Sovereignty That Really Matters

In the famous <x0) political core of the world economy,” Harvard economist Dani Rodrik claims integration of the global economy, nationals, and democracy cannot co-exist. The least that can be done is combine two of them, but leave the middle the third.

Until recently, Washington's so-called Consensus, with emphasis on liberalisation, market disorder and privatisation, shaped world economic policy. While the 2008 global financial crisis was destroying its credibility, the G20 states soon agreed to avoid protectionist policies against which the consensus among them stood.

In the meantime, the European Union remains (and remains) the only democratic experiment at a supernational level, which boasts of moving forward, despite the fact that many shortcomings have weighed it down. In other words, economic integration, embedded in the nations that make up the EU, remained as it was, until democracy became secondary to international developments in the economic market.

But the year 2016 was a turning point, although we still do not know what happened. “ (Pekins) has arrived, which some see as an alternative development model based on a greater government intervention. But it was Brexit's vote (Britain's medal from the EU) and Donald Trump's election as president of the United States that seriously influenced the movement for a well-placed balloon between globalisation, nation-states, and democracy.

<x) Similarly, many of Trump's voters were convinced that Wall Street's collected power, the transnational acters there, and other states had to be contained in order for “America to become great again. ”

It would not be good to ignore this diagnosis, which Rodrick himself takes into account (at least part of it), only because one does not like what would lead to Trump and some of the conservative followers who voted on Brexet. Their effort consists of preventing globalisation until at the same time they want to preserve or even advance other aspects of Washington Consensus, such as financial collapse and strengthening democracy through states.

In his first appearance before the United Nations General Assembly, Trump gave a 42 - minute speech in which he used words like “sovrine” or “sovine” 21 times an average of every two minutes. And in Europe, the United Kingdom is not the only place that will be pulled out of the Neo-Westphoalian community: Poland and Hungary are also on the same road. Also, the Catalan pro-independence movement, led by several different parties, most of which would not feel comfortable if they were called <x4-globalizing “ ”, follows a similar logic that slips into nationalism.

All these forces overestimate their capacity to weaken or avoid existing economic integration, which has been strengthened in recent decades. If these movements do not change, then they are designed to weaken the power of the nations they belong to (or in the countries trying to create) in the process of globalisation. In brief, an increase in formal sovereignty can paradoxically result in the practical loss of sovereignty, which is something that really matters.

Take Britain for example: if Be still exists, the British have nothing to say about what their most important export market should be. As for Catalonia, the pro-independence and pro-sovranity movement, it can produce a policy that is far less sovereign and at the mercy of international events.

Just a week after Trump's speech in the United Nations, French President Emmanuel Macron displayed his vision of Europe's future in an address to Sorbonne. Macron also mentioned the word "sovrinity" repeatedly, making it clear that it formed the basis of his vision of Europe. But, unlike populists, it promoted an incompatible and effective sovereignty, Europe in view and supported by two key pillars: unity and democracy.

Relations between states are guided by cooperation, competition, and confrontation. There is little doubt that a degree of confrontation will always be present on the international level. But the European Union has clearly demonstrated that incidents can be reduced by increasing the cost of conflict dynamics' possibilities exponentially. Unfortunately, movements that understand sovereignty through insultistic concepts usually become extreme nationalists, which do not promote common spaces that enable the prosperity of international society.

The preference of some countries to isolate themselves within borders is anachronic and self - destructive, but it would be a big mistake for others to react by avoiding cooperation with these countries. The spirit of cooperation, along with the constructive competition, must structure relations among all acts of international legitimacy. Even in countries that have been subjected to reduced dyss ' courses, most people support anything. Such is the case with 48% of British voters who opposed Brexit, and that of 49% of Turks who told “Jo” the expansion of power for their president, underagligible by rejecting the gear the EU uses as a bad thing. Most of these voters would be disappointed if the EU turned its back on them.

The nationality of international society depends on dialogue. And to avoid repeating the shortcomings of Washington Consensus, which were so clearly discovered in 2016, this dialogue must occur within the structure of the common democratic public sphere. If we cultivate this common public sphere, reducing the pre-environment of states, we will step by step advance towards a less explore side of the triad described by Rodrick: global democracy.

Of course, a universal democracy would be a very difficult goal to achieve (as Rodrick himself stands). But with technological developments and the increases of economic and cultural synapses, this is not a sample. In that sense, the EU has launched a new route, one aimed at expanding democracy beyond the scope of the nations. For Europe, as for other countries, this is a worthy course.

Javier Solana was the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary General of Nato, and Spanish Foreign Minister.