Kurdish Dream End

The challenge presented by I The SIS united both the Iraqi coalitions that fought in Iraq and Syria, as well as inside the states and non-state groups that made up it. With his project to annul borders between states, Califat presented a global challenge to Middle Eastern geopolitical assets imposed by Great Britain and France at the end of World War I (The Sykes Picture Agreement). Displacement of I The SIS has been destabilising even within different coalitions itself, as components and their groups are divided into groups and clans in and between. They are ruthless and play double. They don't know the limits to their ability. The United States and Russia don't know how to get rid of this mess. They can't pull back without losing their face. They seek to solve chaos by military means, but they know that only political compromises can solve it. So the conflict in Syria, but also the one in Iraq, are destined to continue long. The Halfhana region has become a war theatre in which great powers and regional actors -- Turkey, Iran -- are faced, but also Israel.

The Kurdish issue should be considered in such a context. With the territorial loss of ISIS's but not ideological loss, with negative reactions to the September 2017 referendum regarding Iraqi Kurdistan independence and Turkey's intervention in Syria ( “The Euphrates Home” and the “Dega of Ulitri”) has opened a third phase of the conflict. The Kurdish national issue has become more central than before. Initially, the Kurdish provided excellent infantry to crush the ISIS. With the loss of the latter and Turkey's gambling entry down, their benefits have been reduced. New interests have become priorities. In its first phase, the conflict in Syria was a civil war, similar to that Libyan against Colonel Gedddafi. In the second, there was especially a battle between the Sun block and the rain. Today's third page consists of a chaotic conflict between global and regional powers and between ethnic, tribal and tribal interests, which have been placed two of their money. Various entities in war are simultaneously allies and enemies and are fragmented in their interior. Nobody trusts anyone else. Situate is hobbessian, a death struggle for everyone. It's complicated because peace processes are two. One in Astana sochi, sponsored by Russia, Turkey and Iran. The other in Geneva, supported by the United Nations and especially by the United States and Saudi Arabia.

fragmentation of Kurdish camp

Crushing Kurds goes down in their history. They were a nomad people, dedicated to livestock and divided into clans and trib plain. The four are the states in which there are significant minorities of 30m Kurds: Turkey, in which there are 14.7 million and accounts for 15% of the population; Iran, with 8.1 million and 10%; Iraq, with 5.5 million and 17.5% and Syria, with 1.7 million and 9.7%. It's a significant minority focused on several provinces, the popular port in territories of four countries, especially in large cities. Istanbul is the largest Kurdish city. In addition, there is a diaspora of over 2 million fornicators, especially in Germany. When it comes to the Kurdish nation, it refers to a reality of nonexistence, unless it refers to the fantasies and dreams of “intellectual”. Syrian and Iraqi Kurds are also deeply divided in the provinces where they make up the majority of the population. Some, like those of Abdullah Ocalan's PKK, dream of a cultural and administrative unity to realistically realise it in co-operation with the different states of the region. Not a real unitar state, as predicted by the Treaty of Sèvre.

Other broad, factual autonomy, such as the one predicted by Masoud Barzani for Iraqi Kurdistan. Independence spoke to the referendum, but not the secession from Baghdad. The administrative, cultural and economic autonomy is allegedly a first step towards a sovereign state. It is a more realistic line, also adopted by Syrian Kurds, to have international support, necessary since Kurds do not have the strength needed to earn it on their own, despite the value of their militia: not available even for an agreement with Bashar al-Assad against Turkey. At the moment, Ankara attacks them in the northwestern enclave of Africa, claiming that the YPG is linked to the PKK. In the future, it is also thought to attack at Manbiy, west of the Euphrates, and then at Rolva, the central region of Kurdish settlements in northeast Syria. But in both Syria and Iraq, Kurds are divided between them.

Kurdish divisions in Iraq

The divisions of Iraqi Kurds have resulted in apparent opposition to the Barzani (KDP) clan party and to the Talabani (PUK) clan, which had split two clear entities since the 1990s. Almost nothing has served both the Union's 2002 agreement, 2006, and the creation of the Change Party (OCCAR), originating from a PUK break. Voted by the most educated young people, she had immediately secured a considerable electoral consensus (in 2012, 38 MPs from 111). It called for the unification of orchard militia, kept according to the KDP and PUK, the banking, transport and TLC fighting. The fragmentation became stronger with the actual division of the KDP, due to existing counters between the son of Masoud Barzani, Masrour, who controlled the peeks, and his cousin Nechivan, who dominated the economy. The clash between the KDP and PUK continued, softened only by the ISIS threat. For example, the second opposed Barzani's call to Turkey for the footstick exercise, ahead of the Mosul attack. Even the PUK was divided into 2016 following the illness of its leader Jalal Talabani into a faction run by his wife and a second run by two associates. As a result, a rift enabled the governments of Baghdad and the teheran to get involved in the political internal affairs of the Kurdistan regional government. PUK and Gorran were against the referendum, desired by Barzani in September 2017. The first, relying on Baghdad and Iran, was in favour of a more cautious line and against excessive ties with Turkey. He wanted to balance them with Tehran's support.

