Kosovo, Serbia determine peace

Some argue that the risks are simply very essential for the international community to consider “the idea of border arrangements”, or territorial exchanges, including Serb-populated territories in northern Kosovo and those populated with Albanians in southern Serbia, which is being pushed by Serbian President Aleksandar Vuciq and his Kosovo counterpart, Hashim Thaci.

Critics, as the core of their arguments, decide the possibility of spreading this idea throughout the Balkans.

If Belgrade and Pristina exchange territories, it would mean for Croats and Serbs in Bosnia who, too, can find a way to separate and join their people in Croatia and Serbia, dividing Bosnia in this process. Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro would demand the same.

But are these not the same arguments that were made or could have been made in 2008 when unilateral Kosovo declared independence from Serbia and was immediately recognised by the United States as a special country?

Kosovo consists of 95 percent of the Albanian population. The secession from Serbia was an ethnic division and an overhaul of borders on a massive scale.

Ten years ago, most of the supervisors of the situation -- in the United States and Europe -- concluded that the only practical solution to the Kosovo issue, which was under the direction of the United Nations and NATO since 1999 -- was to give full territory and citizenship. Until Croats and Serbs were allowed to secede during Yugoslavia's bloody war in the 1990s, the international community rightly stated that the borders of Bosnia and Croatia could not be changed, the same principle was not implemented in Serbia regarding Kosovo.

Kosovo was said to be unique. What makes it interesting is that many who are currently opposed to this border agreement between Serbia and Kosovo supported Sui generis argument in 2008 and argued that no consequences would be found in Pristina.

Croatians and Serbs in Bosnia would stay together because they were told that Kosovo was not precedent. Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro were told the same thing. It was announced out loud that Kosovo's secession from Serbia cannot be used as a model of minorities in the Balkans or anywhere else.

And what happened? Absolutely nothing. Except for some light and unconstructed rhetoric, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia actually remained together, as did Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro.

In fact, all arguments that were made in favour of Kosovo's declaration of independence a decade ago can be done today in favour of land swaps between Serbia and Kosovo.

A peaceful and common exchange between territories between Serbia and Kosovo should be acceptable to those who want to see stability in the Balkans. Such an agreement would have to include features to convince skeptics.

First, it must lead to normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, including an exchange between representatives. Second, the agreement should give Pristina the right to apply and join international institutions, such as the United Nations. Third, Belgrade must clearly show Serbs in Bosnia that the only way to get rid of the borders they share is when both countries are in the EU.

Such a declaration would have to be made in written form and ratified in Serbia's parliament. Albania and Kosovo should have the same obligation as for Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro.

Finally, the EU must be firm and convinced of its commitment to accepting the new members of the Western Balkans as soon as these countries have met the necessary accession criteria.

In addition to averting the prospect of conflict between Serbs and Albanians, this agreement on exchanging territories of the northern part of Kosovo for the southern parts of Serbia will remove Russia's main lever over Serbia and save the Balkans from the vile Russian influence.

For now, the Kremlin uses Kosovo to blackmail Serbia. Belgrade cannot go against Moscow in any way, because it would follow Russian threats of veto removal to the Security Council and allow Kosovo to join the United Nations before Serbia and Kosovo reach an agreement between themselves.

If Serbia and Kosovo can make their deal, this lever will disappear and Russia's position will be weakened in line with the circumstances.

Moscow can then try to pressure concessions, perhaps seeking assurances from Serbia that it will never join NATO, but that such costs will likely be more costly than the benefits of normalising relations with Kosovo, with fully consolidated borders and a clear path towards the EU.

Both Vuciqi and Thaci should be valued for their bravery. Both leaders are going against the promotional political structure in Serbia and Kosovo.

For each one, the easiest and most logical move is no movement.

However, they have chosen to close their eyes temporarily and avoid Balkan policy laws. This union of literal leadership in Serbia and Kosovo will not likely recover for decades or perhaps longer. Let's give Serbia and Kosovo the opportunity to achieve and determine their own peace.

(Daniel P. Vajdic is a senior non-resident member of the Atlantic Council and former European and Eurasian leadership station on the Senate Committee for Foreign Relations. )