The History of Changing Regimes for Fools

In my final article, I argued that American President Donald Trump's rash decision to violate Iran's nuclear agreement was the first step in a new round of changing regimes in the Middle East. If his aim was to stop an Iranian bomb and prevent a regional arms race, the existing agreement was functioning well and he should be trying to make it permanent instead of getting rid of it. If his goal was to ban Iran's <x0 regional work> ”, the wise strategy would be to keep the country away from nuclear transformation while working with others to bring Iran on its knees through pressure and additional diplomacy. Instead, Trump, national security adviser John Bolton and State Secretary Mike Pompeo hope the violation of Iran's agreement will allow them to impose sanctions on Iran. They hope this pressure will bring down the Islamic Republic or lead Iran's own hard lines to resume its nuclear enrichment programme and provide a pretext for the long-protective fight Bolton has long defended.

The most logical strits could have been first appreciated if this purpose had first meaning. What Does History Teach? Have previous efforts been produced in changing the regime (from the United States and others) the expected benefits, or have they ended up making matters worse? Does changing regimes produce real benefits at relatively low cost, or is the price usually much higher than expected, while the benefits tend to be disappointing?

The answers, in fact, are very obvious, as can be seen from the following brief history of regime change. (Pro warning: It's almost always a really bad idea. )

State coup in Iran, 1953: In the Middle East, the grandfather of the regime changes after World War II was Operation Ayax, the joint American and British effort to bring down the democraticly elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, and the restoration of young Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlav to the throne. The conspiracy was a fine tactical success, and it can be said that chess was a valuable ally for the United States until 1979. But the chess was like a mixed product as an ally (formerly, he started Iran's nuclear weapons programme), and the US's role in putting him on the throne and supporting him is the main reason Aytolah Khomeni and his political descendants have been so hostile to the United States. Lesson: Even short - and medium - term success sometimes brings much bigger problems later.

Suez crisis: After the Egyptian government nationalized the Suez Canal company in 1956 (a perfect judicial maneuver, by the way), the leaders of Britain, France and Israel joined together under a scheme to bring down Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Israel agreed to invade the Sinai Peninsula, providing the pretext for Britain and France to intervene to protect the “channel”. The attackers alleged that the loss would erupt Nasser's prestige and bring his fall. The result was a humiliating failure: Although the Israeli attacks went well, the scheme did not exactly deceive anyone, and the United States and the Soviet Union forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from their territories. Not only did Nasser not fall by power, but the challenge of two previous colonial powers and Israel further established his prestige. Finally, Suez's war mostly came to indicate that Britain and France were no longer great real powers.

Egypt's adventure in Yemen: Unfortunately for Egypt, Nasser's prestige exceeded them in the head and in the early 1960s decided to intervene on the side of the supposedly progressive forces in Yemen Civil War. Egypt eventually sent more than 50,000 troops, spent money they did not have, and ended up withdrawing five years later with nothing to show.

Ariel Sharon's big scheme: In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, apparently in retaliation for the attempted murder of the Israeli ambassador to London, but in fact as part of a large scheme that then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon had cooked. In an Attempt to Break Down PLO and to install a pro-Israel government in Lebanon, Israeli troops invaded its neighbour, knocked down a dozen Syrian planes and chased Jasser Arafate and PLO down to Beirut. But the whole scheme was quickly discovered, and Israel ended up occupying southern Lebanon until 2000, and the final result was Hezbollah's creation. Well done, Aric!

Saddam Hussein vs. World: Debt after the Iran-Iraq War, in 1990 Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and tried to annex it. This open effort to solve its many economic and internal problems failed completely because an unimaginable coalition of Western and Arab powers led by the United States soon gathered to remove Iraq from Kuwait, destroy most of its military power and then destroy its various weapons of mass destruction programmes. Saddam was able to hold power, but his attempt at “to change the” regime in Kuwait was a total failure.

Fall of Taliban: When the Taliban regime in Afghanistan refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to be arrested by the US after 11 September, the United States joined the Northern Afghan Alliance and intervened to expel Taliban from power. Washington later helped coordinate the formation of a new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai. Guess what? This was more than 15 years and a trillion dollars ago, and today the United States is still mired in a war it cannot win and it seems to be beyond its reach. It turns out that the collapse of governments is easy; creating them new is really, really difficult. And don't forget that the Soviet Union had a similar experience when it tried to lead the regime change in Kabul and ended up in a protracted war that couldn't win as well.