The referendum marked a turning point. It sounded a strong response not only to Baghdad and Tehran's governments but also to Ankara's, not only to preventing flights to Erbil, but also to embargo threats. Baghdad Army and Iraqi Shiite militia recaptured almost all Kurdish-dominated territories in the fight against I The SIS, specifically Kirkuk, “The Kurdish Jeruzalemin” and its oil-rich location. The PUK ordered its peeks not to resist and impulsed its new dissertive initiatives with Baghdad and Tehran. Masoud Barzani resigned from the President at the end of October, claiming he was politically isolated and that he had been abandoned by the United States, in support of which he had long hoped, and in gratitude for the assistance given in fighting I The SIS and its opposition to Iran. Kurdistan's future already depends on the ability of the three parties to find a compromise and find it with Baghdad to save as much of the region's autonomy as possible. Only Saudi Arabia supports them, considering that Kurds, who are Sunni, would limit the power of Baghdad's Shiite government.

Syrian Kurds

Syrian Kurds are less fragmented than those Iraqis. It is even though they do not have to choose between Turkey and Iran. They know Ankara's hostility will not be softened, and that Turkish patriotic opinion is contrary to the autonomy of the guardvas, considered a existential enemy, even more serious than the reconstruction of alauite Syria. With the concern of the United States, Turkey is increasingly linked to Russia, from which it has had approval for “The Euphrates service” and the “Dega of the Olive”, despite traditional ties between Kurds and Moscow, which belong to the Cold War, when the guard constituted the PKK base from which Turkey was attacked, NATO member. For this reason, the leaders at any time have contacted al-Assad. They were never really broken. By 1978 they had an office in Damascus, and during the civil war, they had worked closely with the government, despite good reports with the United States and the formation of several thousand U.S. special forces, both to determine targets for American aircraft and to train The YPG. Syrian Kurds have never questioned the country's unity. They seek only autonomy, which the Alavit regime seems ready to give, unless it is the fact that Kurdish forces will need Damascus to resist Ankara's claim in creating a seat belt on Syrian territory south of its southern borders.

But even among the Syrian Kurds, you were showing a split of “fighters and businessmen”. The latter, compare with the first. They seek to speed up understanding with Damascus and ease the enmity towards Turkey. Their challenges depend on them, especially their main concern - the smuggling of oil. They also think that their level of security can increase the recapture of Sunnitary Arabs from al-Assad, who are majority and are ethnically divided by the Kurds. Even in Syria, the phenomenon occurring in other parts of the Arab world is being verified: ethnic and religious minorities feel more protected by authoritarian regimes than by so-called democratic regimes, which tend to transform into brutal dictatorships of most.

As in Iraq, the evolution of the situation in Syria is unpredictable. It depends on the intervention of foreign global powers, both Russia and the United States and regional ones. The reality is that Kurds are only partly masters of their destiny. It is to be asked whether the Kurdish national movement, or at least, the search for substantial regional autonomy would have been able to re-evaluate the disaster of the failure of the Masoud Barzani referendum, dangerous and disorganized, that all supporters of the Kurdish cause had tried in vain to persuade him to give up, even with the memory of his father's failure, built in 1945 of the Kurdish republic of Mahabad in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The hint of interests followed by foreign powers: Russia and the United States

Russia and the United States are directly committed to conflict. Their rivalry also testified to by the existence of two peace processes: that of Astana and Geneva has certain limits. They want to avoid clashes between the relevant forces and the inevitable subsequent evacuation. Then both do not want future Middle Eastern systems to predict any modification of borders. They know that such a thing would open to the “Pandora's Quat” of new conflicts, which would end up involving them.

Finally, both would like to declare “mission accomplished” and withdraw from the troubled region, but without the possibility of Moscow agreeing to remanage the benefits achieved with its intervention (naval and air bases); the ruling position of al-Assad and the Alaws). For their part, the United States cannot completely abandon their loyal allies whenever it is Syrian, nor can it set free Iran, even from the threat it would pose to Israel's security and the probability of a nuclear and nuclear conflict between the two countries. Besides strategic interests, the tactical interests of both countries are opposed and often contradictory in their own interior. In support of al-Assad and Syrian territorial integrity, Putin will not compromise co-operation reports with Turkey, which put Anakara's NATO affiliation to a serious test. In addition, traditional consensus with Syrian Kurds cannot be completely annulled, linked with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, using them as a backlog on Turkey's southern side, the southern pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. For accuracy, such a period belongs to the fact that the YPG is so closely related to the PKK.

