Drugut, Molliq and Ymer risk staying nowhere

If there's been anything that characterizes the Kosovo political scene since the launch of the LDK and its social soles sometime over a decade ago, it has been some continuous friction, however, with not a little tension from political parties to have social reference. This was primarily determined by postwar frustration: there was always a social structure that he found to be politically unrepresented, and from here on, he did. And it wasn't a small structure. Just after the March 2004 riots, which now fill 14 years, the fight for reference in question -- that is, for filling the void of the medium-man hanni -- began to be filled by the PDK, though in a paradoxical version: coming simultaneously with evacuation.

The PDK grew up precisely from its historical reference (left of an undeveloped version, militaristic nature, epic-nationalist discours etc), or better said by making it largely fade (now as a goal but a tool). The PDK was opened to the enrichment, which was wrapped up in privatisation, panajo of interventationist legalisation, and the internationally crowned, turned into some absorption species for soybeans and sorlop, and was all in the end coalition with the LDK. And from Ibrahim Rugova's death there was finally learned a good lesson: the cult of the individual, which the language of capitalism later added to the temperature “PR” played a great role in the Kosovo/Albanian provincial environment.

Her tongue changed. Idealism is falling into pragmatism of Albanian dais. She married the business world. A strange marriage of what neither the economy-political can be called -- since the land we still find among Azem Syla's materials -- implies neither the subject nor the timing as conditions of the modern economy -- but the legacy of space as pre-modern property facts became the eko-nomian (the original/antic understanding of the economy-as is the “home”<2>) of independent Kosovo. As a result, the family, clan, and non-work ethics (in the webean sense of the word), took the dung of local economics and policy.

Many media sold out PDK's as magnet. This whole climb on stage was disguised with a political super-structural dictionary such as <x0-statery”, “government”, <x4-integration” etc., as infrastructure from its political and social meaning began to dam in the state of ministerial investment (asphalt, “nation's path” and so on). These and many other settlers began to characterize this party's new prophecy. And yet the PDK's social references remained strong, since, in a measure, the social tray itself fed this center wheel. Wessel's Lushtaku in Skenderaj share the same energy as Thaci in Pristina, along with the post-war social-mographic globe: continued village-city migration.

In 2004 Veton Surroi's ORA was created. Returning from former Yugoslav anti-Republish in a local-timer with the KLA's pre-war structure; to liberal partisan of the post-war terrain, but that in the external plan was photographed with a nekonnes like Bush corridors of the NATO summit, Surroi had managed to absorb people from civic provinency, whose identity over the last three decades was negatively sealed: sub-bassss that in the most domestical case wanted at least disincent from the village to the return. At least from what they saw as heavy and ignorant peasants (just opening a book of Surroi and seeing insulting language against the entire regions of Kosovo). After a pair of elections, the social references to this party despite being stripped of votes in the 2007 elections were found missing. Surroi saw himself in the vision of 10 years ago: he recovered himself in the offices of the KOHA Group.

Nor the AKR had any social reference. There was even no less impression of Pacolli as a prorus, and timer with Milosevic. But that AKR's boom in the 2007 elections resulted most of some of the Muslim average Kosovo mediocre belief that Pacolli will recover the country economically, through mass employment. And when 2010 arrived, The FER would come out as some sort of composition of the younger generation, whose cultural capital reflected being more Anglofil and Americanofil than locals, since as in ORA's example, their identity over the years has been built into negration and negation (just or unjustly this is another issue).

In some form FER was a new ORA, as is the alternative side. The country's economic policy has already been detected by the clan. And from the fact that it was in their hands, all they had left was the weapon of calling out on foreign schooling, which was to cause damage to the New Spirit. Well noted: Kosovo's average Albanian, who has first tasted Universities in 1970, is deceived to some extent even today after that fable. In other words, FER before they were officially Albanians, they were cultural non-Albanians who wanted grouping Kosovo youth under the neoliberal dung.

But when it happened that they passed the threshold they saw themselves in emptiness. ORA was more numerous, whereas the LDK, however social reference (more distributed than concentrated), was dominated by an average age at which FER Sâ would find common languages. So that self-desiring in the VV was seen as a solution to the best medium term. Not that the VV was better off with her social tissues. On the contrary. But one) uniting the two forces that marked the coming generation post 1975 , 2) access to virtuality (in the form of combating the media power), 3) was the natural growth of support that came after the collapse of the VLAN, equal to 4) the great disappointment that brought out of the country of late 2014, etc., was a bit of a little bit of agligible growth. This marriage between a somewhat idealistic vote with that butterfly, the VV finally smiled in June of last year, fuelled by three years of opposition against Demarketing and Association. To burst months ago like an inflated artificial.

But since the VV's stem, despite deficitism in its social tissues, has in time capitalized a lot of the energy and vitality of that country's idealism as well (unknown precisely in strengthening or weakening this vitality the part of illegal LPK is increasingly taking refuge within the VV), the part that is already being declared independent in the country there is no such thing. This was very easy to see in advance: When Shpend Ahmeti spoke of the national flag at best was viewed as a charming source of comedy. And the depletion of this bloody political vitalism, in addition to leaving independents in large voids (the almost totalness of social reference, failure to follow through by young people and businesses, despite the amphimus and Devolley, the loss of media war) endangers even greater divisions - the one between them. VV stubular in this regard has only been damaged when it is read as a subject that has already lost the butterfly vote it had in FER's electorate,/12 MPs. But not as an idea, since VV is everywhere a faithful electorate.

Independents, meanwhile, are winners not why they have introduced the parliamentary strength of their former subject, but why in fact with their gesture they have secured parliamentary powers similar to the AKR ministries and as alternative seats in the Assembly. That's because independents, like the AKR Alternative, have followed similar ways to power: short ones. It's probably all figured pretty much out by the spirit of haste that created the PAN's creation.

 With a devastating difference: here are the three most talked about individuals after separation, Dorgi, Molyqaj and Ymeri, the three most repeated situation figures come out: neither nationalist nor former nationalist, nor left, nor social democrats, nor idealists, nor dependents on the desired idealism, nor Euroscopics, nor election reference, nor leadership, the situation that makes the environment not less challenging between the Spend Ahmeti of Dardan Sejdiu after the political agenda, who wants to be able to do the most clearly.