Supported or expelled in pluralism and liberalism?

One of the most controversial issues in the field of political theory has been, and the debate about pluralism and its possible connection to liberalisation remains. These two concepts, of course, constitute two separate central theoretical categories in the field of political theory, given the development of debates within them, as well as the acceptance or opposition that has been made to their idea on political grounds. It is also seen by the different definitions or meanings that various authors (e.g. George Crown, 1994; John Gray, 1996) gives these two concepts, they have often theorized a tension and incompatibility in the relationship between pluralism and liberalisation. Against the different attitudes of these authors, and focusing mainly on the attitude and arguments presented by Isaiah Berlin, we argue here that in theory and practice there is a common connection and support relationship between pluralism and liberalisation. So the main principles that pluralism protects, such as plurality of value, incompatibility, numerous concepts of good etc., find themselves best in the context of a liberal society.

The principles of the plurality of their value and co-mity were central to the examination of Isaiah Berlin of the relationship between liberalisation and pluralism. For Berlin (1969), there is naturally a plurality of different values and beliefs in people, which are naturally conflicted, clash with each other, and cannot be reduced to one another. This, he takes as a conceptual truth, and when he tells us in his attitude that: “between the various components that pluralism contains, the most essential thing is to argue that values are plural, which means they are neither forms nor backgrounds from a single source”. And from this point on, from the idea that we don't have a single source or origin of which values originate, we also have the claim of justifying the existence and objectivity of these values, the different beliefs where everyone believes or wants to believe as the ultimate purposes for his/her life. In fact, this is also evident in Isaiah Berlin's definition of pluralism in his famous work The Crouched Number of Humanity (1990), like “the perception that there are different conclusions that man can see and yet still be fully rational, fully human, capable of understanding each other, and of liking and receiving light from each other”

Another important point that pluralism protects, and which basically has to do with justifying existence and claiming the objectivity of different values, has to do with non-communication and incomparability of these values. Because for Berlin, pluralism is primarily and essentially a theory of noncommunication of different values, we have to stop explaining it. Incompatibility is designed to say that there is no single scale of value units in terms of which different values can be measured. That term is often understood Incompatible The idea that things, in this case, cannot be compared. These two terms are important in the analysis of pluralism, for they also suggest that there cannot be a list of the goods or values given first. aprior and the hierarchically listed, by which you can measure, evaluate, or show the validity of each of them; on the other hand, since the concepts of good, the end goals of people are different, they can also be incompatible, and as such, they are also unique among them, and should be allowed to be followed freely by their “<1>.

Now the question of how pluralism and the principles it predicts is related to liberalization. For defenders of the idea that there is a logical connection between them, at the heart of the argument that liberalisation and pluralism match the claim that the plurality of the value of non-communication and the numerous concepts of good is the starting point of liberalisation (Schlosberg: 2006). It is known that for liberalization, regardless of the different interpretations that can be done and that lead to different directions, the principal principle, the fundamental central value for it, is Freedom: I understand this as a freedom to act, freedom to choose, freedom to pursue different end goals for life, and so on. Right here, is the point where plurality of value takes on its specific importance, since it assumes that individuals must be free to know and follow all the true values and genomes they believe in. So we see that we have a match between the idea of plurality of value and that of individual freedom (agreed rather in its negative conception). Liberal principles serve as the empirical reality of pluralism of value. Ideally, a liberal pluralistic society “would organize itself around the principle of maximum possible adaptation of various legitimate lifestyles” (William Galston, 2002). So that it would tolerate these different life - styles and also ensure the maximum possible adaptation within the context of a society.

In this regard, another value of liberalisation is also noteworthy. autonomy, which finds and finds harmony and support in the context of a pluralistic society. We can understand it as having a space within which individual/or groups are free to develop their beliefs and act in the way they think the best they can for them, without being forced or forced by factors or external institutions. That the liberal value of autonomy finds itself, and co - logically, within a pluralistic society, that is highlighted at Galston (2002): the liberal “>>of autonomy can only be realised in a pluralistic society, and thus the assessment of autonomy leads to assessing moral pluralism... Moral Pluralism, he argues, openly supports the importance of freedom in a way that monastic theories do not. So the author here tells us that an assessment of self - autonomy and/or the natural group also leads to recognition, or at least to an admission, of different ways of seeing things from others, of different ways of acting, of judging, etc. And such a thing can best happen only in the context of a liberal pluralistic society.

Another argument that shows the link between pluralism and liberalisation has to do with the importance of both, making elections by the individual. As we noted earlier, there is a natural conflict between values and life - styles that are issues that plurality is concerned with, and on which individuals are required to make choices. And just making these choices, which determine the nature of what we are, what we do, become best in the context of a plural and free society. That's what Isaiah Berlin (1990) means when it says that “pluralism is the best context for making elections because it recognises as unco-ordination and rivalry through values”. This is because, in this rivalry or conflict between different values, pluralism maintains the idea that there cannot be a choice/an exact and only response that serves at once all the values and interests that people have, so they should be set free to choose or pursue the values they believe are best for them.

Another argument that is presented in the link between pluralism and liberalisation is the one dealing with the group (groups) where individuals belong, as well as the recognition of the differences between these groups. While it is acknowledged that the pluralistic thought is generally more focused on the group, recognizes the importance it has in shaping the identity and behavior of individuals who make up it, and validates it and legitimizes the variations of values, beliefs, different lifestyles that characterize different groups, criticisms that are addressed to liberalisation at this point, and that it claims that even separates it from the relationship to plurality of its individualistic nature, the absence of socialism in the liberal sense, or a lack of ground between individuals, and the state, which is a lack of recognition of the differences of the group and autonomy. However, such assumptions seem to be rejected by liberal pluralistic authors, who claim that liberalism does not only serve individual or individualism in society, but generally serves groups as such. We see this from William Galvon when he tells us that: “Liberalism requires a powerful, though controversial, assumption, in favor of individuals and groups to direct their lives as they deem it reasonable, within a broad range of legitimate variations, in accordance with their understanding of what gives meaning and value to life”. For Isaiah Berlin, this freedom and recognition of self - determination in a liberal society is not only for individuals but also for groups. Thus, we understand from these lines a protection of liberalisation at this point, claiming that he also serves various groups that make up society, knows their diversity, and their self - determination on the basis of what they see to give value and meaning to their lives, without the implications of the interventions that may come from outside (group).

It is precisely from the context of freedom protected by liberalism that pluralism also takes on its specific importance, since it assumes that individuals must be free to recognize and pursue all the genomes they believe in. As Peter Lassman (1999) with a keen point: “is hard to see how anyone would accept pluralism unless they previously accepted liberal ideas” themselves. So, as we discussed in this article, we find that there is a relationship, a common relationship of support between pluralism and liberalism, which finds (can) find itself in a life of life on the practical ground in a certain society.