Erdogan's Islamic agenda and Gylen's race!

From Arbana Jarra and Alon Ben Meir

Until five years ago, Fetullah Gylenn and Turkey's President Erdogan were allies who supported each other. Both used Islam as the basis of their doctrine, which made them ideologically different from secularist revolutionary figures Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the New Republic of Turkey in 1923. In 2002 The AK party was founded by Erdogan, promising broad social and political reforms and economic development. Pledging to make Turkey a model of Islamic democracy, while enjoying the support of Islamic preacher Fetullah Gylenn and his followers.

Many intellectuals in Turkey and abroad were convinced that the party's commitment to democratisation was true, especially during the first five years. This period was marked by a rapid and sweeping economic development, coupled with significant democratic reforms, beginning with a radical reshuffle of civil-military relations with recognition of minority rights, including the language and cultural rights of Kurdish citizens.

These initial reforms created a high level of confidence in the ruling of the AK Party among the Turkish people, including the Glimen Hizmet movement, believing that the AK Party would eliminate all undemocratic aspects of former Turkish governments.

From 2009 to 2011, the AK Party government succeeded in establishing a legal framework that prevented Turkish military involvement in politics from preventing military interventions, what Turkey had suffered in the past. But, as Erdogan consolidated his power, his commitment to creating a full democracy failed to meet all expectations. Instead, it became a very personal autocracy embedded in Erdogan's figure.

Fethullah Gulen left Turkey in 1999 at a time when he was under investigation for the mini-government, which at the time was still firmly controlled by Turkey's secular elite and supported by the military. In 2000, he was found guilty, in absentia, to destroy the government by bringing civil servants into various government offices a lawsuit he denies with persistence, which he returns to be pursued by Erdogan.

Before 1999, Gulen acted within a secular constitutional Turkey, and his followers for the past four decades spread to all of Turkey's institutions. His fans call him a moderate Islamic security marked by his humanitarianism as he promoted his ideology through a network of high-ranking schools in Turkey and around 140 countries around the world.

Historically, the two Islamic organisations were at odds. The Hizmet movement assumes and practices an open version of Islam for dialogue with other religions and believes in differing from below through education. On the other hand, Erdogan and his party embraced mostly adopted political Islam by the Muslim Brotherhood Sunnite, trusting in the changes from above, which they carried out by usurping authority and forcing people to change through state powers.

After being re-elected in 2007 with a stronger mandate, The AKP under Erdogan's leadership grew more convincing with its Islamic ideology. However, despite their different Islamic tendencies, Erdogan signaled his willingness to co-operate with the clergy, whose loyal followers could expand Erdogan's global influence. Erdogan did not trust Glilen, but first decided to co-operate with him in order to win the support of his followers. But when the time came to put himself on a global level, he hit Hizmet and used the coup as an excuse.

Since his 1999 exile, Gulen had built an impressive business empire. His “media framework in Turkey and abroad had become increasingly powerful and schools cared for the next generation. Much of the financial issues were guided by Islamic principles “, Deutsche Welle reported. While Glilene educated young people with foreign science and language, “Erdogan was not so interested in education reflecting his base, which largely consists of the poor and less educated”.

Sitki Ozcan, from the US-based Zaman media, said Erdogan's intentions were to exploit Turkish schools inspired by Glilene worldwide, especially those in Africa and Central Asia, to support his goal, which Sylen understood and later rejected. When we look at Erdogan's statements and documents uncovered in recent years, we can easily say that Erdogan has never liked Güney or his” movement, Ozcan says.

In early 2010, Erdogan concluded that he had gained considerable power in the country and that it was time to realise his long-awaited dream “califat”, though parliament continued to pass reforms regarding human rights, education and minority rights. Meanwhile, Erdogan was still enjoying US, EU and international media respect and was popular in the country for his achievements.

When a corruption scandal was discovered in late 2013, Erdogan had only two options: “either to be brought to justice or to become a dictator and to destroy justice”, Ozcan says.

The BBC reported on the move to Gylinen, questioning its mission by stating that “Hizmet has no formal structure, visible organisation and no official membership, but may have increased into the world's largest Muslim network.” Hizmet is dedicated to promoting development and education projects for the common good. His lawyers claim that they simply work together in an alliance closely related to Mr. Gylen's message, but no one is willing to find out where the money comes from.

Aydogan Vatandas, an investigative journalist from Turkey, says the main reason that the leadership of the Gylen movement failed to see Erdogan's real ambitions was because of their belief that the military's subjection to civilian authority and limiting the influence of the judiciary would have no negative effect on Turkish democracy. “It was wrong to believe that the weakening of these institutions would lead to a democracy display”, Vatandas says. According to him, Erdogan has already consolidated his power to reform society, which led to the cleanup of the entire Gylenn movement from Turkish society.

Hundreds of thousands of people in Turkey have been subject to legal proceedings on false accusations of membership in the Gylen movement since the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, for which he blamed Gyleni. Erdogan has conducted legal procedures against the 445,000 suspected members of the Gylen movement, including judges, teachers, police officers and journalists. Furthermore, Erdogan has kidnapped over 100 suspected members of the Gylen movement from other countries.

Nazmi Ulus, representative of the Gylen movement in Kosovo, said that although the movement keeps their schools (Colegin Mehmet Akif) in Kosovo and supports their activities, they no longer feel secure in this country that allows Turkish aid to kidnap six Gylenists in March of this year. “As far as the people of Kosovo are concerned, we can say we are safe, but again considering Erdogan's self-position and ability to blackmail and act in the region is impossible to say yes, we are sure”.

Although Erdogan was able to derail Hizmet's movement in Turkey, hundreds of thousands of followers of the movement are still alive and are quietly embedded in private and government institutions. And despite Erdogan's efforts to clear Gyleken's followers outside Turkey, the Hizmet movement remains well integrated in many countries, including the US, which are beyond its ability.

To be sure, Erdogan sees Gyleni as his enemy and he does not hide his determination to usurp the leadership of Sunni Islam from Saudi Arabia and revive elements of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the Gylen movement is determined to continue spreading to the ground.

Despite Erdogan's base, most Turks despise him because of the suffering he has caused through his cleansing and the damage to the economy he once strengthened, and this base will not continue to follow his Islamic agenda. Given, however, that unlike Erdogan, Fetullah Gulen enjoys an unelected and deeply honored position by his followers, his society-oriented Islamic philosophy will surely survive Erdogan's political Islam, which can be reduced once he leaves the political scene!