill its pledge, not to affect its unconditional <x0th> commitment” to Europe's security. While France has a new president who has defended the concept of strategic autonomy, and is not afraid of bold innovations.

Furthermore, the two countries have taken preliminary steps towards mutual nuclear guarantees: the impact of their 2010 Lancaster House 2010 nuclear co-operation treaty, confirms that any threat to one's “vital interests” would equally burden the other side.

If they want to offer Europe a common nuclear security, Britain and France should just continue to walk this way with the deepening of their nuclear partnership (for example, for nuclear alignment and common goals), and by developing their common declarational policy, to make it clear, that what they see as the “vital interest” of Eruopian partners is actually their own interests.

Of course, to create credibility where it really matters in the eyes of the potential aggressor a “extended barrier” It requires that both sides engage in an agreement to produce permanent evidence of mutual trust. Here, NATO has established the corresponding model. Nuclear racers must include beneficiaries in all aspects of nuclear doctrine, policy development and planning, thus sharing the risks and burden.

In NATO, this is aimed at securing bases and aircraft to provide nuclear bombs. In the context of Europe, where most French and British nuclear capabilities are stationed on submarines, cost sharing can be an appropriate alternative.

“But Great Britain and France must prepare for this scenario, deepening their existing nuclear partnership, and repeating that Europe's vital interests are increasingly in harmony with theirs.

Meanwhile, other Europeans have to get out of their comfort, and resume a serious debate about their responsibilities on personal security. Popular speculation about a German bomb cannot survive beyond daily summer news and yet has been a welcome provocation.

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