Even the United States must find a compromise between the goal of protecting the Lolva Kurds, him not to disrupt reports with Turkey and him to promote a regime change in Damascus. Of course, they hope that Moscow will be stuck in Syria. This explains the brutal reaction of American aviation against Russian private military company “Wagner”, which has suffered dozens, if not hundreds, of people dead, forcing Putin to declare, among the general island, that the United States had not caused losses among Russian soldiers. Then, Russia must avoid Turkey and Iran initiatives, seeking with a kind of agility not to make anyone unhappy.

Turkey

The Syrian conflict has marked the failure of Turkey's previous foreign policy and the end of both neo-Ottoman trends, as well as its dream of dominance over a “the Sunnitosphere”, following contrasts borne with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which consider the consensus between Ankara and Tehran and the support given to the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdogan has had to give up the dream of domination of the Sun bloc, of the project to drive al-Assad and the one to create from the Mediterranean in Iraq a 30-pound security belt south of Turkish borders. It's been centuries since Erdogan legalised on the cancellation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and cursed the British “Syspion” Lawrence of Arabia, traitor of the Arab cause. Erdogan then entered into a clash with the United States, NATO and the European Union, starting in the July 2016 failed coup, by the American refusal to hand over the Gylen cleric and the removal of training and arms of a 300,000-effective border guard and a limit imposed on civil and political freedoms in Turkey, which have hit the very most pro-Western elements.

There is no other option left than to seek the support of Moscow and Tehran, namely, the traditional enemies of the Ottoman Empire, although being convinced that an Iranian domination in Syria, at least in perspective, will be against Turkish ambitions to become regional hegemony in the Middle East and that he cannot fully believe in supporting the flexibility of Vladimir Putin. Perhaps Erdogan hopes to include China in the Middle East in support of Turkey, even though Beijing is preoccupied with growing Indian influences in Iran. In such a vision, the Middle East would become a confrontational theater between the two Asian giants, which would disrupt the plight of the stalemate from which the United States and Russia seem unable to escape.

Israel

Israel has already been involved in the Syrian conflict. The Jewish state cannot accept the creation of a <x0 land-powered” between Iran and Lebanese hyzballahs, which would strengthen both Iranian influence over Gaza and Hamas, but also the risk of losing the Golan Heights, from which it produces a considerable part of its water. In particular, Jerusalem, which remembers Hizballah's military capacities in the 2006 conflict, fears the rocket weapons of “God's warriors”. So they bombard the missiles and rocket launchers given by Iran and the weapons warehouses that Hizballah owns in Syrian territory. He must have planned a new lightning fight. It may not be limited to Syrian territory, but would quickly extend across the Middle East, putting Washington and Moscow in the face of the need for difficult elections. Jerusalem aims at the actual alliance with Saudi Arabia, which would enjoy a humiliation of its existential enemy, Iran. For his initiative, Jerusalem would have at least silent support on the part of Turkey, placing Moscow in the face of the need for difficult elections.

View closing

The war in Syria is destined to last longer and more internationalize. The event that could exceed the current tide ruled out the fantasy intervention of China and India would be a conflict between Israel and Iran. In such a case, the United States and Russia can hardly sit back. They would be involved in the mess of the Middle East. Nothing makes you predict that the situation will improve quickly. Multilateral diplomacy is powerless. Everyone claims they want to cease a brutal conflict. They can't do it either because local factions fight for their survival and why they think they can only guarantee weapons, even though foreign actors have their own diplomatic interests. Various residents of ceasefires and peace put sticks on each other's wheels. The war is progressively losing every religious compromise, has become geopolitical, characterized by the fight for regional power and that within different groups.

Even from their divisions, despite their military capacities and value, Kurds, both Syrians and Iraqis, are in the midst of several fires, hopes of building a Kurdish state, such as the one envisioned in the Sèvre Treaty, but also to join the Royale Kurds with those Iraqis, but not the good that both sides already love. They were fed by the conviction that they had earned credit for the fight I The SIS and the firm trust in the alliance with the United States. Both have fallen to the end of the fight against I The SIS, with the international isolation they have found, with strong pressures from Iraq, Iran and Turkey, exerted especially after the proposed Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum from Baghdad.

The Kurds have lost one of their most precious assets. Sympathies, which they enjoyed in the West of the value of demonstrating and their warriors in the fight against I SIS, as well as an excellent media campaign, that presented them as the sole Democrats and tolerants of the Middle East. The Democrats are few. They all know a strange form of tribal and tribal democracy that does not ask about any opposition. Tolerants are even less, as demonstrate the brutal ethnic cleansing practiced in territories occupied by ISIS. Kurdish national cause can be born only after a long period.

(The reserve general Carlo Jean is the Geopolistics Doc at Link Campus University and president of the Economic Geopolistic Research Centre)