Is Trump normal in foreign policy?

Presidents form foreign policy but it's scary, given what we know about Trump. In the debate whether Trump's first year has been better or worse than expected, real fear is that the worst has not yet come.

For researchers dealing with the effects of presidential leadership on US foreign policy, Donald Trump's surprise victory in 2016 has offered him a very strong test. What does it mean for the United States to choose an inexperienced leader in government with little knowledge of foreign policy and a clear contempt for expertise?

After a year in office, Trump confirmed much of what we knew about the way leaders matter: he has remained loyal to the few views he brought with him, showed the importance of substantial knowledge (or lack of it) of decision making, and showed why advisers cannot replace experienced leadership. In other ways, he has surprised, largely by failing to appoint people who can help him get what he wants. And while the world will face at least three more years of Trump, there is little reason to think that his behavior will change in the future.

THE EATHER OF ONE GREAT
International relations researchers believed that leaders don't really matter. The states will act as they do, no matter who's in charge. Political scientist Kenneth Waltz, for example, has argued that the restrictions of the international system, not individuals or domestic politics, determine the actions of states.
Recently, though, this view has begun to change. Long before Trump's election, researchers had collected a host of new evidence about how individual leaders influence the behavior of their countries. A breakthrough is that the experiences and preliminary beliefs of leaders, formed long before they arrive in office, form how they make decisions, from obtaining and processing information to discuss with advisers and ultimately to decide on a move. What we see when leaders enter the office is essentially what we'll get, at least for the first years.
Three things from theory differ in particular. First of all, the leaders' beliefs are “tranche”, which means they form before the leaders come into office and do not try to change much over time. As former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger writes in his memoirs, “The beliefs that leaders formed before reaching the top office are intellectual capital that will consume as long as they continue to remain in office.” Although this climb is sometimes viewed as a defect, fixed beliefs are, as political scientist Robert Jévis argued, needed guides that help decisionmakers face a complex world. We don't want the beliefs of our leaders to change very often, we don't want the contagious beliefs to be a feature, not something annoying.
The second approach is that issues of substantial knowledge are important for leaders to be informed about the world and there is no shortcut to gaining that knowledge during work. Research on expertise shows that it is “specificion”, which means it is not translated from one topic or topic into another; even chess experts are humble from placing random pieces on a board. Not surprisingly, then, the business experience does not translate into the mind of foreign policy.
Third, though bureaucratic advisers and appointments are crucial, they do not replace a leader with direct foreign policy expertise. The inexperienced leaders often say that counselors can fill gaps in their knowledge or guide them during their work. During the 2000 presidential campaign, for example, George W. Bush stressed that he would be surrounded by good people, strong, capable and smart”.
But, as my last job has shown, it is very important that a president has as much knowledge of foreign policy as his advisers. Experienced leaders provide better supervision of foreign policy decision-making, because they are more likely to ask difficult questions, identify a poor schedule or accept unrealistic proposals. Their reputation for expertise can improve oversight indirectly, as subordinates know their boss will control their work. Experienced presidents are also better able to use various advisory sources.
In Bush's case, his lack of experience empowered advisers like Vice President Dick Chen to act without supervision, leading to the weak planning of war in Iraq and its consequences. By contrast, Bush's father, former President George HW Bush, was highly supported by the same advisers, including Chenny (who was secretary of defence), to plan a successful Gulf War in 1991. One important change was that old Bush, former vice president, embassy at the UN and CIA director, had deep foreign policy experience that prompted his team to ask questions and review war plans before sending them to the Oval Office.