United States v. Saddam Hussein, 2003: After September 11th, George W. Bush embraced the neo-servative project for “regional transformation” in the Middle East, beginning with the invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheny were convinced of this crazy scheme; Israeli leaders, such as Shimon Peres, Benjamin Netanyah, and Ehud Barak, helped to sell this idea to the American people, and many liberal hawk books were also used for that purpose. In any case, the whole idea was deceptively positive. The United States had little difficulty defeating Saddam's fourth army, but the final result was a bitter uprising, large-scale expansion of Iranian influence and eventually the showing of Islamic State. The war also cost more than 7,000 American soldiers and contractors their lives and left more than 50,000 injured, cost American taxpayers several trillion. The harsh neuroscientists including John Bolton defend the decision even this day, but neither the price nor the result is what they confidently predicted when they were taking the country to war.

Gaddhafi fall: Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi was a thorn in the American heel since assuming his power in 1969, but a protracted multilateral campaign of sanctions eventually convinced him to give up Libya's weapons of mass destruction programmes, which were not too advanced. In return, George W. Bush agreed to leave him in power and refrain from changing the regime. However, when an anti-Gaddafi uprising began as part of the Arab Spring, President Barack Obama immediately denied Bush's pledge and joined British, French, Oman and several other Arab countries to get rid of the annoying megalomani. The final result was not a new, prosperous and peaceful Libya, however; instead, the country soon went to anarchy, creating new opportunities for the Islamic State and allowing many uncertain weapons to flow into other war zones.

“Assad must be removed” (or maybe not): As with Libya, foreign powers could not resist trying to interfere with the uprising against Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The Obama administration stated that “Assad must be removed”, and Saudi Arabia, the United States, Turkey and a number of other powers tried to assist anti-Assad forces, despite the fear that this could result in power control by jihad. Meanwhile, Russian and Iranian intervention keep Assad in power, and the final result has been more than half a million deaths and a continuing power struggle that continues to escalate further.

I could mention America's failed efforts to manage political transitions in countries such as Yemen or Somalia, but you understand the essence. And you think I've chosen only the biggest disasters, the most comprehensive studies of the full universe of “regime changes imposed on the outside of” have shown that it rarely produces the useful results its supporters predict. In view of this bad story, you would think that external powers would understand that “the change of regime” is a pandora box that is better left closed.

Reasons are not difficult to understand.

First, the collapse of a foreign regime puts other regimes on alert, and they begin to take action to avoid a similar fate. Not surprisingly, Iran and Syria intervened to undermine US efforts in Iraq, for example, because they knew they were next on the US strike list if it would succeed in Iraq's adventure. And it's not surprising that North Korea sacrificed a lot to get nuclear weapons, or that Iran seriously considered this, given that the United States has repeatedly demanded their collapse. The more the United States makes changing the regime a major tool of its foreign policy, the more resistance it is likely to face.

Second, the collapse of a foreign government is not the end of work when hard work starts then really. The removal of an existing regime creates winners and losers, and the latter are usually willing to take up arms or do other unpleasant things to regain their former positions. Instead of a prosperous and sustainable democracy, with political competition being regulated by institutions and true and legitimate norms, the most likely result is a failed state and civil war.

Third, after the new government is installed in power, it is rarely the appropriate tool that regime changers expect. Hamid Karzai was hailed as the ideal leader for post-Taliban Afghanistan, but he was rude and politically unstable, who refused to suppress corruption or take advice from Americans on whom his government depended. Iraqi post-Sadam leaders have also been almost entirely reliable US clients, and some of them, such as former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, were the most sympathetic to Iran since the beginning. Even when you help bring someone to power, they have to govern with their own interests and with political survival in mind, and that often means doing things that Americans will not like. This is especially true in the Middle East, where the United States is not popular (and not without reason).

Mixing this problem is ignorance: Foreign powers that interfere to overthrow a local government rarely know enough about the society they are entering to make wise decisions about the new order now to be created. They will not know which local leaders are reliable or honest, or have enough cultural meaning to create institutions that will be considered legitimate by local populations. No matter how bad things were before the old regime collapsed, the situation will likely be even worse after the old order is destroyed. The regime's changers always claim to be greeted as deliverers, but the most likely result is a population that is soon disappointed and soon turned down and violent.

Finally, no people like to take orders from armed foreign occupants, however sympathetic their original goals may have been, and the heavy measures facing segments of resistance will fuel nationalist passions and generate new sources of opposition. This has been history almost wherever the United States has intervened in recent years, and the experience of the United States is not unique.

The real mystery, of course, is why the United States seems unable to learn this very clear teaching. One of the reasons you don't learn is that it's the countries where it intervenes that keep most of the costs of its imperialist folly, while the only Americans who die or get injured are those who have volunteered for military service. And because the United States now finances wars by borrowing, economic costs will be paid by future generations, not by those who make decisions today. Add to this the falanga of well-funded skifts, paper-led organisations, lobbies and campaign contributors that politicians buy and enable Bolton and the comfortable and soft corners from which it operates and you can begin to understand why a president who often said that the United States should come out of the country's “business building of the nations” are taking steps that will force it to do more of the same. Foreign Police Translation: Read.al