Our Best Hope Against Nuclear War

The 25th amendment envisions that the deputy chairman and majority of cabinet officials can inform Congress that the president is unable to “have the competencies and tasks of his office”

Think of what's at the moment just a completely hypothetical question: What can Defence Secretary Jim Mattis do if he gets an order from President Trump to launch a nuclear attack on North Korea for revenge, for example, for a poor hydrogen bomb test?

Of course, Mattis may try to persuade the president to cancel the attack if he thinks the move is reckless. He could take time to prepare for unforeseen occasions or to collect information. He may even argue that this action has legal consequences because it can cause nonprofessional civilian victims in northern and southern Korea and thus violate the laws of war.

In the end, however, legal experts argue that Mattis would have to follow his commander's orders at the helm. That's how our system works. If Mattiss' efforts to convince the president failed, he could resign. But if he remained in office and refused a legal order, he could be dismissed.
“The president's view, and whatever orders come from that point of view, put the fate of things,” wrote Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard University professor and a respected authority on national security law, in a recent post on Lawcha's blog. (Hard law student Sarah Grant, co-signed the post).

But look closer if you worry that Trump's impulsive decisions can lead the state ship to the rocks. Research reveals some interesting cases when another disorderly president, Richard Nixon, was controlled by his subordinates.
Let us begin with a little - known confrontation involving, again, North Korea. On April 14, 1969, North Korean warriors rejected an EC121 Navy discovery plane over international waters, killing all 31 crew members. Nixon wanted revenge militarily, as did his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. But Defence Secretary Melvin Laird was cautious, fearing that the United States was not ready for the consequences.

So Laird slowed down the process. He delayed the action. He conducted studies. It halted additional monitoring flights needed to collect information before an attack. Citing a study of Pentagon logistics, he told Nixon he suspected “if we now have the ability to handle a major confrontation in Korea”.
And Laird prevailed. Nixon's revenge attack never happened. Reading memories of Richard Hunt, published by the Secretary of Defense's Historical Office, it seems that Laird realized a classic case of bureaucratic barriers.

Nixon could make harsh and unclear statements, like Trump. In August 1969, terrorists caught a TWA flight and flew on a plane to Damascus, Syria. According to Evan Thomas of “Being Nixon”, the president received the news while he was drinking cocktails in San Clemente, California.

“Bundardon Airport”, ordered Nixon. This time, Kissinger was careful. Thomas quoted him as setting “as giving the president the chance to have second thoughts”. Kissinger slowed the movement of aircraft carriers to the eastern Mediterranean. Laird was also careful. He planned to use <x4) weather delay” to stop carriers even more.

The next morning, as they were informed of the transport movement, Nixon asked Kissinger if something else had happened “. Kissinger said: “Kissinger later wrote that “never heard a word about the shelling of Damascus”.

A recent example of venturing the desire for presidential revenge comes from Jeffrey H. Smith, a former CIA general adviser who during the Nixon era was a new army lawyer. Smith recalled in a recent post for “Security” that in 1974, a few days before Nixon's resignation, he was shown a message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to the subordinate commanders, advising that if they had received any White House orders “to use force”, they should first confirm it with the chairman or secretary of defence.

Thomas explains in his book: “concerned that the president might do something desperate, Defence Secretary James Schlestinger passed the word that all orders from the White House to troops must go through it.” Schlesinger later claimed he just wanted to reinforce the chain of command. This episode was also investigated by Politico's Garrett Guff.

What could our imaginary Mattis do if he tried similar methods of prevention, but the president still wanted to release what Mattis and his commanders considered a reckless attack?

Well, there's a cure for this in our Constitution. The 25th amendment envisions that the deputy chairman and most cabinet officials can inform Congress that the president is unable to “have the competencies and tasks of his office”. The vice president would take over the post, unless more than a third of the House of Representatives and Senate support the president.

But remember, that's all hypothetical. As the stories of Nixon relate, even the most intense presidents usually end up listening to Pentagon advice.

/ The Washington Post ) Read.al