NJ Um... PRESIDENT NORMAL?
Despite the almost constant drama of the past 12 months, Trump's first year in office has confirmed much of what we know about how leaders influence foreign policy. That doesn't mean Trump played the old rules he didn't do anything like that. But he is essentially the president elected on November 8, 2016: a man with some fixed trust and basic little knowledge. And his actions as president have attempted to confirm the three views mentioned above.
First, although Trump is often accused of lack of fixed faith, he has several views that are evident before the elections. Just one year before Trump's inauguration, journalist Thomas Wright argued in Politico that the then candidate had three clear beliefs: he was against trade, alliances and in favour of strong men of the state abroad.
Trump has remained loyal to those beliefs during his first year at the White House. Immediately after entering office, he withdrew the United States from the Trans-Peace Partnership (TPP), and he made clear his opposition to trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement. After statements against NATO during the campaign, Trump raised doubts about the United States' commitment to Article 5 ʹ which envisions collective protection when he refused to support it in a speech in Brussels (he finally reaffirmed Article 5's commitment when he returned to Washington). And his admiration for authoritarian leaders has been evident, reflected in his public praise for the leaders of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. These beliefs have proved to be highly contagious.
Second, Trump has been damaged by lack of experience and lack of knowledge. His actions, including the accidental discovery of classified information for the Russian ambassador and the trumpeting of symbolic business agreements with an increasingly safe China, even though other TPP countries try to continue with a multilateral agreement without the United States, reveal a careless man with a gullible belief in bilateral agreements, not a chief negotiator.
Thirdly, Trump's team has not been able to replace its lack of knowledge, even where there is experience. Although Defence Secretary James Mattis is effectively running the Pentagon, as a group, Trump advisers are not limiting it, nor are they channeling its preferences to consistent politics. For example, as Susan Glasser for Politico reported, during his trip to Europe this summer, Trump removed a reference to his speech in NATO's Article 5 at the last minute, bypassing his team. The president's continued Twitter threats to North Korea also undermine the notion of a consistent administration policy.

SU TRUMP RIPRIZS
Where Trump really surprised is in the field of personnel. In a sense, his refusal of expertise should be expected, given the populist approach of his campaign. But when someone sees more widely in US foreign policy history, the sharp division between Trump and Republican foreign policy and the national security community is extraordinary. This community was in the introduction of the “Movement Never Trump” during the campaign, as symbolized by an open letter of March 2016 opposing Trump, which was signed by 122 Republican national security professionals. In exchange, Trump has refused to appoint these professionals to positions within his administration.
Instead, with some visible exceptions, Trump has filled his administration with very inexperienced people. Most of the presidencys try to find their base, and especially when their party has been out of power for a long time, the new presidents often face the challenge of having a knowledge-appointed but with little direct experience or years outside the government. But an inexperienced president who deliberately chooses inexperienced advisers was, until before Trump, basically unimaginable.
The Trump administration has either refused or failed to make appointments on an unprecedented scale, even leaving what most observers consider important foreign policy countries, such as ambassadors to Europe and the Middle East, incomplete. Trump himself has left little doubt that this absence, as well as the reduction of the State Department, is deliberately, stating in response to a question of the State Department's free working places that “I am the only one that matters”.
Part of what makes Trump's behaviour in this surprise area is that even though his refusal of expertise clearly has a political appeal, it also makes it harder to get the policies it wants. Even a president who wants to do less in the world still has some advantages. Career officials can fill the gaps temporarily, but it takes political appointees to try to translate the president's words into actions.
The first year is usually what the presidents do what I call “political investments”, which include staff decisions, budgets, strategies and creation and institutional change. Presidents differ in their ability to make these investments. But most, up to Trump, at least tried.

What? THREE ET Hello?
What should we wait for the rest of Trump's mandate? Not much to learn, that's for sure. Learning is often slow when it develops. For example, George W. Bush was held in his second term when he faced the difficult realities of Iraq. But Bush read books and consulted with foreign experts. Such teaching requires opening up to new ideas and new people - both qualities that Trump is severely lacking.
There are also long-term effects that we have not begun to appreciate. As Jim Goldgeier and I wrote in this magazine shortly after the inauguration, a very good foreign policy is invisible. Diplomacy, trade and alliances - all things Trump despises have benefits that can be difficult to see until they are gone. But as a security policy, we only miss it when it is necessary. The weakening of Trump from these foreign policy tools leaves the United States badly prepared for crises that inevitably challenge presidents.
Trump's leadership has confirmed much of what we know about how the presidents form foreign policy but that's frightening, given what we know about Trump. In the debate whether Trump's first year has been better or worse than expected, the real fear is that the worst will come.

From: read.al