Why did Milosevic surrender to Kosovo?

The real and unresolved mystery of the Kosovo crisis is: Why did Milosevic surrender? Many theories on this matter, but none really convincing. Even if you want to read them in their entirety, it is not clear why 79 days of air bombing have caused the white flag to rise in Belgrade. The most important tests can be summed up this way:

A Military Victory

First version, initially supported by the spokesman NATO: Milosevic has surrendered following the passage of the Alliance's bombings at the expense of his troops, made more efficient after the intervention of KLA people who have removed Serb forces from their whereabouts. The weakness of this theory lies in the awareness that the Serbian Army has left Kosovo in good condition, without suffering much of what from the Allies' air invasions, regardless of the communiques, and without suffering considerable human or material losses. In a clean military profile, the bombings were a real fuse.

A Strategic Victory

Second version, that is, the case of the spokesman NATO takes a step back: Milosevic has been delivered from damage suffered by shelling of Serbian economic infrastructure, an increasingly large hand. Even this theme does not stand, since bombings have never undermined morals neither of the civilian population nor of the military forces. On the contrary: Serbian militia looked almost as if they were waiting for the moment that NATO would finally find the courage for a ground attack to cause, though in part, considerable defeat to allies. Milosevic, has been well-known, is not a sentimental man, and the less reliable that the economic misery of the people may have been crucial to his surrender.

NATO, an unbeatable enemy

Version three, released by the White House: Milosevic has surrendered after realizing that a ground attack was only a matter of days and that the US president was obeying daily and more about its necessity. Untrusted hypothetosis, seeing that when Milosevic surrendered, preparations for a ground attack were still in a mimbronal state. And especially, despite Clinton's continued security, the American leadership was far from having the courage to take responsibility for the bloody land attack.

A Political Success

Fourth version, favoured by the State Department: Milosevic has surrendered after realizing that NATO, thanks to its strong diplomatic harmonisation, would not cease the bombings and that it would remain to the end. The consideration is possible, however, which does not explain why Milosevic has suddenly chosen to abandon the field, especially in light of what was said earlier regarding the inefficacy of shelling on troops, on economics, and the American reluctance to enter land war. A public passive and general military good conditions were his strengths.

Russia Saves NATO

The fifth version, released by all who looked at Russia as an ally even when clearly it was not: Milosevic has surrendered after on 3 June Russia, having strongly supported him, abandoned him in its destiny and chose the West, thus isolating Belgrade and actually deprived it of any alternative choice. This analysis, openly embraced by others by Sir Michael Jackson (the British commander of KFOR), contains some element of authenticity especially if it relates to other theories. But it does not shed light on what Moscow wanted to gain when it seemed to embrace Allied demands and sought to convince the leader of Belgrade to abandon Kosovo, nor on why Milosevic has suddenly become a non-commodic character.

The answer to the mystery should be found in a careful chronological analysis of Moscow's reactions to the crisis, and especially in the apparent strange behaviour of the Kremlin during the 10 crucial days of the conflict, from June 2nd to June 12th. Russian policy towards Kosovo may best be understood in light of three stages being well-informed. The first has been instincting and profound, since it is emotional and instinctively solidarity with Milosevic, condemning NATO attacks and promising to support the leader of Belgrade. Long before the launch of the bombings, Duma has indicated that it would help Milosevic in the event of an attack. And as the X hour approached, the Russians demanded the UN sentence, while Prime Minister Primakov was trying to persuade the Germans to support a strongly peaceful proposal in behalf of Milosevic. As speculation grew for a contingent of Russian volunteers to enter Serbia on orders to assist the Serbian Army, and Western intelligence denounced the sending of military equipment. Furthermore, the Russian position was well photographed on March 25th by the Moskovite daily “Nezavisaya Gazeta”. The “is in Russian interest to allow the United States and NATO, along with their crazy Eastern and Western European allies, to press ahead with the war in the Balkans and to be stuck there. The U.S. Empire's collapse has begun, but when the Kremlin realizes that the European front will remain compact, then the scenario changes and moves to the second stage.

