I find that old Europe “was dying”. Not so today.

Donald Trump, the American president, leads alongside an almost paralyzed Congress to issue laws. In both countries, left and far-right movements and ideas have more supporters than ever before. Political debate is filled with anger and hatred and violence. Armed men have already shot lawmakers in Washington, left and right. In Britain last year, an MP was killed in the assassination.

Meanwhile, Emmanuel Macron, the new French president, is achieving something extraordinary: His new centre party, “Republic in motion”, is on track to win a vast and unprecedented majority in the French parliament. Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, will probably be re-elected to a third term in September, by voters who still favour central parties in majority. Even in Italy, where rumours of an increase in populism have recently become stronger, voters rejected that party in large numbers in local elections.

Remember Old Europe? It was said to be dying, becoming insignificant, there was a “cumen” in which the British did not want to rot, and now, suddenly, it is gone. Suddenly it looks more stable, more hopeful, and especially consensual. It's discussed reform and renovation, not revolution. Economic growth has increased. Forecasts of right extreme growth have failed to materialise.

Paris and Berlin are united and secure, while Washington and London are separate and dysfunctional. Something is rotten in the Anglo-Saxon world, or at least on its U.S. Queen-United axis. Although it's too early to be definition, I'm here to state some assumptions about why this happened:

Inequality: In relative terms, Britain and the United States have greater inequality than the rest of the developed world, of course more than Germany and France. Although it is hard to prove that it has increased, some indicators say inequality has actually dropped since 2008 in both countries, the perception of inequality is strong. This can be because each of them has tolerated the birth of an oligarchy: High wages for corporate directors, the spread of luxury real estate and all-out billionaires, in the media and politics, can affect the way people vote.

Low Social Expenses: In relative terms, Britain and the United States do so less. The United States is in the lower part of the spectrum, and Britain is closer to the middle, well below Germany and France. Even here, perceptions can be important. In the United States, the health care dispute has radicalised the issue. In Britain, savings budgets (unable to end deficits) reduced social spending in ways that people noticed. London's terrible rock fire this week has raised questions about recent cuts in fire department budgets.

English: It seems strange, but think of the use of English as the language of the world trade has been an advantage of trade in the United States and Britain, but it has also made both countries' economy and policy more open to external, more difficult to fix and, as a result, unstable. English has also become the language of the digital and internet revolution. New technologies are used first in the United States and Britain, and experimentation is healthy, but can also create obstacles and discontent. The sudden and unexpected call of political homesickness in both countries for the years 50s, for a simpler “ ” ) can reflect the fact that everyone has had so many “turities” recently.

Brexit Effect / Trump: Contrary to expectations, the Brex referendum and the spectacle of British political turmoil have led to an increase in support for the European Union and the centre's policy throughout the continent. President Trump and chaos at the White House have also damaged support for parties perceived as his allies. Norbert Hofer in Austria, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands and Marine Le Pen in France far worse than expected in the last elections. The extreme right is also contracting in Germany. Trump's ties to Britain's Theresa Mayn can harm the prime minister.

Vote: In an era of political changes, proportional representation and mixed systems produce a wider and more flexible range of political parties than Anglo-Saxon binary systems. The big parties, which are actually coalitions of the Republicans, Democrats, conservatives and labists, are more difficult to manage and reform in an era of change. Unable to find anything they like from what is offered in a political system “remaining”, voters support “outside”, such as Trump and labist Jeremy Corbyn. It is difficult to imagine a new party, such as the Republic “in Marshim” of Macro, to be born in the United States or Britain.

Pride: Both Britain or better England and the United States remain convinced of their extraordinaryness. An important part of the political classes of each country the followers of “America first”, some of the Brex followers still believe they can “cece ahead of only” and live happily without allies. French and German voters have reverse historical experience. Most still want to be part of economic and military alliances. Old generations in particular fear extremism and are more cautious than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.

Fate: If some voting had gone differently over the past two years, the United States and Britain could easily be governed, respectively, by Hillary Clinton and David Cameron. And we wouldn't be talking about any of this. / The Washington Post ) The world..