Trump Summit '% Putin: Why should false agreements be avoided?

At his next meeting in Helsinki, Finland, President Donald Trump should focus on works rather than Vladimir Putin's words. Otherwise, the White House will repeat the mistakes of previous American administrations.

In the usual scenario, every new US president believes he may be more successful than his predecessor in establishing a partnership with the Russian leader. Faith has been announced, promises have been made, agreements are ready to be reached, bypassing earlier acts of aggression against its neighbours.

This new ocean guarantees the Kremlin the right calm, to prepare for its next offensive, which will lead to another strain of bilateral relations, and it all starts from scratch. Instead of repeating a cycle that allows Russia to step back after its territorial revisionism, and establish the ground for further debstalments, the US administration should seek the most effective ways to keep Moscow under control, at a time that advances its own interests and its allies.

In all, there are two strategies opposed to the American policy towards Putin's Russia: imperial accommodation or transatlantic insistence. In the first strategy, policymakers estimate that a rapprochement with Moscow will reduce the risk of conflict among major powers, and will provide constructive joint initiatives.

Sadly, those who support such a policy act on the basis of two wrong premises: the one under which the Kremlin is interested in permanent compromises, and that Russia has certain interests toward former satellites that Washington should recognise and accept.

In reality, the Kremlin's negotiating tricks are not intended to secure mutual benefits or <x0 favourable” targets. It is based on the calculations of zero games or the winning-loss formula, in which Moscow estimates it will benefit from a temporary suspension of enmity with the West, even if all its expansionist goals have not been achieved.

This is an application of Lenin's dictatorship, to move “forward, and one step forward after”, and it's nothing more than a tactical pause before the next offensive. The second wrong assumption is that Russia has “national interest” outside its borders.

It reduces the independence and security of all Central and East European states, and empowers Moscow to engage in its imperial adventures. Russia's foreign policy since Putin took power nearly 20 years ago includes determining its neighbours' foreign policies and security, regulating the extent of their territories, and detecting their international alliances.

Suggestions have been made for a “major agreement” between Trump and Putin, which would allow Moscow to claim its rule in all former Soviet territories in exchange for permanent promises to co-operate in other areas.

Paradoxically, recognising Russia's <x0) asymmetrical interests” against its neighbours is more likely to result in a clash with NATO. If the Kremlin is convinced that it has the free hand to intervene in countries along its borders, it can make a false account, and provoke a direct clash with alliance member states.

The great “Pazar” would thus turn into a major failure, increasing the chances that Washington would be involved in a conflict with Moscow. In contrast to a self-blown approach to Russia, transatlantic aid will strengthen America's Alliance and national interests.

The new National Security Strategy of the United States states that Russia is a rival and a contender, aiming to weaken Washington's international influence, and to separate the US from its allies and partners. In light of this prudent geopolitical assessment, Washington's strategy should prevent the Kremlin from undertaking offensive action in Europe, which could provoke a more severe American response.

To achieve this goal, the rights to consolidate the protection of key allies such as Poland, Romania, and three Baltic states. Some measures have already been taken to more effectively protect the security of these vulnerable NATO allies, including the establishment of the Enforced Frontier Presence (eFP).

But more needs to be accomplished in the years to come. In particular, NATO must increase its ability to respond quickly to any possible military movement from Moscow. In addition, Washington must take into account the long-term priorities of creating a more permanent military presence in Poland, as Warsaw has recently requested.

Meanwhile, a stronger commitment is needed to strengthen state sovereignty and national security of all countries of the former Soviet bloc bordering Russia, particularly NATO partners such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan, and the inclusion of more and more of the wavering Russian allies, such as Belarus and Armenia.

A renewed war involving one of these states could destabilise the wider region, and put US allies under pressure. A greater political, military and economic commitment will serve as an obstacle to the Kremlin's intervention.

In essence, there is nothing wrong with meeting with the Russian leader, as long as Trump does not blindly believe Putin's words, or fall into the Kremlin's trap to weaken Europe, and weaken the transatlantic link.

By negotiating from the positions of the military force, Trump must show his authority, marking clear signals of what Washington expects from Moscow, including a withdrawal from Ukraine, and ending military threats against all NATO allies.

On the contrary, as during the Obama administration, the White House will again find itself paralyzed when Putin decides to launch a new international attack. /In Albanian from the world.al