Russia begins to move and not be excluded from Western decisions. He does so during consultations by G-8 foreign ministers. Chernomyrdin, former Prime Minister, plays a first-hand role in trying to convince him NATO is led by a political solution in exchange for Russian domestication. At the end of May, Finnish President Martti Akkashar, who heads the talks on behalf of G-8, also enters the stage. Meanwhile, Chernomyrdin meets separately with the leader of Belgrade, while official Moskovite statements become increasingly severe. On May 26th, Chernomyrdin boton at “The Washington Post” an hysterical editorial, in which it writes that the United States has lost the moral right to be the leader of world democracy in light of the bombings that bury freedom and democracy in Yugoslavia” and requires Belgrade to avoid creating diplomatic relations between the Russians and the Americans until the end of the bombing. The next day he meets with Milosevic. From that moment, in the bow of few days, Russian politics enters the third phase.

Two days after Chernomyrdin's explosive release, it becomes known that his discussion with Milosevic has been quite fruitful. On June 2nd, Russian news reports declare that Aktisaari and former Prime Minister “have submitted Belgrade not one, but two plans” and that “Mosca considers allowing a virtual partition of Kosovo”, with a “Russian <x4contigence” ready to control Kosovo's northeast. 24 hours later, on June 3rd, Milosevic accepts NATO's proposal to withdraw troops from Kosovo, while Chernomiddin declares on Russian state television that “with the Yugoslav request, Russia will also participate in peacekeeping operation”. The sin that escapes events. On June 4th, the Russian Foreign and Defence Ministers assured Duma that Yugoslavia should not be betrayed. On June 5th, Russians do not appear at the first meeting held between Serbian and NATO officers to study the withdrawal details within a week. Between June 5th and June 7th, treaty breaks down and June 10th NATO is expressed in favour of a push.

That same day, a Russian military contingent leaves its location in Bosnia and, in agreement with Serbia, leaves swiftly towards Kosovo. This, while the Russian government assures the US vice president that Russian troops will not enter Kosovo. The White House believes and blocks the NATO commander's plan for a preventative attack in Pristina. At 1:30 a.m., the Russians enter Pristina and, with Serbian help, invade the airport and stop NATO forces from entering. (Various intelligence claims the Russians have been able to rely on a military equipment given by Serbs). A detailed Croatia of this military blitz was published on June 14th by “Mosskovsky Komsomoletts”, which reveals how since June 12th a contingent of 2,500 paralytists was willing to be launched on Pristina, while “that had already been decided that Russia would have a sector of its” in Kosovo. And if Hungary were to stop using its airspace, then Bulgaria would allow the passage, thus giving life to a corridor that directly linked Russia to Kosovo. So, the division of the territory was already uniformly assigned, whether NATO liked it or not. A diverse version of the Kremlin, which dismissed it as demanding Bulgarian permission -- except for Romanian and Hungarian -- to enter the air zone of respect. To stop the operation for fear of a plane crash. Meanwhile, Serbian forces, already on the road to withdrawal, avoid an open support for the Russians to avoid a resumption of the bombing.

During a whole week, Moscow continues to claim one of its own sectors. Until, on June 18th, he accepts halfheartedly to distribute his troops to areas controlled by the French, Americans and Germans. Operations that let you understand very well how Milosevic's surrender is nothing but the other side of the medal and a concerted maneuver between Belgrade and Moscow. Yes, once it realizes that it cannot divide the Alliance, Moscow decides to “be” as a mediator for the West, really negotiating with Belgrade from the start. The idea was to persuade NATO that the right solution was granting Serbia the northeastern Kosovo area, of course under Moscow's control. A solution that would also give value and prestige to Russian diplomatic action. But the project has surrendered since three small European countries have had the benefit of not trusting Moscow, while the project has surrendered. NATO has not wanted to issue over a sector exclusively controlled by the Russians.

In light of these circumstances, it can be said that the Russian double-coho coalition has failed. While Clinton has the luxury of publicly thanking the Kremlin for his cooperation.

(Zbigniew Brzezinski for Global Viewpoint, 1999)