Why does Latin America turn left?

In the November elections in Chile, the anti-stablishment vote was the name of the game. A new populist left coalition, modelled after Spanish Podemos, received one fifth of the vote. Many recorded figures in political life, including Senate President, lost their seats in Congress. Commentators rushed to say there was a return of the electorate to the left.

And yet, in the second round of voting held on December 17th, the Chileans turned billionaire Sebastián Piñera into the presidential palace. How is that possible? And what does this paradox reveal about the state of politics in Chile and the region?

In much of the international press, standard narraviti says something like this: because Latin America makes the distribution of the world's most uneven income, it tends to choose leftist reformers. When reformers keep their word and offer genetic social benefits, voters love it and demand to keep the same person or the same party in government.

If the world worked so simply, then Michelle Bachelett, Socialist President Kilyan, who raised taxes for the rich, increased the income for the poor, enabled free university education, and sent out a bill with very geerious pensions... would have succeeded in choosing its continuing course. But he failed.

Today, only two out of five pounds approve of the way she cared for these reforms. Her leftist coalition has been split, traditional Socialists and Social Democrats have lost seats in Congress, and her biggest nightmare has become reality: again [it happened near 2010] she had to hand over the conservative duty, Piñera.

Chile is not unique in this regard. Voters in Argentina and Peru have recently preferred successful businessmen [Mauricio Macri and Pedro Pablo Kucynski, respectively] of populist, left and right options. In Brazil, Dilma Roussef was charged and removed from the office. Her Worker's Party [ The PT] coughed in popularity and the pro-business administration that came became quite familiar with what seems to be a regional trend.

Why are Latin American voters giving up the populist or semi-populistic left? Standard explanation is corruption. In Argentina and Brazil, of course, one may not understand the latest political changes without referring to the Peronists and the Workers' Party's past. The best gift the Machri administration could receive was the discovery of a former individual minister while trying to hide millions of dollars and euros in a local country.

But this simple explanation does not match Chile. True, Bachelet's son and daughter were involved in a secret state agreement. But Piñera is no saint. In 2007, for example, Chile's security regulator fined him for internal agreement. In many countries, this would have been the end of his political career and he has other issues with the law.

So why did the pounds vote for him?

One reason is Bachelet's ill - diagnosed left Chile. When students took to the streets in 2011, other groups joined, left intellectuals interpreted this as a rejection of what was called “Model”: a market-based economy that was open to the world, with a major role for the private sector in public service projections such as health, education and pensions.

The Bachelet administration had cut the finances for private schools, removed pro-profit education, refused to build new hospitals through public-private partnerships, and would not allow private firms to manage additional amounts from savings.

Few of it was popular, but many of it actually failed. High-class families who had had trouble sending children to private schools [approximately 60% of all students attending these institutions] had not welcomed what they viewed as an undesirable mix of government. Patients faced long waiting lists for treatment because of hospitals that had not been built.

Citizens were certainly upset by the conflicting, costly behavior of private companies. But they wanted to fix the system, not reject it and replace it with something else. They wanted evolution, not revolution.

The Bachelet government slowed down the economy. In Latin American middle - class societies, well - paying jobs are of great importance. And the leftist in the region, like the Laborist party in the United Kingdom in the 80s, doesn't seem able to offer anything for them.

Piñera had the promise of rapid economic growth. Many business deals were put on hold by election time, so investments will begin in 2018. But the growth of Chile's production has been neglected for nearly two decades, as has export diversification. What Piñera will do in this direction is unclear.

For a country that is far more educated than a generation ago, voters will expect a minimum level of responsibility from their leaders. Piñera is a mediocre speaker [his victory statement was so silly that even his wife and children could be seen talking while he was talking], but the degree for economics at Harvard tells more about him. On the contrary, Alejandro Guillellier, his opponent in the second round, indicated that he understood very little even in the most basic political issues.

Piñera was the only 36% election of voters in the first round. But in the run-off, many voters saw it as the slightest evil and enabled them to win the battle convincingly. He may not have much at the congress, and students and trade unions will likely turn to the streets to protest once he takes office in March. He hopes to be like Macri, who has remained popular. But he may end up with Michel Themer, who replaced Rousseph and Kuczynski, both of whom lost their support just a few months after taking office.

Soon we will know which of the two will happen.

== sync, corrected by elderman == Periscope