Time of buzzing: No Kosovo palm can be recovered

Understandably, 9 years of infertility of Kosovo's foreign policy are many. There are so many, so to speak, that they cannot be considered tenacious, but disabled. This best shows the figures, which say that by December 2017, Kosovo had recognised 114 states, approximately 55.9% of UN member states, 82% of EU member states (five countries have not recognised) and 88% of NATO member states.

Of course, all this infertility is well known, that at some given point would favour Serb efforts more than Kosovar on their way to membership in international organs. To analyze infertility is to get into some political anals that are unaware of where the problem starts and where it ends. But, it is enough to see the performance and it is understood that all of the blame can share, as Kosovo does not only belong to those who have led it, but also to those who have not done enough.

If we were to make an analysis-shaped resume, it seems that the recognition of Kosovo has come more from those countries that have held the major burden of support they have given since the first days of the declaration of independence. This is because 46% of its recognitions were made only during 2008. So this indicator stresses that only in the year of the declaration of independence (2008), Kosovo has recognised 53 states (from February 17th to December 5th 2008). While from 2008 to today, the number of recognitions has been on the decline, and for 9 years, Kosovo has recognised only 61 states, which in a simple proportion shows some 6-7 new recognitions annually.

At this level, the irrecognition is put in the face of Serbian destructuring diplomacy, which, throughout the first half of the year 2018, fabricated and defended the paper that Kosovo is no longer recognising but just cremating. So, the countries that have known her are starting to retreat and declare her ignorance. Of course, this thesis did not matter if the number of recognitions actually hit zero for Kosovo diplomacy.

Whatever it may be and no matter how weak the results of Kosovo's recognition by other states, nothing legitimises the exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia. Diplomatic, media, as well as various pressures with or without the archbishop using Serbia are nothing more or less than a cast hook, to catch what it could or to disturb the region's situation at all.

From this situation, as stated in his first few days of American analyst Daniel Cerwer, after Kosovo President Hashim Thaci put the idea of border correction, creates a dangerous idea, which can bring about the destabilisation of the Balkans.

By “The strategy for achieving the full international recognition of the Republic of Kosovo” of the MPJ adopted during June 2011 were the six factors that had thus far hindered the positive performance of new recognitions, and the following:

The rejection of the Ahtisaari Pack by the Security Council's (Russia) permanent membership and the inability to reach consensus on the UN Security Council;

Lack of unity in the EU over Kosovo's independence has created the vision that Kosovo is an unresolved European issue. This, due to the non-recognition by the five member states: Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain;

The misappreciated assessment of some states that Kosovo's independence is the result of “secession” (from a sovereign state) rather than a state created by the violent and non-consensual break-up of a multinational federal state; Serbia sparks such fears with harsh propaganda for “reconceptions of recognition” for countries with internal problems;

The lack of clear interest in recognition by a large number of countries that still have no firm stance on Kosovo's independence, which are far from geographically and politically with Kosovo and the Balkans and do not have Kosovo on their list of priorities;

The removal of Kosovo from the top foreign policy priorities of the supporting countries and the lack of memory for Kosovo's past;

The departure from the international political scene of influential personalities during the process of Kosovo's liberation and independence.

Time is running out, the tail is weighing more than its beak. Since Kosovo's February 17th 2008 declaration of independence, the Republic of Kosovo has had two fundamental goals: internal statehood and the consolidation of Kosovo's citizenship on the international level. Over the past few years, Kosovo's foreign policy has faced a huge resistance, it is evident not only in the number of few recognitions it has had as a state, but also has felt the weight of the Kremlin's foreign policy, which, despite not open, has supported Belgrade in the international arena, especially on the Kosovo issue.

In recent years, facing mounting pressures for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, Pristina has been tempted and instead of maintaining the line of a country to which genocide has been exercised by Serbia and which, with the help of allies, managed to secede and obtain independence, it has stalled in some long-term Brkselian negotiations, the end of which is more pleasing Serbia than Kosovo. For Pristina, negotiations must be clear:

The territory cannot be affected and what has been provided by Pacos Ahtisaari, despite the goals -- Serbian, Russian and any other state -- for changes to “compromis”.

Kosovo must be recognised by as many states as possible through active and rational diplomacy.

The rights of the Serb population in the north, as well as the rights of any other minority, will be equal to the rights of any Kosovo citizen, nothing more and nothing less.

The implementation of Serbian municipalities must adhere to the laws of the state of Kosovo.

The Kosovo road follows the compass of EU membership and any other international institution.

Kosovo's admission to the UN and other international institutions is the largest goal of any government in Pristina.

The strategic alliance with the US and partners that have helped in its independence and the current development is inseparable, indisputable and unequivocal.

Kosovo protects and preserves its territory, (through army or other bodies) as well as its independent executive, lawmaker and law enforcement bodies, as well as protects the lives of any Kosovar citizen from attacks that may come or may be canned.

Kosovo's future is in NATO.

On the other hand, the EU, which over the last decade has experienced an economic crisis and then the long crisis of immigrants from Syria and South Africa, is feeling busy in its jaws of American pressure to break its flirting policy with Russia and to pursue a more pro-American course. The facts show that part of the European states, starting in Germany itself, are closely linked to Russia, and their destiny in ensuring liquid heating gas cannot easily be removed from Moscow.

In this respect, perhaps, institutions or individuals of the Brusselsn policy have repeatedly referred indirectly to supporting the Moscow-backed Serbian demands to dialogue long, unproductive, and with the aim of delaying Kosovo's recognition in the international arena. The longer negotiations in Brussels take place between the two states, the more ground Serbia benefits on the international level, the longer Pristina is delayed in achieving its goals and with much cynicism, the Russian <x0DRuleta” of the unknown future is understood to favour Belgrade having more means for achieving its goals than Pristina.

Moving from the ridiculous topic of the Kosovo <x0 national” to the border demarcation of Montenegro, and these days of exposure from Mr. The Thaci of the “need” for border correction is easily understood at what core Kosovo politics have entered. It has not only emerged from the axis of its strategic goals, but has gone so far as to discuss without having any advantage on the table “correcting” of the borders.

Towards recent claims by President Thaci, Albert Rohan (the deputy of Ahtisaari), former number two in negotiations on Kosovo's final status, which considered ideas for partitioning or exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia to be exceeded and dangerous. Austrian diplomat stressed that Kosovo has already made its compromises, acknowledging Martti Ahtisaari's Pacon, on whose basis it declared independence on February 17th 2008.

But apparently the roarers are doing their job, wasting plenty of time and opportunities for Kosovo, without any benefit, as the future is not known what it brings.